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This thesis comprises four published papers (the Papers) - three on accounting-based loan
covenants and one on the going concern qualification (GCQ) - plus a linking essay. The essay
focuses on the Papers' common subject matter of corporate control and on their common research
methodology, positive accounting theory.
The essay shows how the agency literature is closely bound up with problems of corporate control.
It goes on to argue that certain features of positive accounting theory - its recognition of conflict
and of institutional influences, and its focus on economic incentives - render it a particularly useful
framework for research into loan covenants and the GCQ.
The loan covenant papers address both the structuring of loan agreements ('ex ante' issues) and the
subsequent functioning of such agreements, in particular breaches of covenant ('ex post' issues).
Their chief contribution to the 'ex ante' literature is the first evidence they provide on the extent and
incidence of covenants in the UK; their UK/US comparison, drawing on institutional differences to
explain why accounting-based covenants in the UK, unlike the US, have a positive association with
term but no association with gearing; and their analysis of the incidence of accounting-based
covenants in convertible and secured debt agreements. The Papers' findings on 'ex post' matters
contain early evidence on the costliness of covenant breaches, on the effectiveness of managerial
opportunism in avoiding covenant violations and on the costliness of mandatory accounting
changes.
In the context of loan covenants the essay also provides a methodological critique of positive
accounting theory, which it sees as a developing research programme. This is reflected both in the
ambiguous relation between accounting-based covenants and the investment opportunity set (which
is resolved in this research for a UK setting), and in the 'ad hoc' nature of many arguments put
forward by the theory's proponents to explain existing practice. Finally, the essay argues that the
positive accounting theory and the decision-usefulness views of accounting have more in common
than is sometimes supposed.
The going concern paper addresses important issues of independence and disclosure. The essay
discusses several possible explanations for the low GCQ rate among failed companies, adducing
evidence from more recent research. The GCQ paper itself shows that, although the self-fulfilling
prophecy argument and differential audit firm size do not appear to prejudice independence, auditor
switching may pose such a threat.
The essay concludes by pointing at directions for future research, in particular in areas with public
policy implications, and by suggesting that greater use of a case study methodology could deepen
our understanding of these issues.
5
POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY AND
THE STUDY OF CORPORATE CONTROL:
AN OVERVIEW ESSAY OF RESEARCH INTO LOAN COVENANTS
AND THE GOING CONCERN QUALIFICATION
1. OBJECTIVES OF THE ESSAY AND SUMMARY OF ORIGINAL
CONTRIBUTIONS OF 1HE SUBMITTED PAPERS
1.1	 Objectives of the essay
This essay has three main aims:
i)	 To explore the links between the attached published papers (the Papers). This is done
on two levels:
Showing their common subject matter, in that they all examine mechanisms of
corporate monitoring and control.
Evaluating their common research methodology, the positive accounting
theory framework.
To highlight the original contributions of the Papers. For ease of reference, these are
summarised in section 1.2 below.
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To relate the Papers to research published either contemporaneously or subsequently.
It is not the objective of the essay to summarise earlier literature relating to the topics
examined in the Papers, as this is done in the Papers themselves.
1.2	 The original contributions of the Papers
1.2.1 The loan covenant papers
These Papers constitute the first research:
i)	 To provide evidence on the extent and incidence of use of accounting-based covenants
in the UK (see section 4.2.1 (i)).
That (a) explores international differences in the structure of public debt agreements as
between the UK and the US, and (b) that draws on institutional factors to explain these
differences (see section 4.2.2(a)).
iii) To examine the relation between accounting-based covenants and convertibility and
security, two key dimensions used in the structuring of debt agreements (see section
4.2.2(b)).
7
iv) To provide evidence on the costliness of covenant breaches and the nature of contract
renegotiations following on a breach, and to relate these to the cause of the breach (see
section 4.3.2(a) and (b)).
v) To explicitly investigate whether the costs of covenant breaches can indeed be avoided
by income-increasing accounting policy changes (see section 4.3.2(c)).
vi) To investigate whether lenders themselves would expect to impose costs on borrowers
put in breach of accounting-based covenants by new accounting standards (see section
4.3.2(a)).
1.2.2 The going concern qualification (GC0) paper.
The original contributions of this Paper are:
i)	 The evidence it provides on the high degree of likelihood of failure required before a
GCQ is given (see section 5.2(a)).
The first research to investigate the threat to auditor 'independence posed by the self-
fulfilling prophecy argument (see section 5.2(b)).
iii)	 Its original approach to examining auditor switching by looking at matched groups of
GCQ and non-GCQ companies (see section 5.2(c)).
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iv)	 The first UK evidence it provides on the association between GCQs and audit firm size
(see section 5.2(d)).
The rest of this essay is organised as follows. The next section shows the relevance of the four
Papers to issues of corporate monitoring and control set in the wider context of the corporate
governance debate and Section 3 examines the positive accounting theory framework that has
been adopted. Section 4 . looks in more detail at the three loan covenant Papers, focusing on
their contribution to the literature and on methodological issues. In Section 5 the same is done
for the going concern qualification Paper. The final section looks at directions for future
research.
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2. CORPORATE CONTROL AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
2.1	 The importance of a system of corporate governance
Tricker (1984) makes a clear distinction between management and governance. While the
former is concerned with running the business the latter entails 'overseeing and controlling the
executive actions of management and satisfying legitimate expectations for accountability and
regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundaries' (pp. 6-7).
In the classical joint-stock company the governance process was made effective through a
system of checks and balances. The owners or shareholders of the company had the tight to
nominate and appoint the directors. These in turn would report periodically to the shareholders
on their stewardship of the shareholders' finds. In addition the shareholders had the right to
appoint independent auditors to report on whether the directors' accounts showed a true and
fair view.
Tricker argues that this original simple model of the joint-stock company has now changed in a
number of significant ways (1984, pp. 14-15):
i)	 Shareholders are often widely dispersed and may not all have the same interests as one
another.
ii)	 As a result the power of the board of directors is often very significant.
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Furthermore, shareholders are no longer viewed as the only party to whom
management should be accountable. Rather they are one of a number of stakeholder
interest groups which also include other providers of finance such as lenders, suppliers,
customers, and employees.
iv) The increased power of the board of directors has led some to question the
independence of the auditors from management.
v) Auditors may have a wider responsibility towards all those who might rely on
published accounts rather than only towards the shareholders. Recently the audit
profession itself has shown formal awareness of such a responsibility in the Auditing
Practices Board's paper The Audit Agenda (1994b). The paper supports the view that
auditors should report to and give assurance to stakeholders apart from the
shareholders. Also it recognises that while all stakeholders have a common interest in
the survival of the entity, conflicts of interest between stakeholders may arise.
Some of these problems, in particular those that address corporate control mechanisms, are
fundamental to the Papers reviewed in this essay. Thus the Loan Covenants papers highlight
the controls that one important stakeholder, the lender, exerts over corporate behaviour. They
focus on potential conflicts between lenders and shareholders, and abstract from
shareholder/management conflict. The Going Concern paper investigates the value of the audit
report and tackles the problem of auditor independence in a situation when the survival of the
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firm is in doubt. It therefore addresses issues of conflict between the auditor and management
in a situation where the interests of management and shareholders may well coincide (see
Goldman and Barley, 1974, who also characterise the threat to auditor independence as a 'self.
interest vs professional standards conflict).
2.2	 Corporate control issues addressed in the Papers
Loan covenants and the audit going concern qualification enable outside parties to monitor
corporate behaviour, as explained below.
Covenants play a key role in the relationship between company management (representing
shareholders) and one of the wider group of stakeholders identified above - the provider of
debt finance. Covenants are undertakings given by a borrower as part of a term loan
agreement and they serve a number of functions. These can be seen as addressing both the
adverse selection and the moral hazard problems that arise in lender/borrower relations, and
can be summarised as follows:
i) To serve as a screening device to help lenders identify the credit-worthiness of
borrowers (the adverse selection problem). It is likely that the typical package of
covenants offered by any particular lender is known to potential borrowers and this
will predetermine the credit-worthiness of the borrowers who are prepared to request
a loan from that source. Thus a bank which is known for requiring a comprehensive
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package of tight covenants will attract applications only from relatively credit-worthy
borrowers.1
Once the loan has been granted, covenants act as control devices to prevent the
borrower acting against the lender's best interests in ways not intended when the loan
was originally made (the moral hamd problem). Covenants achieve this by:
a) Controlling gearing levels, so helping prevent financial distress;
b) Providing the lender with an early warning mechanism if financial problems do
develop, and requiring the borrower to discuss - the resolution of these
problems together with the lender;
c) Limiting the likelihood that a borrower in distress will act contrary to the
lender's interests, for example by paying out excessive dividends or embarking
on highly risky projects (see more detail on this in section 3.2 below);
d) If necessary, triggering default on a loan.
Covenants can be accounting-based which means that they require the company to adhere to
certain financial performance measures, e.g. its ratio of debt to capital and reserves should not
1 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who discuss the screening role
of interest rates and security in the context of capital
rationing; also Strong and Walker (1987, Ch.7).
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exceed a certain percentage. Other covenants are not accounting-based but impose a more
direct form of control such as restricting acquisition activity or the granting of prior security on
new debt. Finally covenants can specify bonding activities by the firm (Smith and Warner,
1979), such as those which require the submission of audited accounts by a certain date.
Covenants are clearly a means by which term lenders can exert some form of control over
borrowers. Furthermore they give rise to a demand for audited financial statements so that
compliance with accounting-based covenants can be reliably monitored.
Turning to the going concern qualification, it is a requirement of the Companies Act 1985,
paragraph 10 to Schedule 4, (based on the earlier formulation of the concept in SSAP2
Disclosure of Accounting Policies which came into effect in 1972) that accounts should
normally be drawn up on the presumption that a company is a going concern. This
presumption may be disregarded, however, if the resulting financial statements would not
provide a true and fair view (see Auditing Practices Board, 1994a, Appendix 1). In this
context, the auditors are required to consider the entity's ability to continue as a going concern
and the adequacy of related disclosures and, if necessary, may have to qu their audit
report in this respect. The going concern principle is, therefore, an integral component of the
audited accounts that are made available to shareholders and creditors.
2 SAS600 Auditors' Reports on Financial Statements replaces the
'subject to' qualification with a Fundamental Uncertainty
modification paragraph, provided disclosures of going concern
uncertainties are adequate. SAS600 is effective for accounting
periods ending on or after 30 September 1993. Since Citron and
Taffler (1992) covers a period well before SAS600 came into
effect, this essay refers to the going concern qualification.
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The central role of both covenants and audited accounts in the wider UK corporate
governance process is highlighted by Whittington's (1993) schematic presentation of this
system which is reproduced in Figure 1. Not only that, but these topics also have a bearing on
the recent debate surrounding the effectiveness of the corporate governance system (see
Keasey and Wright, 1993, and the other papers in Accounting and Business Research, Vol.23,
No.91A for a comprehensive treatment of these issues).
FIGURE 1 HERE
In particular, a number of recent prominent but surprising business failures has prompted
questions about the role of the auditor in signalling corporate failure to account users
(Whittington, 1993, p.312) and the effectiveness of covenants as timely signals of distress for
lenders. In addition, one of the main contributory factors to the audit expectations gap appears
to be differing perceptions regarding the auditor's role in evaluating and making disclosures
about the future viability of the audited company (see Humphrey et al., 1993, Table 3b; Porter,
1993). This itself is probably a reflection of wider concerns about the degree of auditor
independence (Humphrey *et al., 1993). Furthermore the effectiveness of accounting-based
covenants as monitors of company performance will diminish to the extent that excessive
latitude is permitted in corporate financial reporting practice. This in turn depends on two
factors - firstly the effectiveness of the regulatory framework for financial reporting and,
secondly, the extent to which the individual auditors ensure a consistent and not too liberal an
interpretation of generally accepted accounting principles.
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Source: Whittington (1993, p.312).
3. POSTIIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY
3.1	 The positive accounting theory framework
Positive accounting theory is based on the well-established distinction between positive and
normative propositions. While normative propositions are prescriptive, positive
propositions are concerned with how the world works.
More specifically, the positive accounting theory school of research seeks 'to explain and
predict accounting practice' (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p.2). According to Watts and
Zimmerman such theories are important because many parties want to know how
alternative accounting or auditing procedures will affect their welfare.
In the context of loan covenants, for example, the following positive propositions are of
interest:
How costly is it for a firm to breach its loan covenants? Do lenders impose costs
when an accounting-based covenant is breached solely because of the introduction
of a new accounting standard? Are loan contracts drawn up in such a way that a
firm could avoid breach of covenant simply by adopting a different method of
accounting?
Research into these issues could be of relevance to normative questions such as:
Should corporate management lobby against the introduction of a new accounting
standard? How should lending bankers define accounting-based covenants in their
lending agreements?
3.2	 Positive accounting theory and corporate control mechanisms in the context of corporate
governance systems
The fundamental axiom that drives positive accounting theory-based research is that the
parties act as rational economic agents (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, p.79). This
approach has been most clearly formulated by Watts and Zimmerman: The economic
-
approach we and many others use applies a simple proposition: To predict and explain
individual behaviour, people (including accountants, regulators and researchers) consider
the private costs and benefits (broadly defined) of an action and choose the action if the
benefits exceed the costs' (1990, p.147).
Some of the early literature that adopts this approach seeks to explain the emergence of
corporate governance structures in rational economic terms. Thus Jensen and Meckling's
(1976) development of the theory of agency costs in effect addresses major corporate
control issues which are themselves an integral part of what we now call the system of
corporate governance. Jensen and Meclding define an agency relationship as 'a contract
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making
authority to the agent' (p.25). The central problem is that the agent (the corporate
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manager), acting in his own best interests, will not always act in the principal's
(shareholder's) best interests. The principal will therefore be motivated to incur monitoring
costs, such as auditing, to control the agent's behaviour.
This agency cost framework also applies to the relationship between management (acting
on behalf of the shareholders) and lenders. In fact Jensen and Meckling define 'agency costs'
in the broadest possible terms as arising 'in any situation involving co-operative effort ... by
two or more people even though there is no clear-cut principal-agency relationship' (p.86).
They argue that when firms raise debt finance, management will have incentives to adopt
policies that will transfer wealth from the lenders to the shareholders. These policies are
classified by Smith and Warner (1979) under the following headings:
(a)	 Dividend payment: management pays shareholders a higher rate of dividend than
was anticipated at the time the debt was raised.
(b) Claim dilution: management issues new debt with the same or even higher priority.
(c) Asset substitution: management engages in riskier investment projects than were
anticipated at the time of the original loan.
(d) Underinvestment: management rejects positive net present value projects if they
expect that the return will accrue solely to the lenders.
19
The fact that management may be motivated to act against the interests of lenders in this
way gives rise to the need for lenders to monitor management actions.3
Jensen and Meckling's agency cost framework does not merely restate the corporate
governance problem from a different perspective but also provides some new insights:
(a) They argue that one way of more closely aligning the interests of principal and
agent is via the- use of incentive contracts. This provides financial reporting with a
wider role as being not limited to ex post reporting but also contributing to the
design of incentives. In the context of the agency costs of debt, for example, lenders
will be concerned that shareholders may be paid higher dividends than were
anticipated at the time the loan was made. An accounting-based covenant that
requires dividends to be some positive function of accounting earnings would
mitigate this problem. Thus Healy and Palepu (1990) show that when firms are
close to breaching such dividend covenants they typically respond by cutting their
dividends rather than, for example, by using new accounting methods to increase
3 These arguments are based on the view that it may pay
shareholders to maximise their own wealth at the expense of that
of debtholders even if the result reduces the value of the firm
as a whole (i.e. the value of equity plus debt). In this view,
contracts can increase total firm value. Fama (1978), however,
argues that such behaviour is inconsistent with stable
equilibrium. In his view, under appropriate assumptions, the
market pricing mechanism (e.g. via the the pressure of potential
takeovers) ensures that firm maximising behaviour is the only
one consistent with stable equilibrium. Dybvig and Zender (1991)
extend Fama, showing that even in the presence of asymmetric
information firm maximisation policies remain optimal provided
appropriate management incentive schemes are in place.
20
reported earnings. In this instance accounting numbers are being used to control
dividend policy rather than merely report after the event.
(b) Jensen and Meclding also show that it is not only the principal who has an interest
in controlling and monitoring the agent's behaviour. The agent himself will
sometimes deem it worthwhile both to guarantee to the principal that he will not act
against the principal's interests and to incur 'bonding costs' by offering to be
monitored in this respect. This is because, if the agent does not act in this way, the
principal can in any case protect himself in advance via the pricing mechanism.
Thus, in the case of debt, the lender could require a higher interest rate to
compensate for possible wealth transfers from the lender to shareholders. It may
therefore pay the shareholders to covenant in advance not to engage in such
activities and so obtain cheaper debt finance. In the case of owner/management
conflicts, the owner could price-protect himself in advance against self-serving
behaviour on the part of management by paying the manager a lower wage. A
manager could avoid this however, by being prepared to undergo periodical audit.
3.3	 Positive accounting theory and research into loan covenants and the audit going concern
qualification
The purpose of this section is to discuss two related features of the positive accounting
theory approach that makes it particularly appropriate for research into the topics examined
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in the papers - its focus on conflict between interacting parties and its reliance on the
parties' economic incentives in its method of analysis.
3.3.1 The focus on conflict between interacting partils
Both loan covenants and going concern qualifications become especially relevant issues at
times of conflict between the parties concerned.
Loan covenants aim to control the extent to which shareholders can appropriate wealth at
the expense of lenders (see section 3.2 above). Regarding the going concern qualification,
the possibility that an auditor may make such a qualification is likely to cause conflicts
between that auditor and the firm's management if management believe that the
qualification may damage the creditworthiness of the firm.
Research in these areas therefore benefits from a methodology which unambiguously
recognises such conflict.
Jensen and Meclding (1976, p.88) raise this matter explicitly when they say: The firm is
not an individual. It is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in
which the conflicting objectives of individuals (some of whom may 'represent' other
organisations) are brought into equilibrium within a framework of contractual relations.'
This perspective is particularly relevant to loan covenants research as such covenants are
often important components of lending contracts.
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It should be recognised, however, that positive accounting theorists have been criticised
for ignoring the reality of the firm as a distinct entity. Chambers, in particular, prefers to
view the firm as an entity in its own right (1993, p.14). This view certainly accords with the
legal reality, in the case of corporations at any rate, that managers are the agents of the firm,
not of the shareholders, and that the firm itself is a party to contracts.
One way of resolving this issue is by Jensen's pragmatic argument (borrowed from Simon)
that 'the elementary unit of analysis in science is not a matter of 'right' or 'wrong' but rather
one of usefulness. Whether one chooses the 'black box' or 'nexus of contracts' definition of
an organisation depends on the question at hand' (1983, p328).
The 'nexus of contracts' perspective has certainly directed our attention to the importance
of accounting numbers in a wide range of commercial contracts. Furthermore, because of
this focus on contracts, it has encouraged research to take a closer look at the legal and
institutional settings within which accounting numbers are used (see discussion of Citron
(1995) in section 4.2.1(a) below for an example of this).
3.3.2 The focus on the parties' economic incentives
In their extensive review of positive accounting theory, Boland and Gordon (1992) argue
that critiques of its economics-based orientation are the most telling. They state: 'The Watts
and Zimmerman methodology is entirely invested in limiting accounting research to only
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questions for which neoclassical economics can be applied (p.162). Citing Demslci (1988),
Boland and Gordon emphasise that positive accounting theory therefore relies on the
underlying assumptions of neoclassical economics, including the existence of perfect
markets which enable fully informed personal utility maximisers to correctly calculate all
costs and benefits.
Not only that, but by assuming that everyone is a personal utility mwdmiser, motivations
that entail a concern with social consequences are effectively ignored. Neu (1992) provides
an extensive critique of positive accounting theory from this perspective. He constructs a
statistically significant model of the voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts incorporating
variables that aim to measure the impact of social variables. However, in some cases the
same results could be obtained using economic motivation as the explanatory variable. Thus
Neu expects an industry norm of no forecasts among firms. in the resource sector because
such firms lack a track record and because exploration is inherently difficult to forecast,
making it unlikely that investors would trust any such forecasts. A positive accounting
theorist would no doubt concur with this expectation, arguing that the costs of producing a
reliable forecast for a resource firm would be so high that it would outweigh the benefits.
From a pragmatic point of view Boland and Gordon agree that 'it is easier to build models
that assume personal utility maximisation than to build models in which the individuals have
a concern for the social consequences of their actions' (1992, p.163). The 'rational
economic agent' view adopted by positive accounting theory is particularly helpful when
researching areas that may otherwise seem intractable, in this case the issue of auditor
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independence. As argued above, financial reports play an important motivating and
monitoring role in controlling conflict both between managers and shareholders and
between the firm and those lending to it. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.115-116) show
that, rather than the shareholders and lenders attempting to produce their own financial
reports, it will be cost-effective for management (the party being monitored) to produce
them and have them independently audited.
This audit will be of value, however, only if the auditors can be relied upon to report any
breaches of contract that may have occurred, and it is this condition that highlights the
importance of auditor independence. As put by Watts and Zimmerman: 'The probability
that the auditors will report a discovered breach is effectively the auditing profession's
definition of independence' (1983, p.615).
Independence, however, is not easily susceptible to analysis. As Moizer (1991) points out,
independence could be analysed from an ethical viewpoint as well as from the above-
mentioned economic interest viewpoint. According to Moizer, two alternative approaches
could be taken by the 'ethical' auditor. As a consequentialist, he could weigh up the likely
consequences of providing a truthful opinion and may, in all honesty, deem non-disclosure
the preferred route. Alternatively, adopting a deontological approach, he would opt for
complete and honest disclosure under all circumstances.
In this connection, The Guide to Professional Ethics (ICAEW, 1992) states that 'A
member's objectivity must be beyond question if he or she is to report as an auditor. That
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objectivity can only be assured if the member is, and is seen to be, independent' (Section A,
para. 1.0). Regarding objectivity the Guide also states, as one of its Fundamental Principles,
that: 'Objectivity is the state of mind which has regard to all considerations relevant to the
task in hand but no other (my emphases). By requiring the auditor to exclude all
extraneous considerations, the ICAEW is adopting the deontological approach described
above. It is not clear, however, whether this adequately describes the way in which auditors
actually behave. In addition, from a research perspective, it would appear difficult to
investigate the concept of independence if its end-product, objectivity, is a state of mind.
Gwilliam (1987) points out that, as a result of this problem, research into auditor
independence has followed one of two paths. What he calls the 'pragmatic' approach has
focused on investigating interested parties' perceptions of auditor independence, while the
'theoretical' approach 'has attempted to explain what aspects of an auditor's work make him
more or less likely to be independent, and has viewed auditor behaviour in terms of conflict
between the auditor and company management.' (Gwilliarn, 1987, p.91).
This latter approach is typified in Watts and Zimmerman's (1983) historical analysis of the
emergence of the independent audit. They cite mechanisms such as the fear of loss of
reputation and the performance of audits by committees rather than by individuals as
promoting auditor independence as early as in the Middle Ages.
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Bearing in mind Boland and Gordon's underlying reservations cited above, the going
concern paper included here has also adopted Gwilliam's 'theoretical' approach as a fruitful
way of exploring auditor independence.
3.4	 The methodology of positive accounting theory
Consistent with its assumption of rational economic behaviour, the bulk of positive
accounting theory research to date explores hypotheses of the sort that are amenable to
statistical tests using reasonably large numbers of observations. Indeed Watts (1994) cites
the increased availability of computers and machine-readable databases as important factors
contributing to the growth of positive accounting research. The Papers included in the
appendices, in particular those on loan covenants, were motivated by the dearth of positive
accounting research in the UK and the desire to apply and extend the methodology of US
research in a UK context. They have therefore adopted the hypothesis-testing approach in
the main, analysing formal outcomes such as the presence of and definitions of accounting-
based covenants and the qualification status of audit reports (although the questionnaire-
based paper (Citron, 1992a) is able to explore lenders' perceptions).
However the 'nexus of contracts' view draws our attention to the fact that contracts are part
of a wider relationship which will comprise informal as well as formal undertakings and
expectations. Therefore, to gain an understanding of the more commonly researched formal
outcomes (e.g. contractual conditions; audit report qualifications) the researcher should
also explore the lender/borrower or auditor/client relationship in its wider context.
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Questions that reflect this wider perspective include: What factors determine the package of
covenants that emerge from lender/borrower negotiations? How does the particular
package of covenants affect the on-going lender/borrower relationship? How do lenders
become aware of possible financial distress and how is it resolved? Why do some
companies in clear financial distress not receive qualified audit reports? How does belief in
the self-fulfilling prophecy influence qualification decisions?
Statistical hypothesis testing is unlikely to be an appropriate methodology for studying
questions such as these. An exploratory case study approach is likely to be a more fruitful
way of gaining an understanding of the processes involved and of generating new
hypotheses for subsequent testing. Moreover, some issues could benefit from drawing on
specific frameworks that have been developed in other contexts. Mumighan and
Bazerman's (1990) application of the negotiation strategy and bargaining power literature
to accounting, for example, employs models not reliant on purely rational modes of
behaviour.
There is no need to view research methodologies such as these as antithetical to positive
accounting research. Indeed Watts (1994) calls for case study work to provide new links
between theory and empirical testing. A shift towards case studies would, however, mark a
departure from the methodology typically adopted in positive accounting research hitherto.
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4. LOAN COVENANTS
4.1 Efficient contracting and managerial opportunism
It has been shown above (sections 3.2 and 3.3.1) that one of the functions of loan
covenants is to control borrower/lender conflict. Since these covenants are often
accounting-based, this has opened up areas of research for those interested in accounting
policy choice issues.
The covenants in a lending contract will be drawn up with a view to controlling the
managerial actions set out in section 3.2 above. However it will be both undesirable and
impossible for them to be defined so tightly that all managerial discretion is entirely
removed (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, p.135). It will be undesirable because excessively
tight restrictions on investment behaviour, for example, may result in the foregoing of
genuinely profitable opportunities. These lost profits could outweigh the benefits derived
from controlling the underinvestment and asset substitution problems (see Laber, 1992, for
a case study illustrating this point). And regarding accounting-based covenants, it may in
fact be impossible to define accounting items such as 'profit' and 'debt' so precisely as to
prevent management using their discretion over accounting policy choice to avoid breach of
covenant.
These considerations of the costs and benefits of contractual restrictions give rise to two
related perspectives on contracting theory:
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(a)	 The 'efficient contracting' or ex ante perspective (see for example Watts and
Zimmerman, 1990, p.136 and Holthausen, 1990, p.207). According to this view,
the terms of contracts, including the permitted accounting methods, are determined
with a view to minimising agency costs and so maximising the value of the firm.
Efficient contracting addresses such issues as: Which types of loan contracts are
likely to include covenants and what type of covenants? (see, for example, Malitz,
1986; El-Gazzar and Pastena, 1990; Begley, 1993). What accounting definitions
are likely to be used in accounting-based covenants? (see Leftwich, 1983; Whittred
and Zimmer, 1986). And, taking a broader perspective, what explains changes in
generally accepted accounting principles over time or the cross-sectional variation
in accounting policies as between different industry sectors? (see Zimmer, 1986;
Whittred, 1987; Mian and Smith, 1989).
(b)
	
The 'opportunistic behaviour' or ex post perspective, i.e. given that the covenants in
place allow some managerial discretion, management may adopt policies that will
distribute wealth in their favour at the expense of lenders or shareholders. It should
be pointed out that the agency literature distinguishes between expected and
unexpected managerial opportunism (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, p.136; and
Christie and Zimmerman, 1994, p.541, for the most extensive exposition of this
distinction). Expected opportunism arises because perfect monitoring is inefficient,
i.e. water-tight monitoring of all managerial behaviour is not cost-effective.
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However, once some managerial discretion is permitted, 'inefficient' opportunism is
likely to arise, resulting in the above-mentioned wealth transfers to management
from other parties.
Researchers adopting this perspective in the loan contracting area have largely
focused on the question as to whether managerial choice of accounting policies can
be explained in terms of avoiding violation of accounting-based covenants (much of
this literature is summarised in Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, chapters 9 and 11).
The loan covenant papers included here examine both efficient contracting and managerial
opportunism issues, as will be shown in the following sections.
4.2 Efficient contracting issues addressed in the loan covenant papers
Citron (1992b) and Citron (1995) are entirely devoted to efficient contracting issues, while
there is also some reference to them in Citron (1992a). This section looks firstly at the
contributions these papers make to the literature (sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2) and then at
problematical methodological issues that they raise (section 4.2.3).
4.2.1 Suninialy of contribution to the literature
The papers examine firstly the characteristics of borrowing firms and of loans that are
associated with the use of accounting-based covenants in both private (Citron 1992a) and
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public debt contracts (Citron, 1995); and secondly, given the presence of such covenants,
how the accounting items are defined (Citron 1992b). They use a variety of research
methods - survey questionnaire; text analysis of lending agreements; and statistical
modelling.
The original contributions of these papers to the literature are:
i)	 They constitute the first published research to provide evidence on the extent and
incidence of use of accounting-based covenants in the UK. This is of particular
interest because company disclosure of loan covenant information is virtually non-
existent in the UK. This stands in contrast to the SEC disclosure requirements in
the US (see Press and Weintrop, 1991).
The use of institutional factors to explain international differences in the structure of
public loan agreements as between the UK and the US. Previous work has focused
on individual markets and has not examined the influence of institutional factors
such as insolvency procedures on the structure of debt contracts. Citron (1995)
adduces such factors to explain why, in the UK, accounting-based covenants are
positively associated with term to maturity but have no association with gearing,
findings which stand in contrast with those in the US.
The examination of two key factors, convertibility and security, both widely used in
the structuring of debt agreements but whose association with accounting-based
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covenants was hitherto unresearched. The Papers show accounting-based
covenants to be rare in convertible debt while their relation with security depends
on the nature of that security.
Some of these points are now discussed in greater detail below.
4.2.2 Discussion of main findings
(a)	 The role of institutional factors in explaining differences in the structure of loan
agreements between the UK and the US - gearing; term to maturity; seniority
Citron's (1992a) survey of UK private bank lending confirms the findings of a large body of
earlier US research (see, for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, p. 139) that highly
geared firms are more likely to provide covenants to their lenders. However Citron's (1995)
analysis of UK public debt contracts finds no such association. This is ascribed to the fact
that the public debt market is a more important source of corporate funds in the US than in
the UK where it is accessed only by relatively few and relatively high quality firms.
Although the gearing of UK firms raising public debt will vary as between firms, it is
unlikely to deviate far from its optimal level for each firm as indicated, say, by the firm's
investment opportunity set (Smith, 1993). There is therefore no gearing-induced demand
for covenants in the UK public debt market, although in the widely used private debt
market the conventional relationship holds (this discussion is returned to in section 4.2.3(a)
below).
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Regarding term to maturity, while the findings of US research are not conclusive, Citron
(1995) finds a strong positive association between term and the presence of accounting-
based covenants in unsecured debt. This is explained in terms of the following institutional
influences - the relative advantage that UK insolvency procedures give to the secured
lender, including their strict adherence to priority rules; the absence of sinking funds in the
UK; and the above-mentioned relatively high quality of firms at the time they access the
public debt market.
Only Begley (1993) examines the association between seniority and accounting-based
covenants, finding few covenants in subordinated debt agreements. This she ascribes to the
financial weakness of the firms concerned, concluding that restrictive covenants would be
too costly for firms requiring the maximum of flexibility merely to survive. Citron (1995)
also finds that subordinated debt rarely includes covenants but, in contrast to Begley's
population, the firms in question are not at risk. He explains the UK result in terms of the
interests ofjunior lenders being aligned with those of shareholders and the ineffectiveness of




Previously unresearched key factors used in the structuring of debt agreements -
convertibility; form of security.
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Citron (1995) cites previous research into the features of debt that are most likely to be
associated with the presence of accounting-based covenants. These studies exclude
convertible and secured debt from their populations. In accordance with the view that the
role of covenants is to reduce conflict between lenders and shareholders (section 3.2
above), Citron finds accounting-based covenants to be rare among convertible debt. This is
because convertibility itself promotes the alignment of lenders' interests with those of
shareholders.
Citron also finds that the effect of security depends on its nature, floating charge security
requires a timely default trigger for the charge to crystallise in the lender's favour, a function
performed by accounting-based covenants. The value of fixed charge security, however,
depends solely on the value of the specific asset in question, so that general accounting-
based covenants are of little value to the lender in these circumstances.
4.2.3 Methodological issues
(a)	 Choosing among competing hypotheses: role of the investment opportunity set
Much of the literature in this area in the 1980s explained accounting method choice in
terms of managerial opportunism. The hypothesis was that, as firms approach their
covenant limits, they will adopt income increasing accounting policies in order to avoid
breaching these covenants (the 'covenant-based hypothesis'). However, researchers testing
this hypothesis did not observe firms' closeness to their covenant limits directly. Instead
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they used the more easily observable measure of the firm's debt/equity ratio as a proxy (the
'debt/equity hypothesis). Their findings confirmed that high gearing ratios are indeed
associated with the adoption of income increasing accounting policies. This hypothesis is
illustrated in Figure 2a.
FIGURE 2 HERE
As early as 1986, however, Watts and Zimmerman (pp. 360-361) proposed an alternative
-
explanation based not on opportunism but on efficient contracting. They suggested that
gearing levels, contract structures and accounting policy choices could be all jointly























Alternative Explanations of the Positive Association Between High Gearing and
Income-Increasing Accounting Policies.
Figure 2a
A Managerial Opportunism Explanation: The Debt/Equity Hypothesis
Figure 2b






The investment opportunity set concept was first utilised by Miller and Modigliani (1961)
when they observed that part of a firm's value derives from opportunities that the firm has
for making additional investments in positive net present value projects over and above
those physical assets currently held. Miler and Modigliani identified such opportunities with
the concept of 'goodwill'.
Myers' (1977), using the idea to examine capital structure, places more emphasis on the
discretionary nature of future investment opportunities. He distinguishes between firms
whose value derives mainly from 'assets-in-place' (i.e. assets whose ultimate value does not
depend on further discretionary investment) as opposed to those where it is based primarily
on 'growth opportunities' (i.e. assets whose value depends more on future discretionary
investment by the firm, such as plant maintenance, marketing, or research and
development). The managers of firms with more growth opportunities have more discretion
over future investment decisions. These firms, therefore, have higher agency costs of debt
because the underinvestment and dividend payment problems (see section 3.2 above) are
more acute.
Building on this distinction, Watts and Zimmerman suggest that because the agency costs
of debt are lower for firms with more assets in place, such firms will have both (i) higher
gearing ratios (based on Myers, 1977) and (ii) fewer and less restrictive covenants. These
firms will therefore be more at liberty to adopt income increasing accounting policies. This
line of reasoning, which is illustrated in Figure 2b, could therefore explain the association
between high gearing levels and income increasing accounting policies.
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It is only more recently that researchers have taken up Watts and Zimmerman's pointer and
investigated the association between the investment opportunity set and debt covenants
empirically. It seems fair to conclude, however, that this empirical work has itself only
served to highlight the ambiguity in the underlying theory. Begley (1993), focusing on
agency costs and lenders' demand for protection, finds the use of covenants (including
accounting-based covenants) associated with both higher gearing and less assets-in-place
(see Table 1 for a comparison of these findings with those summarised in the following
paragraphs).
TABLE 1 HERE
Skinner (1993), however, differs from Begley in seeing assets-in-place as the driver and
also by giving more weight to how costly it is for the firm to agree to covenants. In his view
(confirmed by his findings) firms with more assets-in-place will have more accounting-
based covenants for three reasons: (i) they have higher gearing; (ii) accounting numbers
provide more accurate performance measures for such firms; (iii) since the value of these
firms is less dependent on discretionary future investment, it will be less costly for them to
agree to restrictive covenants. The chief contrast with Begley, both theoretical and
empirical, is that the association between assets-in-place and accounting-based covenants is
negative for Begley but positive for Skinner.
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Table 1
The Relationship Between Covenants, Assets-in-Place and Gearing: A Comparison
Of Recent Findings
Increased Use Of Accounting-Based Covenants
Begley	 Skinner	 Citron
(1993)	 (1993)	 (1995)
Assets-in-place	 Low	 High	 High
Gearing	 High	 High	 No
. association
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However, Skinner's argument that higher assets-in-place permit higher gearing, which in
turn results in more covenants, is unclear. This line of reasoning seems to ignore Smith's
(1993, p.294) observation that a high level of gearing in itself will not necessarily require
greater covenant protection provided it occurs in a firm with a relatively high amount of
assets-in-place. This is because more assets-in-place provide the capacity for higher levels
of debt without a concomitant increase in risk.
Citron's (1995) study of UK public debt contracts provides a synthesis of Skinner's and
Smith's views, showing how a problematical research issue can be clarified by turning the
investigation to an environment which differs institutionally from those examined hitherto.
It confirms Skinner's findings of positive associations between assets-in-place and both the
presence of accounting-based covenants and gearing levels. However, contrary to both
Skinner and Begley, it finds no association between covenants and gearing. This latter
finding is consistent with Smith, whose argument is particularly pertinent to the UK public
debt market which, unlike that in the US, tends to be restricted to relatively few low credit
risk firms (Thomson, 1988). Thus, among UK firms issuing public debt, while higher
assets-in-place are associated with higher gearing levels, this gearing does not appear to
exceed 'acceptable' levels (given the amount of assets-in-place), and therefore does not
generate a demand for covenant protection.
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From this discussion it would appear that, while the positive accounting theory approach is
successful in revealing empirical regularities, it is still at an early stage in developing the
underlying theory. The matters that it is trying to explain are very complex. Phenomena
such as gearing, contract structures and sometimes even industry sector are determined
jointly rather than having an independent/dependent variable relationship. Institutional
factors may be the only truly exogenous variables, and these can prove difficult to model.
Further, there is the empirical problem that hypotheses based on investment opportunity set
arguments are difficult to test because unambiguous measures of growth opportunities have
yet to be developed. Myers himself recognised this when he stated that 'a general measure
of this concept is difficult to derive from accounting data' (1977, p.170). However it is
noteworthy that papers whose research focus is the investment opportunity set itself have
tackled this problem by using multiple measures, finding their results not to be sensitive to
the measure used (see Smith and Watts, 1992; Ga yer and Gayer, 1993; Skinner, 1993).
(b)	 The conservative bias of positive accounting theory
Watts and Zimmerman criticise those who argue that particular accounting procedures (e.g.
current cost accounting) are better' than certain alternative procedures (e.g. historical cost
accounting) when those same writers fail to explain why the supposedly 'better' procedures
are rarely adopted in practice. In contrast, the positive accounting theory approach 'takes as
given the proposition that the accepted set (of accounting procedures) maximises the
wealth of contracting parties and then seeks to understand how wealth is affected by
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specific accounting methods' ' (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, p.150). In this view,
accounting choices are not made in the name of some vague objective such as 'better
measurement', but can be explained in terms of individuals maximising their wealth.
Critics of positive accounting theory point out the conservative bias inherent in this view.
According to Chambers, for example, positive accounting theory assumes that 'the survival
of what is is taken to demonstrate that it is best' (1993, p.1). Similarly Walker (1987)
observes that positive accounting theory fails to provide any framework for investigating
accounting methods other than those currently in use.
(
Christenson (1983) takes this criticism a step further. He states that the proponents of
positive accounting theory measure the success of a theory only in terms of whether it
yields correct predictions; the fact that the assumptions underlying the theory may be
untestable, they deem to be irrelevant. Christenson refers to Zimmerman himself in this
context: '... developing testable implications in accounting requires the researcher to make
simplifying assumptions regarding (unobservable) relative costs ... The accounting
researcher, who cannot observe the costs but only the outcome of the manager's decision
process, must make assumptions about the relative costs of the various purposes in order
to derive testable implications ... At times these assumptions appear arbitrary and ex post'
(Zimmerman, 1980, p122). Christenson's view is that this 'tactic' of introducing ad hoc
arguments to explain unexpected findings 'is a violation of the norms which, according to
Popper, ... must be followed if a system of propositions is to be considered "scientific"
'(1983, p.20).
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The various explanations adduced in section 4.2.2(a) above for the negative association
between subordinated debt and accounting-based covenants for weak firms in the US
(Begley, 1993) but for healthy firms in the UK (Citron, 1995) illustrate this criticism of
positive accounting theory. In this case, however, the seemingly ad hoc nature of the
explanations advanced could, in principle, be tested by further research, e.g. into the
convertible loan agreements prevalent in other countries similar to the US or the UK.
Citron (1992b) also contains a finding which exemplifies this problem. This analysis of the
accounting definitions used in bank loan contracts confirms the findings of earlier research
(e.g. Leftwich, 1983) that negotiated accounting rules tend to depart from GAAP in order
to produce more conservative and more objective accounting measures. This is to reduce
the scope for managerial opportunism. The loose definition of Operating Profit in Interest
Cover covenants is a crucial exception to this rule, however. A positive accounting theory-
based explanation of this is that Operating Profit is so difficult a figure to define exactly that
the costs of negotiating and monitoring a tight definition would outweigh the benefits.
In short, the absence of a conservative, objective Operating Profit definition is not seen as
being inconsistent with positive accounting theory. On the contrary, the fact that this is the
way contracts actually do define Profit is taken to mean that certain unobservable costs
must exist which justify such a definition on wealth maximising grounds.
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Christenson (1983) and Chambers (1993) find this unacceptable. Chambers, for example,
observes that The positive accounting literature is, in fact, barren of a single example of a
contract specifying fully the methods of accounting to be used ... the whole contracting
monitoring edifice ... collapses for lack or looseness of contracts (1993, p.14).
How are these demanding research standards to be reconciled with those successes that
positive accounting theory has had in deriving certain empirical regularities? Belkaoui
(1992) provides a refreshingly non-ideological approach. In his view most accounting
hypotheses, including those based on positive accounting theory, can only lead to loosely
specified statistical relationships, but this should not invalidate them. The accumulation of
'repeated testimony and new evidence' (Belkaoui, 1992, p.518) will contribute towards the
refutation or confirmation of competing theories.
Mouck (1990) similarly provides scientific respectability to positive accounting theory. He
argues that the theory does not have to meet Popper's severe falsification criteria as set out
by Christenson, but rather can be seen as a 'scientific research programme' as developed in
Lakatos' philosophy of science. Central to Lakatos' view is the concept of a "problems' hift"
which is 'a series of theories ... where each subsequent theory results from adding auxiliary
clauses to ... the previous theory in order to accommodate some anomaly' (Lakatos, 1970,
quoted by Moucic, p.233). Mouck cites the focus on positive contracting costs as a
"progressive problemshift" in the positive accounting theory research programme, i.e. one
which has produced novel predictions and empirical findings. Recognition of the
importance of the investment opportunity set (see section (a) immediately above) and the
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move towards studying efficient contracting (see particularly section (c) following) are
possible examples of more recent "problemshifts". However in the light of the discussions
of these issues in sections (a) and (c), it seems premature at present to conclude that these
are unquestionably "progressive problemshifts".
(c)	 Positive accounting theory and accounting as 'useful information'
Positive accounting theory distinguishes itself from a priori normative approaches which
seek to prescribe an ideal way of measuring income that contains relevant and reliable
information for users of accOunts (see Belkaoui, 1992, Ch. 17). Whittington (1987 p.335)
points out that this is an unfortunate distinction to emphasise since debt covenants are
intended to provide lenders with timely signals of impending distress. Therefore these
covenants should in some way be measuring the firm's future cash flow earning potential or
the risk attached thereto, i.e. they should be providing relevant and reliable information.
In fact an early paper by Watts (1977) refers to this potential overlap between the positive
accounting theory and the decision-usefulness approaches. While accepting that
information for monitoring bonding covenants is useful information to investors' (p.63), he
goes on to emphasise the difference between the two. Information for monitoring is a freely
contracted management control mechanism which provides management with the benefit of
cheaper debt. In contrast, information for investors is intended to help them make rational
investment decisions and, in Watts' view, managers have little incentive to disclose any such
information.
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More recent papers, however, explore the information value of accounting information in a
positive accounting framework. Malmquist (1990), in his study of oil and gas industry
accounting, argues that managers choose those accounting methods that provide the most
accurate measures of underlying performance. This is because inaccurate measures would
result in unnecessary loan defaults and costly renegotiations. On this basis Malmquist
hypothesises that oil and gas firms with higher debt/equity ratios are more likely to adopt
fill cost accounting than successful efforts accounting. This is because the higher the
debt/equity ratio, the more will the variance in this ratio be exaggerated by successful
efforts accounting; and the greater this variance, the more likely is an unnecessary, costly
default to occur. Although Malmquist's results confirm this hypothesis, both he and
Holthausen (1990) show that the alternative hypothesis of managerial opportunism could
equally well explain the result (cf section 4.2.3(a) above). This is because the managers of
firms with high debt/equity ratios, being closer to default, will choose accounting methods
such as full cost that are less likely to put them in covenant breach.
The above paper by Malmquist investigates management incentives to select accounting
policies that best portray underlying performance, given the presence of accounting-based
debt covenants. Other papers (Smith and Watts, 1992; Skinner, 1993; Citron, 1995)
examine whether cross-sectional differences in the use of accounting-based covenants can
be explained by differences in the extent to which accounting numbers accurately measure
company performance. These studies are all based on the premise that accounting numbers
provide poorer measures of performance for firms with relatively more growth
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opportunities. This is because, given the conservative nature of accounting, financial
statements are less likely to fully reflect asset values and income flows that are dependent
on uncertain future events. Although the statistical strength of their findings differ, these
papers provide overall support for the view that firms with more assets-in-place are indeed
more likely to have accounting-based debt covenants.
This line of investigation, recently adopted by researchers drawing on the positive
accounting theory framework, is still in its early stages. In particular, as Holthausen (1990,
p.211) points out: '... we know relatively little about how the choice of a particular
accounting method will more accurately signal financial distress, managerial performance,
or some other attribute that a contract is attempting to monitor'. However, research of this
nature could provide a useful meeting-point between positive and normative accounting
theorists.
3	 'Ex post' issues addressed in the loan covenant papers
4.3.1 Summary of contribution to the literature
Citron (1992a) primarily addresses a number of ex post issues. This paper makes the
following original contributions to the literature:
i)	 It provides the first evidence in the literature on the costliness of covenant breaches.
A large body of previous research had investigated management's accounting policy
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choices and their reaction to proposed accounting standards merely on the
assumption that covenant breaches were costly. A key new finding of Citron
(1992a) is that the cost of a covenant breach depends on the cause of that breach.
It is the first research to explicitly investigate whether an income-increasing
accounting policy change would indeed be effective in avoiding the costs of a loan
covenant breach.
It is the first research to examine the views of lenders as td whether a breach of
covenant brought about by a new accounting standard would be costly to
borrowers.
4.3.2 Discussion of main findings
(a)	 The cost of breaching loan covenants
The proposition that managerial opportunism, whose purpose is avoiding the breach of loan
covenants, is a determinant of accounting policy choice depends on the assumption that
such breaches are costly. Since covenant breaches are strictly events of default, it would
seem likely that such breaches are costly to the borrower. Practising bankers (Zinbarg,
1975; Donaldson and Donaldson, 1982) however, tend to de-emphasise the banker's right
to accelerate loan repayment under these circumstances, preferring to focus on their
willingness in most cases to accede to reasonable requests to modify covenants.
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Watts and Zimmerman (1990), in their review of the achievements of positive accounting
theory, highlighted this as an area requiring future empirical research. They stated that 'to
date, researchers have been unable to document the magnitude of the costs imposed by a
technical violation of a debt covenant or the magnitude of renegotiation costs' (p.151).
Citron (1992a) provides the first evidence in the literature on the costliness of covenant
breaches, albeit not quantified financially. The findings are based on a survey of lending
bankers. A questionnaire survey was chosen as the appropriate research instrument because
the outcome of a covenant breach is the result of vigorous negotiation between banker and
customer. Therefore a study of the views of one of the parties to these negotiations (viz:
the lending banker) is of value.
The research elicited a variety of possible banker responses to breach of covenant, ranging
from immediate loan recall (the most costly) to unconditional waiver with no contract
renegotiation (the least costly). The option chosen by the lending banker varies with the
cause of the breach. The most costly options are likely if the breach is caused by a real
deterioration in company performance with no prior warning given to the banker, while the
least costly reactions result from breaches brought about by new accounting standards.
Subsequent US research also investigates these issues. Chen and Wei (1993) analyse the
features that distinguish those firms that obtain waivers from those that do not. They find
that firms obtaining waivers have a lower estimated likelihood of eventually being wound
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up, lower gearing, secured loans and smaller loans. Beneish and Press (1993) quantify the
refinancing and restructuring costs associated with covenant breach as averaging between
1.2% and 2% of market capitalisation.
Findings are inconclusive regarding the impact of new accounting standards on loan
covenant compliance. Most other research into this issue has investigated aggregate share
price reactions. Frost and Bernard's (1989) study of oil and gas company accounting and
Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue's (1992) research into pension accounting find no share price
effect. Mohrrnan's (1993) study of oil and gas companies, however, does find a proposed
change in GAAP having a negative share price impact.
Finally, Gopalalcrishnan and Parkash's (1995) survey of lenders and borrowers confirms
Citron's findings regarding the relatively high likelihood of waiver, the costliness of such
waivers but the low cost of covenant violations brought about by new accounting
standards.
(b)	 Contract renegotiation subsequent to covenant breach
As part of the research into the cost of covenant breach, Citron (1992a) documents
bankers' views on likely contract renegotiations under various circumstances. Most new
contractual conditions, such as additional security or increased interest charges, are costly
to the firm. However it is also possible that a firm's accounting-based covenant limits may
be relaxed, particularly where the breach is caused by an acquisition which may so change
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the firm's financial and asset structure that the old covenant limits are no longer relevant.
Subsequent papers by Beneish and Press (1993) and Sweeney (1994) tabulate similar
contract renegotiations based on information reported by firms in breach of their covenants.
In a subsequent paper Beneish and Press (1995) find that announcements of accounting-
based covenant breaches are associated with significant negative share price returns, and
that these are due mainly to the incremental finance costs and the additional covenants
imposed by lenders. Concomitant announcements of audit qualifications make little
contribution to the share price decline however.
•This line of investigation is in keeping with Smith's (1993, p.301) view that future research
in this area needs to understand breach of covenant as part of an on-going lending process,
rather than merely as a one-off event which may influence accounting policy choice. This in
turn raises the fundamental question as to whether the distinction, made in section 4.1
above, between ex ante efficient contracting and ex post managerial opportunism is valid.
Management may adopt accounting policies that reduce reported gearing so that, even if a
covenant is breached, waiver and renegotiation are more likely outcomes than loan
repayment. Renegotiation is likely to result in a new set of covenants being drawn up. Thus
management's ex post behaviour may affect 'efficient contracting' at the next round of
negotiations.
(c)	 Bankers' reaction to managerial opportunism
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The hypothesis that managers select accounting policies in order to avoid covenant
violations is based on the further assumption that bankers are unable, by some means or
other, to negate the effects of such actions. Citron (1992a) is the first piece of research to
investigate this issue. He finds an overall likelihood of just under 60%, in the view of
respondents, that in the event of a disclosed accounting policy change the lending banker
either could not or would not take any action. This means that in these cases the new
accounting policy would succeed in achieving management's objective of moving the
company away from its covenant limits. Subsequent US-based research (Sweeney, 1994)
finds, among companies that eventually breached their covenants, that accounting changes
had successfully delayed the breach only in those cases where the required change in
income was very small.
Citron (1992a) opens up the possibility that opportunistic accounting behaviour by
borrowers could appear to succeed for at least three reasons: (a) the lender is 'fooled'; (b)
the lender is aware of the borrower's accounting policies but is contractually unable to
threaten default; (c) the lender is able to threaten default but chooses, for some reason, not
to do so. The analysis in Citron (1992b) indicates where management has the potential to
exploit loose accounting definitions. These observations raise important issues surrounding
opportunistic accounting behaviour. For example, what distinguishes those firms that
choose to behave opportunistically from those that do not? How easily are lending bankers
'fooled' by accounting policy changes? Under what circumstances (if any) do bankers
decide they are able to 'live with' borrowers' income-increasing acccitinting changes? It is
likely that the most appropriate way of pursuing these issues could be via research into
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actual lending cases, drawing on the lending contracts themselves and the recall of key
parties such as the bankers and finance directors involved.
Placing the above issues in a corporate governance context, Whittington (1993) queries
whether auditors are adequately fulfilling their monitoring role if firms are able to
manipulate their reported results so as to avoid covenant breaches. A recent paper by
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) probes this question. In their study of firms that breached
debt covenants, they only find evidence of income-increasing accounting polices in the year
of violation when firms either receiving going concern qualifications or experiencing
management changes are omitted from the sample. It seems that firms in either of these two
categories are subject to pressures to report conservative rather than inflated income
figures. In the case of firms with going concern qualifications, DeFond and Jiambalvo
suggest that the auditors increase their monitoring of management's accounting choices for
fear of subsequent litigation.
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THE GOING CONCERN QUALIFICATION
As shown in earlier parts of this essay, a competent and independent audit is a crucial link in
the corporate governance process. Citron and Teller (1992) investigate the influence of
auditor competence and independence in the particular context of the GCQ decision.
However it is important to emphasise that the GCQ decision is only one of many contexts
in which the broad issues of competence and independence can be investigated. Those
features peculiar to ' the market for audit services which make competence and
independence particularly sensitive issues include the problematic nature of evaluating the
quality of an audit and the fact that, for all practical purposes, auditors are appointed and
-
dismissed by client management, the very parties on whom they are reporting (Moizer,
1992). The length of time for which the auditor has had a client, the extent to which the
auditor earns fees from non-audit services, the size of an audit fee relative to total fee
income and the likelihood of auditor switching are additional factors which may jeopardise
auditor independence.
Citron and Teller (1992), however, focus on a specific area in which auditor competence
and independence are severely tested, the GCQ decision. They adopt what Gwilliam calls
the 'theoretical' approach to examining auditor independence (see section 3.3.2 above) by
focusing on the cost motivators influencing the auditor to behave in either a more
independent or less independent fashion.
Slummy of contribution to the literature
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The original contributions of this paper are as follows:
i) For the first time, the paper provides extensive empirical evidence throwing into
question a key link in the corporate governance process, viz the extent to which
auditors disclose going concern uncertainties in the last accounts issued prior to
failure. It shows that subsequent events can explain non-qualification in only a small
minority of cases.
ii) It uses the GCQ situation as a context for investigating potential threats to auditor
independence. Of particular importance it studies the hitherto unresearched self-
fulfilling prophecy argument. By use of a matched group methodology, the paper
shows that there appears to be no objective foundation to the fear that the GCQ
itself precipitates failure.
iii) The paper also examines auditor switching as an independence-related issue. While
auditor switching has been widely researched, no other paper has taken the
approach adopted here of focusing on matched groups of financially weak
companies distinguished only by the presence or absence of a GCQ. The paper
finds evidence for an association between a GCQ and subsequent auditor switching.
iv) The paper provides the first UK analysis of the relation between audit firm size and
rates of GCQ.
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The research in this area raises few new fundamental methodological issues. Therefore this
chapter focuses on the key findings of the paper and discusses them in the light of
contemporaneous and subsequent research.
; Discussion of main findings
(a) The low GC0 rate among failed firms
Citron and Teller (1992) find a low rate of GCQ (26%) among failed listed firms during
the years 1977-1986 (see Table 1 of that paper). Preliminary results from more recent
research by Citron and Taffler (1995) show an even lower 17% rate of qualification for the
period 1987-1994. There are five possible explanations for this type of finding:
(i) Incompetence, i.e. auditors are poor at recognising going concern problems. The paper
cites earlier research which discounts this possibility. Subsequent research provides further
support for auditor competence. Biggs et al. (1993) construct a complex model of the audit
going concern decision, finding in particular that auditors' in-depth client knowledge plays a
critical role in this judgement. Similarly Goodman et al. find that non-financial variables that
proxy for auditor assessment of client management capability are crucial in discriminating
between qualified and non-qualified distressed firms.
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(ii) Threats to auditor independence. These are discussed in sections (b) to (d) below.
However it should be noted that issues of independence and competence can be difficult to
disentangle from one another (Moizer, 1991). Thus, it may be impossible to ascertain
whether an auditor's failure to disclose is due to incompetence or to the deliberate
avoidance of a potentially troublesome issue.
(iii)The duties imposed on the auditor regarding going concern judgements do not entail a
one-to-one relationship between firm failure and receipt of a GCQ, i.e. it is not the auditor's
role, in making the GCQ decision, to predict business failure. As formulated in the 1985
Auditing Guideline, the auditor is merely required to make a judgement about the
appropriateness of the going concern basis for the preparation of the financial statements
(Auditing Practices Committee (APC), 1985, para. 6). The more recent SAS 130 similarly
emphasises that it applies to going concern purely as an accounting concept (APB, 1994a,
paras. 5-8). However the 1985 Guideline hinted at a wider responsibility when it says:
'Where there is significant uncertainty about the enterprise's ability to continue in business,
this fact should be stated in the financial statements even where there is no likely impact on
the carrying value and classification of assets and liabilities. Where this is not stated . in the
financial statements, the auditor should refer to it in his report' (APC, 1985, para. 31).
However Mutchler's (1984) interviews of US auditors reveal a wide variety of views
among auditors themselves regarding the auditor's role in the presence of going concern
uncertainties. If indeed there is no consensus within the profession, it is not surprising that
the views of users and auditors should differ in this respect.
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(iv) However effective the auditor may be, a clean audit report can never be a cast-iron
guarantee of survival. As SAS 130 argues: 'Any judgement made, whether by directors or
auditors, although reasonable at the time, can be valid only at that time and can .be
overturned by subsequent events' (APB, 1994a, para. 12). As shown in Citron and Taffler
(1992), however, this argument does not explain the low rate of qualification. This paper
addresses the issue by examining the subsequent _events befalling 79 non-qualified failed
companies, finding that such events could explain non-qualification in only 11% of cases.
Moreover, Porter's survey research (1993) shows that non-auditors are quite able to
distinguish between the auditor's existing duty to 'express doubts in the audit report about
the company's continued existence' and a hypothetical duty to 'guarantee the auditee
company is solvent'. While finding that poor performance in the former duty is a major
contributor to perceptions of auditors' deficient performance, Porter's respondents accept
that the latter duty is one that could not reasonably be expected of auditors.
(v) The influence of loan default. This factor is the focus of the study by Chen and Church
(1992) and is of particular interest in this essay as it provides a link between the loan
covenants papers discussed in this essay and the GCQ paper. Chen and Church's key
findings are first that 99% of firms in loan default also received a GCQ; secondly that, of all
qualified firms in default, 84% remained viable in the following year; and thirdly that, of
failing firms, 95% of those that were qualified were also in default while 94% of those not
qualified were also not in default. Their central contribution is that while default is strongly
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associated with GCQ it does not appear to be related to failure, in the short-term at any
rate. This provides a possible explanation of the low GCQ rate among failed firms.
Chen and Church ascribe the association between default and GCQ to the fact that US
audit going concern standards specify debt default and restructuring as potential indicators
of going concern problems. It should be noted that in the UK, both the 1985 Guideline
(para. 10) and SAS 130 (1994, para. 31) contain similar references. While Chen and
Church's conclusion does imply that auditors are relying mechanistically on default status to
guide their going concern judgements, this may be rational behaviour in an increasingly
litigious environment. The auditing guidelines do provide auditors with many other
indicators of going concern problems, although most of these are not as objective as being
in loan default.
Furthermore default is a poor indicator of failure, according to Chen and Church, either
because it is often successfully resolved through negotiation or, even if unsuccessful, the
process can be so lengthy that failure can be avoided for an extended period (1992, p.33).
This could mean that forcing a firm into negotiation with its bankers due to loan default
may actually contribute towards its ultimate survival, a proposition worthy of future
research (see also Jensen, 1989).
(b) Self-fulfilling prophecy argument not supported
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This is a vital and complex issue but one which has not hitherto been the subject of
academic research. An auditor has an economic interest in his client's survival. The fear that
a GCQ may itself trigger failure is a cost factor motivating aiainst qualification in
circumstances that would otherwise warrant it. Therefore, belief in the self-fulfilling
prophecy argument operates against auditor independence. A recent statement of this belief
is to be found in the Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance (1992), the Cadbury Committee, which states that 'there must be a risk that
any qualification about the company's financial viability, however it is expressed, will
precipitate the company's collapse' (p.42). However Citron and Taffler (1992) find that
qualified companies are no more likely to fail than a matched group of unqualified
companies, thus lending no support to the objective reality of the self-fulfilling prophecy
argument.
As mentioned above, despite the importance of this issue, it does not appear to have been
studied empirically elsewhere. Chen and Church (1992) provide evidence of an 82%
survival rate among qualified firms. Furthermore, 76% of these surviving firms were in loan
default (their Table 7A). Although Chen and Church do not refer to the self-fulfilling
prophecy argument, their data also appear to invalidate it, especially as so many of their
surviving yet qualified firms were actually in negotiation with their bankers.
(c)	 GC0 firms have a higher rate of auditor switching
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Humphrey et al. conclude from their interviews with prominent individuals in the business
and auditing community that 'a willingness to qualify indicates a willingness to challenge
management' (1992, p.39). This is consistent with the view that the desire of clients to
avoid qualified opinions and to shop for more acceptable opinions constitutes a threat to
auditor independence.
Citron and Taffler (1992) find some support that auditor switching is indeed linked to the
receipt of a GCQ. Haskins and Williams (1990), however, question the association between
qualified audit reports and auditor switching. They report that a wide range of economically
motivated factors such as firm distress, size and growth are more important than audit
opinions in explaining auditor changes. If this is the case, then auditor switching may not be
indicative of a threat to independence. However it may be that a model that explains auditor
switching in general may not provide insight into switches following specifically upon
receipt of a GCQ.
Krishnan (1994) finds that switches occur not due to qualifications themselves but because
firms receive more serious qualifications than they deserve. Thus for all firms deserving an
asset realisation qualification, the switching rate will be higher among those that actually
receive the more serious going concern qualification (1994, p.208). Krishnan suggests that
such behaviour may result from negative private information discovered by the auditor
during the audit. If this is the case, opinion shopping is unlikely to be worthwhile, since no
firm will precommit itself to a more acceptable audit opinion.
62
Whether auditor switching is associated with threats to auditor independence remains an
open question and one that is important enough to merit further research.
(d) Large audit firms exhibit the same rate of GC0 as smaller audit firms
Citron and Taffler (1992) argue that smaller audit firms are more subject to anti-
independence pressures than large firms. Smaller firms, for example, have a relatively larger
economic interest in any one client. However their finding of similar rates of GCQ among
the two sizes of firm does not support this hypothesis. A possible explanation lies in
Mutchler and Williams' (1990) conclusion that GCQ rates could themselves be a function
of the riskiness of the firm's client base which is itself related to the firm's audit
methodology. In their study of Big Eight firms, they find that the more structured the audit
approach, the riskier the client base and, hence, the higher the GCQ rate. They do not
examine, however, why firms differ as between audit methodologie's and client bases, or
indeed which determines which.
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CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The Papers reviewed in this essay address issues which are of public concern and which
attract continuing attention from researchers.
Much of the debate surrounding positive accounting theory has been polarised, largely
because of the exclusivity Watts and Zimmerman have often claimed for their approach
(see, for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, p.132). This essay has aimed to
demonstrate that the approach does indeed have a valuable contribution to make provided
its underlying assumptions are understood. This is at one with the balanced view adopted
by writers such as Eisenhardt who concludes that 'agency theory presents a partial view of
the world that, although it is valid, also ignores a good bit of the complexity of
organisations' (1989, p.71).
In this spirit, an important direction for future loan covenants research would be to
incorporate a broader view of the lending process as a whole (see Smith, 1993; and section
3.4 above). Holthausen (1990) indicates that prior research into opportunistic behaviour
ignores the implications of a multiperiod horizon. Research which more realistically does
recognise a multiperiod horizon could draw on Holland's studies of customer/banker
relations (1993 and 1994). Holland casts his case studies in an agency theory framework
but extends this to incorporate notions such as informal contracts in which there is a mutual
expectation of a supply of and demand for services over time.
64
Furthermore all the Papers reviewed here deepen our understanding of companies in
distress. A case study approach may be an effective way of extending this research by
integrating the subject matter of all the Papers (loan covenants and the GCQ) into a wider
view of firms in distress.
Such an approach may be an effective way of analysing, for example, how companies enter
loan default and the extent to which the process succeeds in preserving going concern
value. It may be that an appropriate package of loan covenants can contribute to company
survival by ensuring timely banker intervention (see the discussion bf Chen and Church's
(1992) research in section 5.2(a) above). Jensen's (1989) view that lender monitoring of
highly geared firms promotes successful reorganisation rather than liquidation would
provide theoretical support for such a study. At the same time it is relevant to investigate
the extent to which GCQs provide lenders with new information, or whether alternatively
they are merely confirmatory or possibly whether the lenders themselves play a role in the
GCQ decision.
Case studies of the functioning of loan covenants are likely to be espkially fruitful in those
situations where covenants have a particularly important role to play. In MBOs and
refinancings, for example, covenant packages are usually designed with care and are not
included just as a matter of form. Research into the functioning of loan covenants in these
contexts could act as test cases for their use in more conventional situations.
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A related issue, which further addresses the role of loan covenants in the corporate control
process, is the question of how effective the most common accounting-based covenants are
as signals of impending distress. Chambers alludes to this issue when he criticises positive
accounting theory's attachment to the term 'accounting numbers'. This phrase he
perceptively sees as 'implicitly severing the association of the products of accounting from
the observables they are expected to depict' (1993, p.4). Traditionally, positive accounting
theory grants a role to accounting numbers provided they are contained in a contract. But
do these numbers provide information about economic reality, e.g. about the financial
strength of the firm? This question could be probed by examining how effective accounting-
based covenants are at providing timely signals of distress and whether their effectiveness
varies as between firms or with different accounting definitions (see section 4.2.3(c)).
The impact of new accounting standards on companies' compliance with accounting-based
covenants is an important public policy issue on which the research evidence cited above
(section 4.3.2(a)) is mixed. Practitioners present an equally confusing picture. Thus a
statement from the British Bankers' Association (1992) suggests that lending bankers
unconditionally waive breaches caused by new accounting standards in the great majority of
cases. A practising lawyer, however, expresses the view that companies should not be
complacent in such matters when negotiating their loan agreements (Beaumont, 1993).
This is, therefore, an area that merits further research, especially in the light of the radical
changes in financial reporting standards currently being implemented in the UK.
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Citron (1995) refers to the high credit quality of firms entering the I.JK public debt market.
This raises wider capital structure issues regarding what distinguishes those 'elite' firms
which choose to borrow in this market from those that do not. While this could be
investigated using conventional statistics-based empirical research, a deeper understanding
of what motivates a firm to enter this market could be obtained by a case study approach
including interviews with key parties such as finance directors, institutional investors and
merchant bankers. It would be particularly useful to include studies of outlier cases which
have entered the public debt market, e.g. very small firms and small debt issues.
More generally, recent research is beginning to probe the working assumption that
underlies research into the agency cost of debt that we are dealing with an owner-manager.
Indeed Jensen and Meckling conclude their 1976 paper by conceding that it does not fully
spell out the application to the very large modern corporation whose managers own little or
no equity. Garvey and Swan (1994), summarising recent literature on management
turnover in distressed firms, question the assumption that managers are always willing to
act against the interests of lenders even when it means courting financial distress. The
contribution of loan monitoring to modern-day corporate governance therefore requires a
better understanding of how this monitoring function differs among firms with different
ownership structures.
There are also a number of issues related to the GCQ that have public policy ramifications
and which merit further research. Citron and Teller are currently extending their research
beyond the 1977-1986 period so as to examine these matters.
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In the UK institutional context it is of interest to examine the influence of more recent
professional guidance. Firstly an Auditing Guideline was issued towards the very end of the
period covered by the original research in 1985 (APC, 1985). While this Guideline should
have provided a more structured approach to the going concern qualification decision,
there is an alternative view that it merely formalised the passive approach to auditing going
concern uncertainties (Siklca, 1992). Secondly SAS130 (APB, 1994a) and SAS600 (APB,
1993) have recently specified a more active audit approach and a new style of disclosure,
effectively replacing the going concern 'qualification' with a going concern 'modification'.
Furthermore, the self-fulfilling prophecy and auditor switching arguments have important
implications for auditor independence.
The self-fulfilling prophecy is an under-researched problem. Citron and Taffler (1992)
provide evidence that it does not appear to have any objective basis. However, if auditors,
managers and regulators believe that it operates then it will continue to influence the
qualification decision. Therefore more research is called for in this area, particularly into the
perceptions of the various parties involved.
Citron and Taffler (1992) provide evidence that auditor independence may be prejudiced in
a GCQ situation due to threats of auditor switching. This important issue needs further
investigation, both by using a larger sample size and by attempting to separate out the
qualified audit report from other potential causes of auditor switching.
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In connection with disclosure, it could be relevant to investigate the extent of voluntary
disclosure of going concern problems currently found in interim reports. This is especially
important as the last set of financial statements issued by a failing company is just as likely
to be its interim report as its audited annual report!' The results of such research could have
policy implications regarding the role of interim reports and their audit.
Research into GCQ rates among private companies could throw further light on the paper
included here, in particular whether the expected impact of a GCQ on share price and the
higher public profile of listed companies influence the qualification decision. On the one
hand an auditor may be more likely to qualify a private company than a listed one to the
extent that the value of the auditor's economic interests in a private company client is likely
to be lower. On the other hand the cost to the auditor of not qualifying a company that
subsequently fails may be lower in the case of a private company, since the auditor's loss of
reputation will be less and the likelihood of a third party lawsuit may be lower.
Finally, Chen and Church (1992) find that most qualified firms were also in loan default.
However 23% of their qualified firms were not in default and it would be of interest to
explore what distinguishes these types of firms from those without a GCQ.
4 Citron and Taffler (1995) identify interims as the last set
of accounts to be published in 50% of the 108 cases of non-
qualified listed and USM companies failing between 1987 and
1994.
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In conclusion, it is hoped that this essay's critical review of recent research into the
contributions of loan covenants and the going concern qualification to the processes of
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Financial Ratio Covenants in UK Bank Loan
Contracts and Accounting Policy Choice
David B. Citron*
Abstract—The attitudes of lending bankers to the use of restrictive ratio covenants in loan contracts are of
importance to both corporate management and accounting policy makers. Such attitudes also underly research
linking costly contracting with accounting policy choices. This paper reports a survey of 33 UK lending bankers.
It analyses their views on (a) the extent of ratio covenants in UK bank loan contracts and factors with which their
presence is most likely to be associated; (b) costs that may be imposed on borrowers violating such covenants or
expecting to do so; and (c) the ability of borrowers to avoid such costs by appropriate choice of accounting methods.
Respondents indicated that ratio covenants are widely used, particularly for loans in excess of LI million and with
companies that are relatively highly geared. 'High cost' penalties such as loan acceleration are most likely to be
adopted where no prior warning has been given of a covenant breach. Where prior warning has been given, or where
a breach is due to an acquisition, waivers and contract renegotiation are more likely responses. Breaches caused by
new SSAPs cause few real costs to borrowers, while just under 60% of respondents Indicate they may take no action
in response to a voluntary accounting method change.
Introduction
The use of financial ratio covenants (FRCs) in debt
contracts is an important example of the economic
significance of accounting numbers. The presence
of such covenants may affect the financing
methods and/or the accounting policies adopted by
borrowers. However, the influence of FRCs will
depend. in part, on management's expectations of
lenders' reactions to covenant violations or near
violations.
Research investigating the relationship between
the presence of FRCs and issues such as account-
ing method choice and the impact of mandated
policy switches has rested on the assumption that
covenant breaches are indeed costly (Duke and
Hunt, 1990, p. 47; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990,
p. 151). However, this raises questions such as
whether default, or indeed contract renegotiation,
is always costly; what factors affect this likelihood;
and what form such costs take. This study ad-
dresses these matters by soliciting the views of
those who would typically impose such costs,
namely lending bankers.
The paper investigates the use of FRCs in
private lending agreements (i.e. bank loan con-
tracts) in the UK. It documents, for the first time,
the extent of FRC use in UK bank loan agree-
The author is lecturer in accounting, City University
Business School. He wishes to thank R. J. Taller. J. Haslam
and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on earlier
versions of this paper.
ments. Systematic evidence is provided of UK
bankers' perceptions of the costs imposed on cus-
tomers in various cases of FRC breach. Of particu-
lar importance, bankers' views are sought on the
likely effectiveness of a voluntary change in ac-
counting method as a means of avoiding default.
Literature review
A major section of the literature to date has drawn
on the contracting theory framework to explore
relationships between the presence of restrictive
debt covenants and issues of accounting method
choice. Two areas of special concern are the impact
of a change in generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples on firms with such covenants (e.g. Leftwich,
1981; Lys, 1984) and the nature of voluntary
accounting method choice among firms with debt
covenants (e.g. Dhaliwal, 1980; Holthausen. 1981;
Bowen eta!., 1981; Lilien and Pastena, 1982; Daley
and Vigeland, 1983). While the strength of their
findings varies, these studies demonstrate that a
higher debt/equity ratio is associated with the
adoption of income increasing accounting
methods. Christie's (1990) meta-study analyses the
results of a number of previously published papers
on an aggregate basis. He concludes that leverage,
interest cover and dividend constraints have signifi-
cant explanatory power with regard to accounting
method choice.
The above studies are taken to confirm 'the
covenant-based hypothesis' (Watts and Zimmer-
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man, 1986), namely that the closer a company is to
a specific restrictive covenant, the more likely it is
to use accounting methods that will help prevent it
breaching that covenant. Watts and Zimmerman
point out, however, that actually testing such a
hypothesis entails extracting details of companies'
specific restrictive covenants. As this is often not
feasible, the 'simple debt equity hypothesis' is
substituted, namely that the larger a company's
debt/equity ratio the more likely it is to adopt
income increasing accounting methods. In effect, a
high debt/equity ratio is used as a proxy for being
close to breaching a covenant. Thus the studies
cited above have, either exclusively or predomi-
nantly, tested the proxy hypothesis.' This proxy
hypothesis. however, may not always represent a
good substitute for the covenant-based hypoth-
esis.2
Recent research has gone some way towards
addressing the assumptions underlying the 'simple
debt equity hypothesis' by investigating the extent
to which high levels of leverage proxy for the
presence of FRCs and for closeness to violating
their restrictions. However, the assumption that
covenant violations are costly, which also underlies
the above mentioned research, does not appear to
have received the same attention.
FRCs are found to be widespread, although not
universal, in public debt agreements (Duke and
Hunt. 1990) and both private and public debt
agreements (Frost and Bernard, 1989; Press and
Weintrop, 1990). 3 The Duke and Hunt and the
Press and Weintrop studies also find that leverage
proxies for the presence and the restrictiveness of
some but not all FRCs. Malitz (1986), seeking to
test the 'costly contracting hypothesis' that finan-
cial contracts can increase a company's value (see
Smith and Warner, 1979), finds positive associ-
ations between the presence of certain accounts
based covenants and both high financial leverage
and smaller firm size. McDaniel (1986) finds that
only one third of Fortune 100 companies have
dividend restrictions in their public debt indentures
and that the trend is to include them less fre-
quently.
All these studies examine actual FRCs but do
not provide details of how accounting items such
as leverage are defined. However, Smith and
'Holthausen (1981) did include some results relating to
companies deviating from specific leverage constraints. and
Bowen eta!. (1981), Daley and Vigeland (1983) and Lys (1984)
introduced firms' levels of unrestricted retained earnings as a
variable.
2 Thus Zimmer (1986) finds a relationship between interest
capitalisation and leverage among Australian real estate
developers in the absence of bond covenants due to the nature
of cost plus pricing contracts.
'Deakin (1989) notes that changes in accounting method
could have an impact on firms with no accounts based
covenants as they may be concerned about the costs or raising
capital in the future.
Warner (1979) in the US, and Whittred and Zim-
mer (1986) and Stokes and Leong (1988) in Aus-
tralia analyse detailed accounting definitions as
used in public debt agreements, as do Leftwich
(1983) and El-Gazzar et al. (1989) for private US
debt agreements. Of particular interest in the con-
text- of mandated accounting method changes,
both Leftwich, and Whittred and Zimmer find
that, as a general principle, contracts tend to
incorporate the accounting methods in force at the
date of monitoring ('rolling GAAP') rather than
those that were in force at the date the contract was
instigated ('frozen GAAP'). As a result, Leftwich
concludes that 'the expected costs of an inadvertent
contract breach when GAAP is changed are lower
than the monitoring and record-keeping costs
associated with frozen GAAP' (p. 36).
There has been little investigation of FRC usage
in term loan contracts outside the US. The degree
of attention devoted to ratio covenants in standard
UK legal texts (e.g. Wood, 1989; Penn et al., 1987;
Lingard, 1988) does provide indirect evidence of
widespread FRC use. However, there is only a
cursory reference to FRCs in The Encyclopedia of
Forms and Precedents (Walton, 1986; see Vol 4,
paragraph 167).
With regard to the other fundamental issue
underlying the 'simple debt equity hypothesis', viz.
that of the costliness of covenant violation, per-
haps the most comprehensive insights are to be
found in the descriptive/prescriptive writings of
practitioners. In the US, Zinbarg (1975) describes
negative covenants as 'checkpoints that permit the
lender to review proposed actions by the bor-
rower'. A similar philosophy has been expressed in
the UK by Donaldson (1988), and by Donaldson
and Donaldson (1982). In Zinbarg's experience, at
least 95% of requests to modify negative covenants
are granted with no quid pro quo. With specific
regard to the effect of changes in accounting
principles, Fogleson (1978) distinguishes between
public and private debt agreements. While in the
former case 'the results can be disastrous', in the
latter case, defaults are, in his view, waived with
relative ease.
Research into the costliness of covenant
breaches adopting the 'simple debt equity hypoth-
esis' has only sought to test the hypothesis that
breach of a public debt agreement is costlier than
breach of a private agreement,' but with inconclu-
sive results. Among other research into this issue,
Abdel-Khalik (1981), in his study of lease account-
ing, finds somewhat differing perceptions as to
'The rationale for this hypothesis is that public debt issues
will involve a greater number of parties and renegotiation of
such contracts may be subject to regulatory requirements.
In this respect, syndicated bank loans, which may involve a
large number of banks from a variety of countries, bear some
resemblance to public debt issues.
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whether it would be costly for lessees to seek
waivers of covenant violations resulting from lease
capitalisations. While auditors and user groups,
including bank loan officers, thought that such
waivers would not be costly, preparers were unsure
(p. 276). MacArthur (1988) in his analysis of
corporate comments on UK Exposure Drafts finds
mixed expectations on the part of borrowers as
to whether the proposals in ED 29 (Accounting
for Leases and Hire Purchase Contracts) would
affect them adversely due to loan agreement
covenants.
Regarding the issue of voluntary accounting
method choice, neither lenders' nor borrowers'
perceptions of the feasibility of avoiding FRC
breaches by appropriate accounting method
choices appear to have been addressed in the
literature to date. El-Gazzar et al. (1989) find that,
while the accounting definitions used in a sample
of private debt agreements give management the
latitude to avoid default through use of off-balance
sheet finance, non-accounting-based covenants
specified in the loan agreement provide a more
effective restriction of such activity.
This research seeks to extend the insights ob-
tained from the above mentioned works by carry-
ing out a systematic survey of lending bankers'
views on the likely costs they would impose for
covenant breaches and the scope for avoiding such
costs through appropriate accounting method
choice.
Research instrument
Both the extent to which FRCs are included in
loan contracts and the manner in which a banker
deals with covenant violation are issues which
are subject to strenuous negotiation between
banker and customer (Slater. 1982; Donaldson and
Donaldson, 1982).
Earlier studies of the impact of changes in
generally accepted accounting principles have been
market based and those examining voluntary ac-
counting method choice have tested for association
with various features of the companies concerned,
such as financial structure and size. Both these
approaches have examined for regularities at an
aggregate level and hence were not designed to
shed light on the complex nature of the banker-
customer relationship alluded to above.
In this study a predominantly structured postal
questionnaire was used as being most appropriate
for eliciting views on the use of FRCs of one party
to this negotiation process, viz, those of the lending
banker (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 411). A preliminary
questionnaire was piloted with four senior bankers,
a banking lawyer and a senior technical partner in
a Big Eight accounting firm in the latter part of
1988. Follow-up in-depth interviews were then held
with these respondents to clarify the issues to be
investigated, draw out new issues and ensure use of
correct terminology. The survey was conducted in
Autumn 1989. Its objective was to explore lending
bankers' perceptions of the situations in which
FRCs are more likely to be used, their attitudes to
various instances of covenant violation, and their
views on the likely effectiveness of changes in
accounting method as a means of avoiding
covenant breach. It is acknowledged that the find-
ings do not therefore provide direct evidence on the
actual cases in which FRCs would be used nor
necessarily on how bankers would actually react to
a situation of breached covenants.'
Respondents
The potential respondent population was identified
as consisting of those banks most likely to be
actively engaged in corporate term lending and
having experience of the use of FRCs. Fifty banks
were identified' and telephone contact made with
each to seek agreement to participate, confirm the
relevance of the questionnaire to their lending
activity and locate the most appropriate person in
the organisation to ensure that questionnaire re-
sponses would capture organisational policy.
Fifty-three questionnaires were despatched. With
the exception of the largest institutions only one
questionnaire response could validly be obtained
from any one organisation. This is because overall
institutional policy predominates in key decisions
relating to covenant breaches. Four large lending
institutions did, however, provide two responses
each since the two respondents in each case dealt
with corporate customers of very different sizes.
Non-response was followed up initially by tele-
phone and then, if necessary, by writing. Thirty-
three usable questionnaires were returned.
Table 1, Panel A provides an analysis of re-
sponse rate, showing that the effective response
'See the Appendix to this paper for a summary of the
questionnaire. A copy of the questionnaire is available from the
author on request. The final form of the questionnaire defined
its scope to respondents as not relating to specialised forms of
lending such as project loans, or lending to specialised sectors
such as shipping, property, aerospace or energy. The reason for
this was that the special factors that are often relevant to these
forms of lending could not be accommodated into the general-
ised questionnaire being used. The findings reported here
therefore do not relate to these areas of lending.
°These comprised: (i) all eight members of the Committe e of
London and Scottish Bankers plus two other British clearers
engaged in corporate term loans; (ii) all four members of the
Northern Ireland Bankers' Association: (iii) nine of the sixteen
UK merchant banks that comprised the Accepting Houses
Committee as at December 1988 plus one other leading
merchant bank; (iv) the 26 US. Canadian. Australian. French.
German and Swiss banks listed in The Banker (November,
1988) as having over 200 UK employees (this being used as the












Total sample population of lending institutions 50
Not prepared to participate 1





Response rate (institutions providing usable responses as
a percentage of the total sample population) 58%
"Reasons for non-response:
Confidentiality 3
Level of relevant lending too low 2
Lending only secured 1
Lending too specialised 1
No reasons given 12




UK and Irish clearers 17 52 13
UK merchant bankers 6 18 6
US banks 7 21 7
Other overseas banks 3 9 3
33 100 779-
rate was 58% of the 50 institutions identified.'
Panel B analyses the respondents by type of organ-
isation. UK and Irish clearers and merchant banks
contributed 70% of the respondents. with overseas
banks making up the remainder.'
Empirical results
Prevalence of FRCs in Bank Loan Contracts
In the US details of individual companies' public
and private debt contracts are disclosed in reports
filed at the Securities and Exchange Commission
and in Moody's Industrial Manual, although de-
tails may be costly to extract. No such systematic
disclosures are made in the UK. The purpose of
this section, therefore, is to analyse bankers' views
on the extent of use of FRCs in UK bank loan
contracts and on the types of companies and loans
with which their presence is more likely to be
associated.
'The response rate among the UK insututions was 79.2%
and among US banks 63.6%.
'Six respondents (18%) designated themselves as director.
16 (48%) as manager and six as vice-president.
The questionnaire was designed to investigate
factors related to wealth transfer to owners and
asymmetric information. The likelihood that FRCs
are used to limit the risk of wealth transfer from
lenders to owners is captured iii the questionnaire
by the following four proxies:
(a) size of loan:
(b) borrower's financial leverage;
(c) term of loan;
(d) presence of security.
The first three factors are hypothesised to be
positively related with the presence of FRCs. The
larger a loan, the greater the potential wealth
transfer that can occur. The higher is the leverage
and the longer the term of the loan, the greater is
the likelihood of financial distress prior to repay-
ment. The presence of security is expected to be
negatively related to the use of FRCs since security
limits owners' wealth transfer gains.
The use of covenants to compensate for the
asymmetry of information between owners and
lenders is proxied by:
(a) company size;
(b) public company status.
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Table 2
Percentage of Loan Agreements which Typically
Contain FRCs According to the Size of the Loan
Secured	 Unsecured
Loans	 Loans
Size of Loan	 Mean
Under £250,000 28% (n = 12) 42% (n 10)
£250,000-	 53% (n 18) 62% (n = 16)
1 million
Over 1 million 67% (n - 32) 73% (n 30)
The differences between the smallest (under
£250,000) and largest (over f 1 million) size
categories are significant using the Mann-Whitney
U-test, one-tailed:
For secured loans at the 0.5% level
For unsecured loans at the 2.5% level
Notes:
1. One respondent did not answer this question.
n < 32 in certain loan categories due to some
respondents not lending in those categories. Thus
the results for each loan category are based only
on the responses of lenders actually lending in that
category.
2. Respondents were asked, for each type of
loan, to indicate the percentage of agreements
containing FRCs by specifying one of six response
categories, viz. 0-5%. 6-35%, 36-65%, 66-95%,
96-100% or 'not involved in loans of this size'.
The mean percentages in the Table have been
calculated by reference to the mid-points of the
various response categories.
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Leverage and Term
Respondents were asked whether they were
more likely to include FRCs in a loan contract
when a customer's gearing was high ('about 75%
of comparable companies having a lower
debt/equity ratio'), low ('about 75% of compar-
able companies having a higher debt/equity ratio')
or if gearing made no difference. Twenty of the 33
respondents (61%) stated that they were more
likely to include FRCs for a company in the top
gearing quartile, indicating an association in the
expected direction between gearing and the pres-
ence of FRCs. 1 ° This result has implications for the
'simple debt/equity hypothesis'. This is because, in
the context of UK experience, the 'simple' hypoth-
esis may be upheld not because a high debt/equity
ratio proxies for closeness to breaching a covenant
but rather because the higher a company's debt/
equity ratio the more likely are FRCs to be incor-
porated in its loan contracts in the first place."
Regarding term of loan, the questionnaire asked
respondents whether FRCs were more likely to be
used for shorter term loans (1-5 years). longer term
loans (over 5 years) or whether term of loan was
not a factor taken into account. Twenty-four of 32
respondents' (75%) stated that the term of a loan
is not a factor affecting the likely presence of
FRCs. A sizeable minority of respondents (25%),
however, stated that they would be more likely to
include FRCs in loan contracts where the term of
the loan exceeds five years. As expected. no respon-
dent would be more likely to include FRCs for a
shorter than a longer term loan.
Both these factors are hypothesised to be nega-
tively associated with the use of FRCs, since larger
companies and public companies are assumed to
have higher levels of disclosure and therefore
asymmetric information is less of a problem.
Loan Size and Security
Respondents were asked to indicate what per-
centage of both secured and unsecured loan agree-
ments with which they were involved contain
FRCs. Table 2 reports the results. For both se-
cured and unsecured loan agreements there is a
statistically significant difference in the expected
direction, using the Mann-Whitney U test, between
the stated median likelihood of a loan under
£250,000 containing FRC as compared with a loan
of over 1 million. However, while the mean
likelihoods of FRCs being used were higher, as
expected, for unsecured as compared with secured
loans in all three size categories, the null hypothesis
of no difference in the use of FRCs between
secured and unsecured loans could not be rejected.'
'Only three respondents stated that they used FRCs more
frequently when lending secured than when unsecured.
Company Size and Public vs. Private Status
To test the hypothesis that bankers use FRCs to
compensate for information asymmetry between
owners and lenders, respondents -were asked
whether FRCs were more likely to be used if the
borrower were a large public company (*sales of
about Ll billion'), a small public company (*sales
of about £100 million') or whether size made no
difference. Twenty of 30 respondents" (67%)
stated that company size, as measured above, is not
a factor. However, as for term of loan, a substan-
tial minority (30%, 9 respondents) stated that they
are, as expected, more likely to include FRCs when
'°The 95% confidence interval for this response lies between
44% and 78%. suggestive of the likelihood that high gearing is
relevant for the inclusion of FRCs. for a substantial proportion
of bankers. No respondents stated that FRCs were more likely
when geanng is low.
"Duke and Hunt (1990) conclude that, while high leverage is
related to both the existence of and closeness to violating
retained earnings restrictions, it is only related to the existence
of working capital and net tangible asset covenants but not to
their restrictiveness.
' 2 0ne respondent did not answer this question as it only dealt
with loans over five years.
"Three respondents did not deal with companies in both size
categories.
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the borrower is 'small'. Of these nine, five cited the
fact that borrowers as a rule dislike FRCs. and the
larger the company, the more able it is to avoid
their inclusion. In terms of contracting theory, this
can be seen as large companies having less need to
use covenants to prevent lenders price-protecting
themselves." The information asymmetry hypoth-
esis was further tested by asking respondents
whether FRCs were more likely to be used in the
case of a public company with sales of about £100
million, with a similarly sized private company or
whether this distinction made no difference. In
93% of responses. I5 company status was stated
not to be a relevant factor, indicating that this
may be a poor proxy for the degree of information
availability as far as lending bankers are
concerned.'6
Costs to borrowers of covenant violations
Bankers use FRCs as checkpoints that enable
them, as providers of term debt, to review the
borrower's situation and take appropriate action
should there be a change in the nature of the
underlying risk. The questionnaire was designed to
explore four key scenarios in which a banker could
be called upon to reassess his relationship with his
customer in this way.
Figure 1 contains the descriptions of each of
these scenarios as contained in the questionnaire.
The 'prior warning of breach' scenario is included
because term lenders generally expect their cus-
tomers IO warn them in advance of expected ratio
covenant violations.' The 'breach due to acqui-
sition' scenario takes account of the fact that
proposed takeovers are a frequent cause of ex-
pected FRC breaches and these would clearly be
situations in which bankers would need to re-
evaluate the underlying risk.' 5
 The case where
violation is caused by a change in generally ac-
"Alternauve research frameworks, such as those based on
negotiation strategies and bargaining power (see for example
Murnighan and Bazerman. 1990) may shed additional light on
this issue.
" n = 30 as three respondents did not deal with both types
of company.
"As a further point of interest, 25 of the 33 respondents
(76%) stated that they are currently (i.e. in 1989) using FRCs
to a greater extent than they did five years ago.
'This point is confirmed by Donaldson and Donaldson who,
in their discussion of events of default. state: 'Lenders should
not find out that a ratio covenant has been broken from a study
of the company's annual report: having been warned in advance
of the possibility, they should be notified as soon as the breach
becomes inevitable and invited to discuss the actions to be
taken. A bank is much more likely to be willing to extend its
facilities if it feels that the borrower has a grasp on the situation
and that it can rely on its forecasts.' (1982. pp. 163-4).
"The pilot survey confirmed the importance of these two
scenarios.
cepted accounting principles is encompassed in the
'breach due to new accounting standard' scenario.
Finally, 'breach shown by accounts' is included as
a base case for comparison purposes.
In all cases of covenant violation, or expected
violation, a variety of options is available to the
lender. The ultimate value of covenants to the
banker lies in the fact that their breach normally
constitutes an event of default.' However, whilst
this is a clear statement of the lender's legal rights.
Donaldson and Donaldson (1982, ch. 7) argue that
often the immediate effect should not be so ex-
treme. Where appropriate. FRCs should enable
the lender to assist a customer in difficulties in a
timely and positive way and should open up a
two-way flow of information between the bank and
customer. The range of options. not necessarily
mutually exclusive, available to the lender, can
be summarised under four main headings as fol-
lows:
(a) Demand immediate repayment
To demand immediate repayment of the
loan, or to reserve the bank's right to recall
the loan at any time which has the effect of
converting the loan to being repayable on
demand. These options are clearly high-cost
from the borrower's viewpoint.
(b) Renegotiate
To renegotiate key terms in the loan contract.
Thus, to protect its position, the bank may
impose costly restrictions upon the borrower
such as requiring additional security or im-
posing capital spending limits. However, it
should be noted that non-costly contract
renegotiations could also take place such as
the relaxation of FRC levels.
(c) Waive
To waive the breach, either temporarily or
unconditionally.
(d) Require additional information
To impose additional information require-
ments upon the borrower.
The questionnaire was designed to explore
bankers' views on the issues raised in the four
scenarios of Figure 1. For each scenario, respon-
dents were asked to state the likelihood of their
adopting various alternative lines of action. The
results therefore indicate the perceived likelihood
that any particular option may be adopted rather
than the actual likelihood that it would. Further-
more, because it is not known how many cases of
covenant violation respondents had dealt with in
practice, their responses are best understood as
'Financial covenants are given 'teeth' by linking them to an
event of default clause, which is intended to enable the lender to
demand repayment as early as possible whilst there is still some
prospect of the borrower being able to meet the demand.' (Penn
et al., 1987, p. 109).
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IFignrs 1
Description of scenarios in questionnaire
(i) Breach shown by accounts
'... the case of a customer whose accounts actually show a material non-technical breach of a FRC,
e.g. due to a real deterioration in the company's balance sheet.'
(ii) Prior warning of breach
'... the case of a company whose financial director contacts you two months before the company's
financial year-end. He informs you that there is a high probability that the accounts for the current
year will show his company to be materially in breach of a FRC, due to a deterioration in the company's
performance. The management accounts for the first nine months show the company to be close to its
FRCs but not yet in breach.'
(iii) Breach due to acquisition
the case of a customer who is finalising arrangements for an acquisition. Existing loan agreements
contain no restriction on such acquisition activity. However, the financial director informs you that this
acquisition will result in a large increase in goodwill on the consolidated balance sheet and hence the
customer will find itself materially in breach of a number of its existing FRCs. Owing to a planned
programme of asset disposals, however, the company expects to restore its financial ratios to their
current safe levels within the next three years.'
(iv) Breach due to new accounting standard
'... the case of a customer involved in a material technical breach of a FRC caused solely by the issuing
of a new accounting standard (SSAP). The new standard has required the customer to change its
methods of accounting so that reported profits are now lower than they would otherwise have been.'
reflecting a combination of their experience to-
gether with their judgment as to how they would
expect to react in the types of situation given,
rather than representing their banks' actual record
in dealing with covenant violations. Where options
are mutually exclusive, respondents were asked
to allocate 100 points among them (see Appen-
dix). m The first three scenarios in Figure I are
discussed together. while the fourth is analysed
separately.
Scenarios (i)—(iii)
Table 3 sets out the reactions of respondents to
the mutually exclusive alternatives.
The views of practising bankers (see footnote 17)
suggest that they are more likely to adopt 'high
cost' (to the borrower) options when a breach of
covenant is revealed in the accounts as compared
with when the company has given them prior
warning of an imminent breach. Combining the
'immediate repayment' and 'reserve rights' options
into one 'high cost' category, there is a 45%
perceived likelihood of respondents adopting such
a high cost line of action in the 'breach shown by
accounts' scenario as compared with only 21% in
the 'prior warning' scenario. The difference be-
tween the two sets of responses is statistically
"This form of rating scale was used by Egginton (1977) in
his survey of UK lending bankers.
significant at the 0.05% level (one-tailed).' In fact,
30 of the 33 respondents (91%) stated that they
would adopt these 'high cost' alternatives more
frequently in the 'breach shown by accounts' scen-
ario as compared with that of 'prior notification'.
Conversely, in the latter case of 'prior warning',
contract renegotiation is perceived to occur with a
37% likelihood in contrast with"only 22% if the
FRC breach has already occurred. The difference
is statistically significant at the 0.05% level (one-
tailed). These findings provide empirical evidence
to support the views of those who argue that an
important role of covenants is to open up clearer
'This and all subsequent significance tests are based on the
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. This non-parametric
test assesses whether paired samples are significantly different,
giving more weight to a pair with a large difference between the
two observations than to a pair with a small difference (see
Siegel, 1956. pp. 75ff1. In this case, for example, a paired set of
observations consists of the likelihood that a given respondent
will adopt a high cost option in the 'breach shown by accounts'
scenario and the likelihood that the same respondent will adopt
the same option in the 'prior warning' scenario. The procedure
requires the differences between the pairs of observations to be
ranked by magnitude, ignoring their signs, and the sums of
these ranks to be calculated separately for the positive and the
negative differences. The probability of particular values of
summed ranks occurring, given the number of pairs, can then be
determined. In this case, for example, since only one respondent
indicated a higher likelihood of adopting a high cost alternative
in the 'prior warning' scenario than in the 'breach shown by
accounts situation, the difference between the two sets of

























Frequency of Alternative Options Adopted by Lenders in Dealing with Breach/Imminent Breach Scenarios
Recall loan immediately
Reserve rights to recall loan at any time, i.e. convert
to on demand
Total 'high cost'
Waive breach and renegotiate terms of contract
Waive breach for a limited time in expectation of
improvement in customer's position
Waive breach unconditionally with no change in
terms of contract/no action taken




Significant differences between pairs of observations are identified using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test. This test evaluates differences between two related samples at a time. Where two separate
test results are reported against a single observation, this is because this observation is being compared. in
turn, with two other observations, i.e. column 2 is compared with column 1 and with column 3 (see also
footnote 21).
_
'at better than .05% level (one-tailed).
• at better than .05% level (two-tailed).
0 at .05% level (one-tailed).
• at I% level (two-tailed).
N/A = not applicable.
The percentages are the means of the actual percentages stated by respondents.
channels of communication between banker and
customer.
The scenario of a customer giving warning of an
imminent breach can be compared with that of a
forthcoming breach due to the goodwill arising on
a forthcoming acquisition. In both cases the bank
receives advance warning, and so no prior expec-
tations are hypothesised. However, in the case of
the acquisition there is an even higher perceived
likelihood of contract renegotiation (52%). The
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level
(two-tailed). Seventeen of the 33 respondents
(52%) stated that they would never convert a term
loan to an on-demand loan in such a case. The
overall average perceived likelihood of this 'high
cost' line of action was only 10% in the case of an
acquisition compared with 21% for the 'prior
warning' scenario, a set of responses that are
significantly different at the 0.05% level (two-
tailed). Nevertheless, it should be noted that even
a 10% stated likelihood of a term loan being
converted to on-demand may be perceived by the
borrower as sufficiently risky to warrant, for
example, an accounting method change.
The questionnaire further investigated the likeli-
hood of various contract modifications being re-
quired assuming that the contract was, in fact,
being renegotiated. Table 4 summarises the
results.
In both the 'breach shown by accounts' and
'prior warning' scenarios respondents stated they
were more likely to impose certain costly contract
modifications, such as additional security and div-
idend and capital spending restrictions, than to
permit relaxation of existing covenant constraints.
Thus, in the case where a breach is shown by the
accounts, there is a 15% overall stated likelihood
that, for example, additional security will be re-
quired compared with a 12% likelihood that
covenants will be relaxed. The difference between
the two sets of responses is statistically significant
at the 2.5% level (two-tailed). Where the customer
gives prior warning of an imminent breach, there
n Respondents used the same response categories as detailed
in Table 2 (i.e. 0-5%, 6-35%, etc). The mean percentages




where p, is the stated likelihood that respondent i would re-
negotiate the contract under a particular scenario (as summar-
ised in Table 3); x, is the stated likelihood that respondent i
would require a particular modification (using the mid-points of
the above response categories); and n . 33.
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Table 4






Contracts in Response to Imminent/Actual FRC
Prior Warning
of Imminent Breach	 Acquisition
Mean %	 Mean %
Additional security 15A 221 25
Dividend restrictions 14 20 24
Capital spending restrictions 13 19 24
Increased interest rate 11 14 18
FRCs relaxed 12*A 17011 310
n-33
are indicated using the Wilcoxon matched-pairsSignificant differences between pairs of observations
signed-ranks test (see Table 3 and footnote 21).
• at 5% (2 tailed).
O at 0.5% level (2 tailed).
• at 2.5% level (2 tailed).
• at 5% level (2 tailed).
is a greater stated likelihood (as was shown in
Table 3) that contract renegotiation will occur in
the first place. Within the context of such renego-
tiations, however, there is still a significantly higher
stated likelihood (at the 5% level, two-tailed) that
additional security will be required than that
covenants will be relaxed. This reflects the extent to
which the use of FRCs and the taking of security
can complement one another. In the eyes of re-
spondent bankers FRCs are being used as a trigger
to enable them not only to realise but also to
obtain security in a timely fashion.
Increased interest rates appear to be generally
the least frequent modification cited. It may be,
however, that this is likely to be required fre-
quently enough to be a matter of significance from
the borrower's viewpoint.
The likelihood that FRCs will be relaxed is also
relatively low in the cases of an actual breach and
forewarning of a breach due to deteriorating per-
formance. However, in the case of a breach caused
by goodwill arising from an acquisition, the relax-
ation of FRCs becomes the most likely stated
modification to be adopted. 23 This provides further
evidence of the pragmatic use of FRCs and the
willingness of banks to countenance adapting them
to new situations."
The difference between relaxation of FRG and additional
security is not statistically significant at the 5% level (two-
tailed), however.
21 Evidence from loan contract definitions supplied by
respondents indicates that it is not uncommon for the goodwill
relating to specific acquisitions to be included on an exceptional
basis, as part of net worth for FRC calculation purposes.
One respondent commented that a breach of FRC due to an
acquisition may not be entirely bad for the bank. Provided the
bank is happy with the new underlying situation, a customer
growing by acquisition can clearly be a source of increased
business.
Apart from the costs of loan acceleration and
contract renegotiation analysed above, the ques-
tionnaire was also designed to ascertain whether, in
addition, increased information requirements were
likely to be imposed in the different scenarios.
Table 5 shows the results to be similar across all
three cases. Respondents stated that both more
frequent and more in-depth information would be
required in approximately three-quarters of cases,
indicating the high probability that borrowers in
such situations would have to face the associated
costs.
Scenario (iv): Breach Caused by New SSAP
The previous section discussed scenarios that
represented real deterioration in the cutomer's
underlying risk. This section looks at the extent to
which costs are perceived likely to be imposed on
customers violating covenants solely due to a
change in generally accepted accounting principles.
Table 6 summarises the results.
In the overwhelming majority of cases (83%)
respondents stated that they thought that no real
penalty would be imposed on the borrower (leav-
ing aside the possibility of information costs), but
rather some form of recalculation would take place
in order to restore comparability between the
company's reported results and the FRC levels
specified in the contract. Twenty-six respondents
(79%) indicated a zero likelihood that a 'high cost'
alternative would be pursued.
Respondents were asked whether they would be
using 'rolling GAAP' or 'frozen GAAP in such a
situation as that of scenario (iv). In 69% of all
cases respondents indicated that they would amend


















Wording of Accounting Policy Change Question
'A company voluntarily makes a material income-
boosting change in its accounting methods. Prior to
making this change the company was close to its
FRC limits but not in breach. The change relates to
an accounting method which is not specifically
referred to in the loan contract. However, the
change is disclosed and is made with the concur-





Frequency with which Additional Information is Required by Lenders in Response to Actual/Imminent FRC
Breaches
Breach










More in-depth information than hitherto 77 79 75
More frequent information than hitherto 77 80 72
' n = 33
2 n = 32 (one respondent did not answer this question).
The mean percentages have been calculated by reference to the mid-points of the various response categories
(0-5. 6-35%. etc.).
Table 6
Lender Responses to FRC Breaches Caused by New SSAP Reducing Borrower's Reported
Alternative Options Adopted by Lenders
Recall loan immediately
Reserve rights to recall loan at any time. i.e. convert to on demand
Total 'high cost'
Waive breach. amend FRCs in contract to accord with new SSAP and
renegotiate other terms of contract
Waive breach unconditionally and amend FRCs in contract
to accord with new SSAP
Recalculate reported ratios using 'old' method of
accounting consistent with original contract





Frequency with which Additional Information Required
More in-depth information than hitherto
More frequent information than hitherto
n = 33
SSAP. 25 In only 28% of cases did the bankers state
they would recalculate the company's reported
results using the method of accounting prevailing
at the time the contract was drawn up and before
the SSAP in question came into force.
Real penalties are rarely imposed for 'GAAP
induced' breaches and there is a preference for
amending the contract definition rather than com-
panies' annual results. These findings provide sup-
port for Leftwich's (1983) conclusion, which was
based on an analysis of private loan agreements,
that 'rolling GAAP' tends to predominate.
In an average of only 14% of cases did respon-
dents state that they thought they would take the
"In 14% of cases this would be done together with the re-
negotiation of other contract terms and in 55% of cases with
no such renegotiation.
opportunity also to renegotiate other terms of the
contract. Fourteen respondents (42%) indicated a
zero likelihood of any such renegotiation. More-
over, as the various costly contract modifications
listed in Table 6 would each be imposed in only a
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Table 7
Lender Responses to a Scenario where Borrowers Make a Material Income-Boosting Accounting Method Change
Mean %
Contractually unable to take any action (i.e. must compare ratios as reported with
levels set in contract)
51
Contractually able to take some action to allow for change in accounting method:
No action actually taken 6
Tighten contractual FRC levels 16





Three respondents did not reply to this question, two of these on the grounds that they could pre-empt the
described situation from ever arising by means of a tightly defined contract. If these 2 respondents are included
as being able to take action 100% of the time, the means for n = 32 become 48% unable to take any action
and 52% able to do so.
Note: The mean percentages are the means of the actual percentages stated by the respondents.
minority of these 14% of cases, the overall per-
ceived likelihood of each of them actually occur-
ring is 5% or less. This further indicates
respondents' extreme reluctance to take any action
that would impose real costs in such instances. In
most cases the banker would in effect merely be
using the opportunity to ensure that there had been
no adverse change in the underlying risk.
Finally, in contrast to scenarios (i) to (iii) dis-
cussed earlier. Table 6 shows that a breach caused
by a new SSAP is expected to result in additional
information costs in less than 40% of instances on
average. It follows from these findings that. in so
far as the effect of covenants contained in bank
loan contracts is concerned, there is no reason to
expect mandated accountin g method changes to
affect share prices in the UK context.
Voluntary Accounting Policy Change
The previous sections have established the extent
of use of FRCs and the frequencies of various
options that bankers believe they would adopt
when such covenants are breached. But can bor-
rowers avoid such costs by voluntary accounting
policy changes? The questionnaire explored this
issue by asking lenders how they would react to
such a move on the part of a customer. Specifically,
a hypothetical situation was presented where a
company. close to its FRC limits, voluntarily
makes and discloses a material income-boosting
accounting policy change relating to an accounting
method not referred to in the contract. Figure 2
provides the actual wording of the question.
In this case the options open to the banker have
to be viewed as part of a two-stage process. Firstly,
in the scenario presented in Figure 2. the customer
is not yet. nor is necessarily expecting to be. in
actual breach of a covenant. Hence it has to be
established whether the banker feels contractually
entitled to take any action at all. Secondly, in those
instances where action is believed possible, the
relative frequency of the various options can be
examined.
Table 7 indicates that, on average, respondents
expressed a virtually even split as to whether they
believed they would, under the terms of a contract,
be able to take compensatory action. Respondents
indicated a mean 51% likelihood that no action
could be taken under such circumstances and that
they would therefore have to compare ratios as
reported with the levels as set in the contract, with
the customer in effect reaping the benefit of the
accounting policy change. The .range of opinion in
this scenario would seem to reflect the underlying
complexity of the situation. This is because the
ability of a banker to take action to mitigate the
impact of disclosed accounting policy changes may
depend, in any particular case, on at least the
following three factors:
(i) The presence of some 'sweep up' clause in the
contract that could be relied upon by the
banker to cover the situation.'
26 The main examples of such clauses are firstly those that
require accounting principles to be consistently applied and.
secondly, the material adverse change clause which makes it
an event of default if such a change occurs in the borrower's
situation. The presence or absence of a material adverse
change clause is itself a matter for negotiation. Donaldson and
Donaldson express the opinion that FRCs themselves constitute
a more effective trigger mechanism than the material adverse
change clause and that, as a result. 'where a company has
negotiated a meaningful set of covenants, it can legitimately
refuse to accept a continuing material adverse change clause'
(1982, p. 148).
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(ii) The precise wording of the above clauses. e.g.
whether or not the bank has sole discretion
to decide upon materiality.
(iii) The extent to which the bank could rely on
such clauses should litigation result.
Given an approximately 50% likelihood that
some action appears contractually possible, what
options do bankers believe they would adopt in
such circumstances? Table 7 shows that respon-
dents expressed an approximately 1 in 8 likelihood
that in fact no action would be taken, despite a
perceived contractual ability to do so. There is thus
an overall likelihood of a little under 60% that, in
the event of a disclosed accounting policy change,
no action would in fact be taken.
In the remaining cases, the banker would restore
the original comparability between the reported
ratios and those defined in the contract. In contrast
to the case of a new SSAP, however, the majority
of such adjustments would be to the reported ratios
rather than to the FRC levels in the contract.27'
The findings reported in this section indicate
that, for UK companies with FRCs in their bank
loan agreements, opportunistic management be-
haviour may be a significant explanatory variable
in the choice of accounting methods.
Summary and conclusions
This study has sought to establish the extent of use
of FRCs in UK term bank loan contracts and the
factors with which bankers perceive their use to be
associated: the costs imposed on borrowers in cases
of breach or near breach of FRCs: and the likely
impact on the borrower's standing with the bank
of changes in accounting method, whether required
by changes in standard practice or purely volun-
tary.
The findings are based on bankers' perceptions
of these issues as elicited by a survey questionnaire.
They therefore may not represent the actual extent
to which FRCs are used and how bankers react to
particular situations in practice. However, these
issues are all subject to careful negotiation by the
contracting parties and the findings of this study
are of value in providing an analysis of the views
of one of the parties to such negotiations.
In addition, the results relate to private bank
loan agreements and should not be extended to
"The differences between responses in the two cases (new
SSAP and voluntary accounting change) regarding both re-
calculation of reported ratios and amending contractual FRC
levels are significant at the l% level using the two-tailed
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test.
'it should be noted that the above analysis relates to
disclosed accounting policy changes. Apart from these there
may well be accounting policy changes which a company and
its auditors would be comfortable about not disclosing, which
would severely limit a lender's room for manoeuvre.
public debt contracts. However, private debt is a
relatively more important source of corporate
finance in the UK than in the US. This is also true
of Australia where several researchers have investi-
gated the role of lending agreements in accounting
method choice.
FRCs were stated to be in widespread use in
respondents' organisations. bein g used in at least
two-thirds of loans in excess of El million. The
sampling frame adopted. comprisin g as it did
organisations which used FRCs sufficiently for the
questionnaire to be appropriate. may be said to
have biased the results upwards. However, it can
be argued that the population of respondents does.
in fact, represent institutions responsible for the
majority of term lending in the UK.
These lenders suggest that the presence of FRCs
in term loan contracts is associated with size of
loan and high financial gearing. Other. albeit less
significant, factors include smaller company size
(i.e., sales of about £100 million rather than of
about E.1 billion), longer term of loan (i.e.. in excess
of five years) and, to some extent. the absence of
security. Some evidence was obtained indicating
that there is a degree of opposition among UK
companies to the use of FRCs and that larger
companies are sometimes able to resist their in-
clusion in loan contracts.
A number of clear patterns emerge regarding
the ways in which respondents believe they would
react to cases of FRC breach or potential breach.
Imposition of 'high cost' penalties on borrowers
such as immediate repayment of the loan or its
conversion into an on-demand loan are. taken
together, the single most likely alternatives that
bankers may adopt in cases of straight FRC
breach. However. where the customer maintains
open channels of communication with the bank
or where a breach would be caused by an impend-
ing acquisition. contract renegotiation or tempor-
ary waiver of the breach become more likely
responses.
In cases of breach shown by the accounts or
imminent breach notified in advance the most
likely contract renegotiations would either help
secure the lender's position (additional security) or
ensure the retention of funds within the company
(dividend and capital spending restrictions). Where
the breach is caused by goodwill from an acqui-
sition, however, the relaxation of FRCs is the most
frequent contract adjustment, which is indicative
of bankers' prime interest being in the nature of the
underlying risk.
Technical breaches caused by a new SSAP were
found to be likely to cause very few real costs to
borrowers. It was also found that in just under
60% of cases, lenders said they would take no
action in response to a disclosed voluntary ac-
counting policy change, whether due to contractual
limitations or for other reasons.
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The extent of use of FRCs in UK bank loan
contracts raises questions as to which ratios are
generally used for this purpose and how effective
they are, if at all, in signalling financial distress or
changes in lenders' underlying risk. Furthermore,
research into those FRCs that are widely used and
how the accounting numbers are defined could
help direct the attention of accounting standard
setters to those accounting issues which can poten-
tially have significant economic consequences in
this context.
In addition, the extent of use of FRCs in UK
bank loan contracts indicates that contract theory
based research should prove fruitful in a UK
environment. The findings suggest that tests of the
'debt/equity hypothesis' in accounting method
choice research should not treat all companies with
a high debt/equity ratio as members of a homo-
geneous population. Those companies whose gear-
ing has increased due to an acquisition programme
need to be distinguished from those experiencing
an organic deterioration in performance. Account-
ing issues may be of less importance to the former
group, since such companies are less likely to
suffer high cost alternatives in cases of covenant
violation.
The issue of when a lender opts for a high cost
reaction to covenant breach as compared with
relaxing FRC limits requires further investigation.
It may be linked with the way in which FRC limits
are set when the contract is drawn up and the
problem of arriving at appropriate ratio levels.
Where limits are too tight, FRC violation may
happen prematurely and relaxation of limits will be
the appropriate response. Where they are too
loose. however. FRC breach may occur too late to
save the company and recall of the loan ma y be the
only alternative.
It would appear that standard setters need not
be overly concerned with the potential negative
economic impacts of new accounting standards
attributed to bank loan covenants. Naturally this
does not extend to other possible economic conse-
quences of a new standard such as direct cash flow
implications and/or the disclosure of new infor-
mation that may alter perceptions of a company's
risk or impose proprietary costs. However, even
thou gh it may be unlikely that high cost penalties
will be imposed in certain circumstances, if corpor-
ate management perceive a possibility that they
could be imposed. this may be enough to influence
their accounting choices. This is an area that may
warrant further investigation.
It would also be of interest to extend our
understanding of the circumstances that lead
bankers to say that they can or cannot take
appropriate action in response to an accounting
policy change. Furthermore, the likely efficacy of
accounting method changes in avoiding FRC
breaches reinforces the earlier conclusion that con-
tract theory based research has the potential to
extend our understanding of the factors that gov-
ern accounting method choice in a UK context.
In- conclusion, the widespread use of FRCs
indicates that this subject area carries implications
for accounting standard setters. This research
shows that the costs to borrowers of covenant
violations resulting from changes in accounting
standards appear to be relatively low. It also shows
that voluntary accounting method changes by bor-
rowers may often be an effective means of avoiding
covenant violation. Further investigation is needed
to ascertain, firstly, to what extent accounting
standard setters can in fact safely ignore the issue
of the effect of new standards on technical
covenant breaches and, secondly, how far the
standard setting programme should focus on those
accounting matters which have the greatest effect
on the ratios most widely used in loan covenants.
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Appendix
Summary and Questionnaire
Q.1.	 State job title.
Q.2. For each of the three loan size categories (under
£250.000. £250,000—£1 million and over £1 million)
indicate the approximate percentage of:
(a) loan agreements that are secured;
(b) secured loan agreements which contain finan-
cial ratio covenants;
(c) unsecured loan agreements which contain
financial ratio covenants.
Q.3. For each of the following circumstances indicate
under what circumstances you are more likely to
include FRG in the loan contract:
(a) Term of loan is 1-5 years; over 5 years: makes
no difference;
(b) Borrower is a plc with sales of about LI
billion; sales of about £100 million; size makes
no difference;
(c) Borrower is a plc with sales of about £100
million; a private company with sales of about
£100 million; makes no difference whether
public or private.
- (d) Company's total debt/equity ratio is high (i.e.
about 75% of comparable companies have a
lower debt/equity ratio); is low: makes no
difference.
Q.4.	 Indicate whether your bank uses FRCs to a greater
or lesser extent today than it did five years ago.
Q.5-Q.8. These questions deal in turn with the four scenarios
detailed in Exhibit I.
(a) Indicate the frequency with which you would
require the customer to supply accounting




(b) Indicate the likelihood of your adopting each
of the following options by allocating 100
points among them (the following reproduces
the options for scenarios (ii) and nil); those
for scenarios (i) and (iv) vaned with the
circumstances):
—Convert into an on-demand loan
—Retain as a term loan but renegoti-
ate the terms of the contract
—Waive FRC restrictions temporarily
in expectation of an improvement in
the company's situation
—No other action taken
—Other (please specify)
(c) In those instances when you would renegoti-
ate the terms of the contract in the situation
described, indicate the likely frequency of








Q.9.	 This question deals with the scenario detailed in
Figure 2.
(a) Indicate the likely frequency with which the
following options are contractually open to
you by allocating 100 points among them:
—Bank able to take action to allow for
the change in accounting method
—Bank not able to take any action
(b) In those cases where the bank is entitled
contractually to allow for a change in ac-
counting methods, indicate the actual likeli-
hood of each of the following options by
allocating 100 points among them:
—Tighten the levels at which the FRCs
are set in the contract
—Recalculate the company's reported
financial ratios using the "old" method
of accounting that was used before the
change
—No actual action taken
—Other (please specify)
APPENDIX A2
FINANCIAL RATIO COVENANTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Subject Matter 
This questionnaire is about the use of accounting data in
term loan contract agreements with companies. The data may
be absolute amounts (e.g. net worth) or accounting ratios
(e.g. borrowings to net worth).	 In this questionnaire all
such items are referred to as Financial Ratio Covenants.
2. Scope
The questionnaire does not relate to specialised forms of
lending such as project loans, or lending to specialised
sectors such as shipping, property, aerospace or energy. In
your answers, therefore, please ignore these areas of
lending.
3. Point of Contact 
Should you have any queries regarding the completion of this
questionnaire, please contact:
David Citron









Q.1 Please state your present job title:
1 =
2 =
Q.2 This question relates to term loan agreements currently in force
with which you have been involved.
(a) For each of the three loan size categories shown below, please
indicate the approximate percentage of loan agreements that are
secured. Tick one box on each line.





Size Category of loan	 0-5%	 6-35%	 36-65%	 66-95%	 96-100%	 size
£250,000 - £1	 million = = = =
Over £1
	 million I-1 = = =










(b) For each loan size category, please indicate the approximate
percentage of Secured loan agreements which contain financial
ratio covenants. Tick one box on each line.






Size Category of loan	 0-5%	 6-35% 36-65%	 66-95%	 96-100%	 size
Under £250,000	 = = = D = CI
	
6 ri
£250,000 - £1 million = =	 =	 =	 =	 =	 I 7 =
Over £1 million	 = =	 =	 =	 =	 =	 8 F--1
(c) For each loan size category, please indicate the approximate
percentage of unsecured loan agreements which contain financial
ratio covenant77--TTEV—One box on each line.
% of unsecured loan contracts
with financial ratio covenants





0-5%	 6-35% 36-65%	 66-95%	 96-100%
	 size
Under £250,000
£250,000 - £1 million
Over £1 million
El El =	 El =
El El = El = =





Q.3 For each of the following situations (a ) to (e), please indicate
under what circumstances you are more likely to include financial
ratio covenants in the loan contract.
Tick one box in each case.
Financial ratio covenants are more likely to be included when:
(a) Term of loan is 1 to 5 years
Term of loan is over 5 years
Term of loan makes no difference
Unable to answer as only 1-5 year
or only over 5 year loans dealt with
If term of loan is a determining factor, please explain why:
(b) Loan is sterling
Loan is in foreign currency
Currency of loan makes no difference
Unable to answer as only sterling or
only foreign currency loans dealt with






(c) Borrower is a plc with sales of about £1
billion ("large")
Borrower is a plc with sales of about
£100 million ("small")
Size of plc makes no difference
Unable to answer as only "large" or only
"small" plc's dealt with.	
=
18
If size of plc is a determining factor, please explain why:
20 F-1
(d) Borrower is a plc with sales of about £100 million.
Borrower is a private company with sales of about
£100 million.
Makes no difference whether company public or private.
Unable to answer as only public or only private
companies dealt with. 21 Li








(e) Company's total debt/equity ratio is high, i.e. about
75% of comparable companies have a lower debt/equity
(total debt = this loan + all previously existing debt) n
Company's total debt/equity ratio is low, i.e. about
75% of comparable companies have a higher debt/equity
ratio
24E1Total debt/equity ratio makes no difference




Q.4 (a) Would you say that your bank currently uses financial ratio
covenants to a greater or lesser extent today than it did five
years ago? Please tick the appropriate box.
To a much greater extent than five years ago
To a somewhat greater extent than five years ago n
No change from five years ago 	 CI
To a somewhat lesser extent than five years ago
To a much lesser extent than five years ago.
















Q.5 This question deals with the case of a company whose financial 	 LEAVE
	
director contacts you two months before the company's financial year-
	 BLANK
end. He informs you that there is a high probability that the
accounts for the current year a will show his company to be materially
in breach of a financial ratio covenant, due to a deterioration in the
company's performance. The management accounts for the first nine
months show the company to be close to its financial ratio covenants
but not yet in breach.
(a) Please indicate the frequency with which you would require the
customer to supply accounting information additional to that
which had been provided by them hitherto. Tick one box on each lin
Almost
	 Hardly
always	 Usually	 Sometimes	 Seldom	 ever
96-100% 66-95%





(b) Apart from requiring the supply of additional information in this
situation, certain other options are open to you as well. Please
indicate the likelihood of your adopting each of the following
options by allocating 100 points among them.
( i )	 Convert the loan into an on-demand loan
(ii)	 Retain as a term loan but renegotiate
the terms of the contract.
(iii)	 Waive financial ratio covenant
restrictions temporarily in expectation
of an improvement in the company's
situation
(iv) No other action taken
(v) Other (please specify):
100
If you have allocated any points to option (ii) above, indicating that
renegotiation of the contract is an option you might adopt, please





(c) In those instances when you would renegotiate the terms of the
contract in the situation described please indicate the likely





always	 Usually	 Sometimes	 Seldom	 ever
96-100%	 66-95%	 36-65%	 6-35%	 0-5%
Increased interest
rate	 = = n = =




	 n	 =	 =
Capital spending
restrictions imposed n	 =	 =	 =	 D















Q.6 This question deals with the case of a customer who is finalising
arrangements for an acquisition.	 Existing loan agreements contain no
restrictions on such acquisition activity. However, the financial
director informs you that this acquisition will result in a large
increase in goodwill on the consolidated balance sheet and hence the
customer will find itself materially in breach of a number of its
existing financial ratio covenants. Owing to a planned programme of
asset disposals, however, the company expects to restore its financial
ratios to their current safe levels within the next three years.
(a) Please indicate the frequency with which you would require the
customer to supply accounting information additional to that
which had been provided by them hitherto.	 Tick one box on each
line.
Almost	 Hardly
always . Usually	 Sometimes	 Seldom	 ever




information required 19 FT
(b) Apart from requiring the supply of additional information in this
situation, certain other options are open to you as well. Please
indicate the likelihood of your adopting each of the following
options by allocating 100 points among them.
(i)	 Convert the loan into an on-demand loan
(ii)	 Retain as a term loan but renegotiate
the terms of the contract.
(iii) Waive financial ratio covenants temporarily in
expectation of an improvement in the company's
situation.
(iv) No other action taken
(v) Other (please specify):
•00
If you have allocated any points to option (ii) above, indicating
that renegotiation of the contract is an option you might adopt,
please answer question (c) on page 10. Otherwise proceed to





(c) In those instances when you would renegotiate the terms of the
contract in the situation described please indicate the likely





always	 Usually	 Sometimes	 Seldom	 ever
96-100%	 65-95%	 36-65%	 6-35%	 0-5%
Increased interest
rate	 =fl 11:




	 i---1	 Cl	 CI	 =	 =
Capital spending
restrictions imposed ED	 El	 D	 =	 =
Financial ratio

















Q.7	 This question deals with the case of a customer whose accounts
actually show a material non-technical breach of a financial ratio
covenant, e.g	 due to a real deterioration in the company's balance
sheet.
(a) In such a case a number of options are open to you. Please
indicate the likelihood of your adopting each of the following
options by allocating 100 points among them.
(i) Recall the loan immediately
(ii) Reserve your rights to recall the loan at any time,
i.e. convert it into an on-demand loan.
35=
36 Li
(iii) Waive	 the breach for a limited time in 	 the
expectation of an improvement in the customer's
position.	 37 Li
(iv) Waive the breach and renegotiate the terms of the
contract.	 38 =
(v) Waive the breach unconditionally with no change in
the terms of the contract 	 39 El
(vi) Other (please specify):






If you have allocated any points to option (iv) above, indicating
that renegotiation of the contract is an option you might adopt,
please answer question (b) on page 12 Otherwise proceed to




(b) In those instances when you would renegotiate the terms of the
contract, please indicate the likely frequency of each of the







96-100%	 66-95%	 36-65%	 6-35%	 0-5%
Increased interest rate 	 =	 CI	 0	 0	 = 43 71





CI 0 = 45 =
Capital spending
restrictions imposed	 El	 =	 =	 =	 =1 46 =
Financial ratio
covenants relaxed	 =	 =	 =	 LI	 = 471 1
Other (please specify)
	
0 0 CI CI =
	 CI 0 0 0 0
	 1= = 0 CI CI
(c) In such a case of a material non-technical breach, please
indicate the frequency with which you would require the customer
to supply accounting information additional to that which had




always	 Usually	 Sometimes	 Seldom	 ever



















Q.8 This question deals with the case of a customer involved in a material
technical breach of a financial ratio covenant caused solely by the
issuing of a new accounting standard (SSAP). The new standard has
required the customer to change its methods of accounting so that
reported profits are now lower than they would otherwise have been.
(a) Of the options which are open to you, please indicate the
likelihood of your adopting each one by allocating 100
points among the following alternative.
(i) Recall the loan immediately
(ii) Reserve your rights to recall the loan at
any time, i.e. convert it into an on-demand
loan.
(iii) Waive the breach unconditionally and amend
the levels at which the financial ratio
convenants have been set in the contract to
accord with the new accounting method.
(iv) Waive the breach and amend the levels of
the financial ratio covenants to accord
with the new accounting method but also
renegotiate other terms of the contract
(v) Recalculate the company's financial ratios
using the "old" method of accounting so as
to be consistent with the original
contract.
(vi) Other (please specify):
100
If you have allocated any points to option (iv) above, indicating
the renegotiation of the contract (other than technical
amendments to the financial ratio covenants to allow for the new
accounting method) is an option you might adopt, 	 please answer
question (b) on page 14.
	






(b) In those instances where you would renegotatiate the terms
of the contract, please indicate the likely frequency of










always	 Usually	 Sometimes	 Seldom	 ever








(c) In such a case of a technical breach, please indicate the
frequency with which you would require the customer to supply
accounting information additional to that which had been provided
by them hitherto. Tick one box on each line.
Almost	 Hardly
always	 Usually	 Sometimes	 Seldom	 ever










Q.9 A company voluntarily makes a material income-boosting change in its
accounting methods.	 Prior to making this change the company was
close to its financial ratio covenant limits but not in breach. The
change relates to an accounting method which is not specifically
referred to in the loan contract. However, the change is disclosed
and is made with the concurrence of the company's auditors.
(a) Please indicate the likely frequency with which the following
options are contractually open to you by allocating 100 points
among them:
(i) Bank is able take some action to allow for the
change in the accounting method.
(ii) Bank not able to take any action to allow for the
change in accounting method, i.e. it must calculate
the company's ratios as reported and compare them




If you have allocated any points to option (i) above, please
answer question (b) below. Otherwise proceed to question 10
on page 16.
(b) In those cases where the bank is entitled contractually
to allow for a change in accounting methods, please
indicate the actual likelihood of each of the following
options by allocating 100 points among them:
(i) Tighten the levels at which the financial ratio
covenants are set in the contract
(ii) Recalculate the company's reported financial ratios
using the "old" method of accounting that was used
before the change.
(iii)	 No actual action taken, i.e. ratios calculated as
reported and compared with the original levels set
in the contract.






Q.10 Tangible net worth is widely used in financial ratio covenant
calculations.	 Please indicate how frequently you permit customers to
include the following assets as part of their net worth.




always	 Usually	 Sometimes	 Seldom	 ever
96-100%	 66-95%	 36-65%	 6-35%	 0-5%
Patents and trade marks
Publishing rights
Brand names that have been
purchased
Brand names developed
by the company itself
Goodwill
Development expenditure
Thank you very much for your time and help in completing this questionnaire.
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Accounting Measurement Rules in
UK Bank Loan Contracts
David B. Citron*
Abstract—This paper examines the financial ratio covenants found in a sample of 25 UK bank loan contracts and
13 contract templates. Minimum net worth, interest cover and gearing are the most widely occumng ratios. GAAP
are used as the basis for all definitions. The definitions of net worth, borrowings and interest are frequently modified
in a conservative direction, drawing on information both from the notes to published accounts and from outside
those accounts. The definitions of profit, current assets and current liabilities, however, rarely deviate from GAAP.
Thus some definitions restrict corporate management's scope to avoid covenant violation through appropriate
accounting method choice while other definitions appear to permit it. Furthermore the widespread use of 'rolling'
GAAP means that standard setters need to bear in mind that new standards can cause covenant violations. The
findings of this study are consistent with those of previous research in the US and Australia.
Introduction
Financial ratio covenants (FRCs) are widely used
in UK bank loan (private debt) contracts. The
violation of loan covenants normally gives the
lender the right to accelerate repayment of the
loan. While such acceleration will not usually be
required immediately (Donaldson and Donaldson,
1982), the possibility always exists that this will
occur.' Moreover, even if the lender does not adopt
this ultimate sanction, it may still impose substan-
tial costs on the defaulting borrower, restricting
permitted activities and charging higher interest
rates.
The borrower/lender relationship is not the only
one in which FRCs- can play a key role. In con-
tested takeover battles the likelihood of a bidder
breaching its FRCs at an early date has been cited
by a competing bidder or a defending target on a
number of occasions.'
The author is lecturer in accounting at the City University
Business School. He acknowledges the helpful comments of two
anonymous referees on earlier drafts of this paper.
An example of this occurs in Magnet Group plc's buy-out
document of 19 January 1990 in which the directors state 'that
it is not unlikely that an Event of Default will occur in the
course of the next three years ... the directors are of the view
that the lenders to the buy-out Vehicle are likely to continue to
act commercially and realistically and not to demand immediate
repayment on non-material or merely technical Events of
Default'.
For example, refer to Dee Corporation's defence against
Barker & Dobson's bid in 1988. It was due to the claim of
insufficient disclosure of the conditions attached to Barker dc
Dobson's borrowings that The City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers was expanded to require that 'in a highly-leveraged
offer. the Panel will normally require that the offer document
contains a description of the financing arrangements' (Rule 24,
2(c)). Examples of other offers in which FRCs have played a
role are the 1989 bids of BDDP for Boase Massing Pollitt plc
and of Isosceles plc for the Gateway Corporation plc.
The above instances suggest that there is a
strong motivation for borrowers to avoid violating
FRCs. One way of achieving this may be by
appropriate choice of accounting methods and
hence the accounting definitions used in FRCs are
a matter of considerable importance.
Contracting theory suggests that the ratios
actually in use and their definitions are those that
maximise the wealth of the contracting parties
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). According to
theory, this set of ratios and their definitions
result from a trade-off between the benefits that
contracting provides by regulating share-
holder/lender conflict against the costs of that
contracting, such as bonding, monitoring and
renegotiation costs.
Research to date into the nature of the account-
ing ratios used in debt contracts has been con-
ducted predominantly in the US, the first in-depth
study in this area being Leftviich's analysis of
private debt contracts (1983). Leftwich finds that,
while generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) are widely used, systematic modifications
also occur. He also finds that definitions tend to
use GAAP current at the date of the calculation
('rolling' GAAP) rather than those in force
when the contract was drawn up ('frozen' GAAP);
that modifications tend to be conservative, with
the effect of reducing management's ability to
avoid covenant violation by choice of income- or
asset-inflating accounting procedures; and that
these modifications tend to consist of straight-
forward adjustments to the GAAP figures, thus
reducing monitoring costs. Smith and Warner
(1979) find that, in public debt issues. accounting
definitions usually accord with unmodified
GAAP. In their studies of Australian public debt
issues, however, Whittred and Zimmer (1986) and
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Stokes and Leong (1988) find a modified GAAP
approach.
El-Gazzar, Lilien and Pastena's (1989) research
into US lessees' private lending agreements finds
little attempt to modify accounting definitions
to include off-balance sheet finance. However,
El-Gazzar and Pastena's (1990) study of US
private lending agreements finds that tailoring
often aims to adapt GAAP to a cash flow basis or
to focus on legal borrowing entities, thus facilitat-
ing the monitoring of borrowers' ability to repay.
This paper uses the contracting theory frame-
work to investigate the accounting measurement
rules used in those FRCs most widely found in UK
bank loan contracts. It thus provides, for the first
time, empirical evidence on the identity and defi-
nitions of the FRCs generally found in private debt
contracts in the UK.
These issues are of relevance to future research
seeking to understand the determinants of ac-
counting method choice in the UK. This is because
the likelihood that managers will choose a particu-
lar accounting method in order to avoid breach of
a FRC depends, in part, on exactly how the
accounting numbers are contractually defined
(Whittred and Zimmer, 1986, p. 20).
As far as accounting regulators are concerned,
the extent to which GAAP are used and the way
in which contracts accommodate changes in
GAAP are important as indicating the impact that
new accounting standards could have on the con-
tractual relationship between banker and cus-
tomer. 3 Furthermore, the extent to which
modifications draw on disclosures in the notes to
the accounts as opposed to relying on the presen-
tation in the main financial statements should
throw some light on the disclosure vs. presentation
debate.
Data sources
The data for this paper are derived from extracts
from bank loan contracts obtained from 22 separ-
ate sources. A relatively wide range of supplying
institutions was deliberately sought in preference
to obtaining a large number of contracts from a
small number of institutions. This was to minimise
the problem of duplication that would be likely to
arise if too many contracts from any one insti-
'MacArthur (1988), in his study of corporate comments on
Exposure Drafts numbers 1 to 31, reports that ED 29 (Account-
ing for Leases and Hire Purchase Contracts) and ED 30
(Accounting for Goodwill) specifically requested comment on
the likelihood that their proposals would cause or hasten loan
defaults. However a review of Exposure Drafts numbers 32 to
55, published subsequent to MacArthur's study, reveals no
further instances when this issue has been raised. While the
majority of these Exposure Drafts had little bearing on contract
definitions, a small number could have influenced reported ratio
levels (e.g. ED40. Stocks and Long-Term Contracts; ED42,
Accounting for Special Purpose Transactions).
tution were included in the analysis. This is because
each lending institution tends to use its own tem-
plate as the starting point for negotiating actual
contract conditions.
Three different sources for loan contracts were
identified: term lending institutions, law firms and
published offer documents. Fifty major term lend-
ing institutions were contacted,' of whom 13 (26%)
agreed to provide loan contract details. While 57%
of the UK clearers and 30% of the UK merchant
banks that were contacted provided contracts, only
8% of the overseas banks (two US banks) did so.
The findings, therefore, reflect a bias towards the
practice of the UK clearers, although this is accept-
able in view of their predominance in the UK loan
market.
Contracts were also obtained from five of the
eight law firms listed in The Hambro Company
Guide (August 1988) as having 50 or more public
company clients. The companies likely to have
published covenant details as required by the City
Code on Takeovers and Mergers (see footnote 2)
were located by examining Acquisitions and Merg-
ers International, February 1989 to October 1990,
for contested cash and/or loan note bids in excess
of £20 million and from well-known buy-out cases.
Table 1 gives details of the 25 contracts studied.
These contracts were drawn up predominantly in
1988 or 1989. As the Table shows, 13 templates,
which are used as a basis for drafting and negoti-
ating actual agreements, were also obtained.'
The sections of contracts that have been ob-
tained are those specifying the financial covenants
and the accounting item definitions. Since the focus
of the study is on the nature of accounting
measurement rules, relevant financial ratio
covenants are defined as those derived from com-
panies' financial statements. Therefore covenants
such as direct restrictions on share redemptions or
asset disposals have been omitted from the analy-
sis. Virtually every contract was anonymous to
safeguard banker confidentiality.
Ratio covenants used
Of the 22 contracts for which there was a complete
listing of the FRCs included, 19 (86%) contained
between three and five FRCs. Five is the maximum
*These comprised: (i) all eight members of the Committee of
London and Scottish Bankers plus two other British clearers
engaged in corporate term loans; (ii) all four members of the
Northern Ireland Bankers' Association; (iii) nine of the sixteen
UK merchant banks that comprised the Accepting Houses
Committee as at December 1988 plus one other leading mer-
chant bank; (iv) the 26 US. Canadian. Australian. French,
German and Swiss banks listed in The Banker (November 1988)
as having over 200 UK employees (this being used as the only
indicator available of size).
'Not all of the 38 contract extracts contained full details of all
financial covenants plus detailed accounting definitions. Where
a subset of the 38 has been used this is indicated.
Table 1
Analysis of Loan Contract Extracts Used
From banks 10 9 19 13
From law firms 10 4 14 5
From offer documents 5 5
25 13 38 22
*These are: Isosceles plc's offer for The Gateway Corporation plc: The
Boots Company plc for Ward White Group plc: and Magnet Group plc's













Financial Ratio Covenants Most Frequently Occurring
Number of occurrences
In actual	 In standard
contracts	 contract forms
(n= 22)	 (n = 12)
Total
(n = 34)
Minimum net worth 18 11 29
Interest cover 17 10 27
Geanng ( = % of borrowings) 16 11 27
Current ratio 6 7 13
Asset disposals/net worth 4 4
Leverage ( = % of liabilities) 3 3 6
Cash flow/relevant expenditures 3 2 5
Minimum profit before interest and taxation 2 1 3
Dividend cover 1 3 4
15 other ratios were found, none occurring more than twice in total.
number found in any one contract.' Minimum net
worth, interest cover and gearing (the ratio of bor-
rowings to net worth) 7
 are the three most frequently
occurring covenants, both in actual contracts and
in the standard forms (see Table 2). Nineteen (86%)
of the 22 actual contracts contain at least two of
these three FRCs, and eleven (50%) contain all
three of them. In nine of these eleven contracts these
three FRCs are supplemented by additional FRCs.
The frequency with which various FRCs occur
in the private debt contracts analysed here is
compared in Table 3 with the findings of two US
studies of predominantly private debt contracts
and two papers on Australian public debt issues. In
contrast to the UK contracts, the US agreements
make greater use of dividend restrictions and the
&Three standard contract forms contained more than five
FRCs, but not all of these may remain in the finally negotiated
agreement.
'This definition of gearing is in contrast to that of leverage
which, in the few contracts where it occurs, is the ratio of total
liabilities to net worth.
minimum working capital covenant, but far less
use of interest cover. The Australian public debt
agreements appear to rely, in the main, on only two
leverage ratios. Further research would be needed
to ascertain whether this is typical of public debt
agreements in other countries.
All the FRCs are maintenance covenants, i.e. they
are in force over the life of the contract, as opposed
to applying only if additional debt is to be issued.'
In some contracts the FRC levels vary over time,
with gearing expected to fall and net worth and
interest cover to rise.' Smith and Warner (1979)
'Contrast with Whittred and Zimmer (1986) who find lever-
age to be a maintenance covenant but the interest cover
restriction to apply only if a further debt issue is proposed.
'Of the 19 actual contract extracts which stated a gearing
covenant level, eight were in the 75%-100% range, nine were
between 101% and 150 0/s and two were 200%. Of the 17 interest
cover covenants, three were 2.0 or less. 11 were between 2.1 and
3.0, and three were 4.0 or above. Of the six current ratios, four
were 1.25:1 and two were above this level. Where the FRC level
changed over the life of the contract, the levels quoted above are
the last ones specified.
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Table 3










Press! Weintrop	 Whittred 'Zimmer	 Stokes 1 Leong
(1990)	 (1986)	 (1988)
US	 Australia	 Australia
Private & public 	 Public	 Public
(n = 83)	 (n = 41)	 (n = 58)
Minimum net worth 1(82%) 4(27%) 3(46%)
Interest cover 2(77%) 4(15%)
Gearing (	 % of borrowings) 3(73%) 2(49%)
Current ratio 4(27%) 3(38%) 5(22%)
Asset disposals/net worth 5(18%)
Leverage (	 % of liabilities) 1(93%) 1 (95%)
Dividend restriction 2(62%) 1(61%)
Minimum working capital 1 (76%) 4(45%)





1. This table ranks the five most frequently occurring ratios found in each study, provided their frequency
was at least 15%.
2. n represents the number of contracts analysed in each study. The percentages indicate the frequency with
which each covenant occurred among the contracts studied.
3. There is some overlap in the trust deeds covered by Whittred/Zimmer (1986). who analyse debentures
and notes including convertibles. and Stokes/Leong (1988) who look only at convertible notes.
suggest a framework which groups covenants under
four headings: production/investment covenants, div-
idend covenants, financing covenants and bonding
covenants. UK bank loan contracts appear to use
the frequently occurring interest cover and gearing
covenants to retrict companies' financing policies,
while minimum net worth and gearing are the most
widely used FRCs for constraining excessive dividend
payments. Regarding production/investment policies.
Smith and Warner point out that it may not be
feasible to use covenants to deal with lender/owner
conflicts such as the underinvestment problem, since
it will be excessively costly to monitor which pro-
jects a borrower has failed to undertake. Dividend
and financing covenants, such as the maintenance of
a minimum net worth, may be indirect yet effective
ways of dealing with this issue. A minimum current
ratio, which is found in over one quarter of actual
contracts studied. may also be helpful in requiring
a company to maintain a certain level of assets.'°
Reporting covenants
Accounts-related reporting covenants specify
which financial statements are to be supplied and
'°Common non-accounts based restrictive covenants occumng
in the contracts studied are similar to those found in other sur-
veys, viz: restrictions on additional borrowings or the granting
of prior security (relating to financing policy); restrictions on asset
disposals, mergers and acquisitions and on capital expenditure
(all relating to production/investment policies): and restncnons
on share redemptions (equivalent to a dividend covenant).
which accounting techniques are to be used.
Twenty-two of the contract extracts studied
contained sections dealing with these provisions
in general (detailed accounting definitions are
analysed in subsequent sections).
All of these contracts require the latest audited
accounts to be submitted. The most frequently
occurring additional requirement is for manage-
ment accounts, specified in ten (45%) of the 22
contracts (see Table 4). These are required with
various degrees of frequency, e.g. monthly, quar-
terly or at 'reasonable' intervals, and are usually to
be drawn up on the same basis as the annual
accounts. This requirement to supply management
accounts in just under one half of the contracts
studied indicates a certain level of demand for
financial information on a more frequent than six
monthly basis. Often an officer of the company
may be required to certify that the results in the
management accounts comply with the financial
covenants.
The great majority of actual contracts specify
the use of 'rolling' GAAP, i.e. those generally
accepted accounting principles in use in the UK at
the date of the calculation (see Table 4)•" This
conforms with Leftwich's finding relating to pri-
vate lending agreements in the US, cited above.
"In those contracts where GAAP are specified as the basis for
calculations and no further details are provided for dealing with
changes in GAAP, then 'rolling' GAAP has been assumed in
Table 4.
Number of occurrences
In actual	 In standard
contracts	 contract forms	 Total

























Procedure specified for dealing with changes in GAAP
'Rolling' GAAP
'Rolling' GAAP but original method applies until appropriate
revisions incorporated in contract
Predominantly 'rolling' GAAP with elements of 'frozen' GAAP
'Rolling' GAAP but lender can require accounts to be redrafted
according to original method
'Rolling' GAAP but borrower must also supply data according to
original method
'Frozen' GAAP. but subject to negotiation where differences are
material
'Frozen' GAAP subject to the interpretation of the facility agent
'Frozen' GAAP




One quarter of the actual contracts and one half of
the standard ones adopt various combinations of
'rolling' and 'frozen' GAAP. The tendency to
favour 'rolling' GAAP, particularly in the actual
contracts, lends some support to the view that the
costs of redrafting accounts to accord with 'frozen'
GAAP are considered to exceed the costs of tech-
nical default caused solely by changes in GAAP.
However, the use of 'rolling' GAAP does mean
that new accounting standards can cause covenant
breaches.
Accounting definitions
This section analyses the nature of the accounting
definitions specified for the four most frequently
used FRCs shown in Table 2: net worth, borrow-
ings, profit, interest, current assets and current
liabilities.
Net Worth
Typical net worth covenants read:
The company shall ensure that Consolidated
Tangible Net Worth shall at all times be not less
than ix.
The company will ensure that, for each of the
periods set out below, the financial condition of
the Group shall be such that Consolidated
Tangible Net Worth is not less than the amount
set out against that period.
The definitions of net worth used in the mini-
mum net worth covenants studied always exclude
at least some intangible assets' : (see Table 5).13
Some specific goodwill items may be permitted to
remain in loan contracts for the financing of
acquisitions or buy-outs. In 11 (73%) of the 15
actual net worth definitions, all intangibles are
excluded (see Panel 5a). Furthermore the revalua-
tion reserve is generally only included up until a
specified date and/or if arrived at by an indepen-
dent valuation (see Panel 5c). Adjustments to take
account of post-balance sheet events are also
common.
The limitations on the inclusion of intangible
assets and the revaluation reserve, as well as the
occasional specific underlining of the requirement
for accounting consistency, promote both the
objectivity and conservativeness of the figures
used, thus reducing management's scope for
manoeuvre to use accounting treatments to avoid
covenant violation. The exclusion of intangibles
also has the effect of ignoring those assets which
would be unlikely to realise cash for the lenders
(see El-Gazzar and Pastena, 1990).
The main constituent of net worth not subject to
careful definition is the Profit and Loss Account
balance, nor is this dealt with in any more detail
' 2Leftwich's (1983) analysis of US private loan agreements
and Whittred and Zimmer's (1986) study of Australian public
debt deeds also find that goodwill and intangibles are frequently
excluded from the borrower's asset base.
°Tables 5 to 7 detail all the accounting measurement defi-
nitions that occurred more than once in the contracts studied.




In actual In standard
contracts contract forms Total
(n = 15) (n = 10) (n = 25)
Net worth includes:
Paid up issued share capital 15 10 25
Proposed share issues already underwritten 2 — 2
Specific reserves detailed:
Share premium account 10 5 15
Capital redemption reserve 8 5 13
Profit and loss account 11 8 19
Capital and revenue reserves 11 10 21
Specified loan accounts 4 — 4
Net worth excludes (entirely or in part):
Intangible assets (see Panel 5a) 15 10 25
Taxation provisions (see Panel 5b) 11 9 20
Revaluation reserves (see Panel 5c) I i 8 19
Post-balance sheet date adjustments to incorporate:
Alterations in group structure 3 4 7
Proposed distributions not provided for in last accounts 6 6 12
Changes in capital and reserves:
Other than profit and loss account changes I_ ' 4
Any such changes as appropnate — 3 3
Fixed asset acquisitions/disposals 1 — i_
Adiustments for accounting consistency
Specifically included in net worth definition 4 4 8
Note: Twelve additional amendments to the net worth definition were found, each occurring only once.
Panel 5a
Intangible Asset Exclusions
Entirely excluded	 II 9 20




All tax provisions explicitly excluded	 4 4 8





Excluded if subsequent to a certain date unless
independently valued	 5 6
Excluded if subsequent to a stated date 	 1 7 9
Excluded unless independently valued	 2
II 8 19
elsewhere in the definitions of other items related
to profits. such as interest cover.
The inclusion of specific loan accounts, e.g.
subordinated debt or a specific inter-company loan,
as part of net worth in four of the 15 definitions
indicates a willingness to take a view of the econ-
omic substance of a situation rather than necess-
arily to adhere to conventional accounting usage.
Interest Cover
Typical interest cover covenants read as follows:
The Borrower shall ensure that the ratio of
Profits Before Interest and Tax to Interest
Charges shall not at any time during each
financial period specified below, fall below the
ratio set out opposite such period, provided that
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the ratio shall be calculated as at the last day of
each month by reference to the immediately
preceding period of twelve months.
The Company shall ensure that Consolidated
Profits before Interest and Tax in respect of any
financial year shall at all times exceed x% of
Consolidated Net Finance Charges for such
financial year.
The most widely used definition of interest cover
is the ratio of profit from ordinary or operating acti-
vities (calculated before interest, taxation and extra-
ordinary items) to gross finance charges (see Table 6).
These items are almost universally calculated on a
group basis as shown in the consolidated accounts.
There is a strong preference for the 'cover'




In actual	 In standard
contracts	 con; 'act forms




, Profit to gross interest 	 9 8 17




Profit	 2 5 7
Profit from ordinary activities	 4 1 5
Operating profit 	 2 4
Trading profit	 2 3
Other (each occurring once) 	 2
12 9 /1
Calculated before deducting/crediting:
Interest	 8 8 16
Net interest	 3 I 4
Taxation	 11 9 20
Extraordinary items	 8 6 14
Exceptional items	 2 2 4
Fixed asset disposal gains/losses 	 - 7 1
Goodwill amortisation 	 1 1 1




Detailed listing of expenses	 1 2
Exceptional items	 1 1 2
Other inclusions (each occurring once)	 3 4
Interest
Includes:
Interest (stated explicitly)	 11 8 19
Lease and HP finance (see Panel 6a) 	 7 4 II
Financing costs, charges and expenses	 6 4 10
Commissions	 6 3 9
Discounts
	 3 3 6
Capitalised interest	 2 3 5
Arrangement fees	 2 2 4
Commitment commission 	 2 2 4
Other inclusions (each occurring once) 2
Panel 6a
Lease and HP Finance Inclusions
Interest element in leasing and HP payments included	 4 2 6
Interest elements of finance lease and HP payments included 	 1 1 2
Interest component of rentals under finance leases included 	 2 1 3
7 4 11
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to interest as opposed to a measure of cash flow to
'relevant payments' (e.g. interest plus loan repay-
ments). Thus, interest cover appears in 17 out of 22
actual contracts (77%) while a cash flow cover
measure only appears in three contracts (14%) (see
Table 2). Furthermore each of these three contracts
also contains an interest cover covenant.
There is little evidence that contracts attempt to
adjust for accounting procedures that are particu-
larly susceptible to management discretion. Profit
before interest and taxation is usually taken as
presented in the accounts. No case was found, for
example, where a lender reserved the right to
reclassify items classified by the borrower as extra-
ordinary. Since definitions of Net Worth also do
not contain any restrictions as to how the Profit
and Loss Account balance should be measured, the
only protection that the lender has with respect to
these items appears to come from the universal
requirements in contracts for accounting consist-
ency and for the use of audited accounts."
As shown in Table 6, interest is generally more
closely defined, capturing the entire range of
financing charges whatever they may be called.'
However, issues which have engaged accounting
policy makers are not widely addressed in the
contracts analysed. Thus, the interest element in
leasing and HP payments is explicitly included in
only just over one half of contracts studied
(see Panel 6a), while capitalised interest is rarely
included explicitly.
There does appear to be an imbalance in the
definition of the Interest Cover ratio, as a result of
which the close definition of the denominator
(interest) could be rendered ineffectual with rela-
tive ease due to the loose definition of the numer-
ator (profit).
Gearing
Gearing covenants typically read as follows:
The ratio of Total Borrowings to Tangible Net
Worth shall not exceed ...
The ratio of Consolidated Total Net Borrow-
ings to Consolidated Tangible Net Worth shall
not exceed, during each of the periods set out
below, the ratio set opposite such period.
The maximum gearing level that borrowers are
permitted is defined as the ratio of either gross or
net borrowings to net worth (see Table 7).
While a small number of the contracts contain a
brief, one-line definition of borrowings (e.g. 'aggre-
gate indebtedness for borrowed monies'), the
'El-Gazzar and Pastena (1990) find that only 21% of the US
bank loan agreements they studied tailor income definitions,
while 58% tailor liabilities and 62% equity.
°One of the key issues at dispute in BDDP's contested offer
for Bosse Massimi Pollitt was the definition of 'fees' for the
purpose of interest and cash flow cover.
majority (85% of the 20 definitions studied)
contain a detailed listing of the items that consti-
tute borrowings.
To what extent do these detailed definitions deal
with the issue of off-balance sheet finance? This is
a particularly important issue since it is often
argued that it is the very presence of restrictive debt
covenants that motivates companies, seeking to
extend their borrowing powers, to engage in off-
balance sheet finance schemes (Peasnell and
Yaansah, 1988). In the contracts studied, all ratio
calculations are based on consolidated accounts
drawn up according to generally accepted account-
ing principles. While a small number of contracts
(four 'standard' and one 'actual') also specify the
borrowing entity in broader terms, e.g. `XYZ plc
and its subsidiaries', which may be taken to in-
clude, for example, unconsolidated subsidiaries,
the ultimate reliance even in these contracts on the
consolidated accounts would appear to give scope
for the use of off-balance sheet finance. Only two
actual contracts take the even narrower approach
of relying on the consolidated balance sheet, as
opposed to the consolidated accounts, an ap-
proach which is more likely to exclude the debt of
unconsolidated subsidiaries disclosed in the notes
to the accounts.
However, some specific off-balance items are
often explicitly included. The main examples are
contingent liabilities under acceptance credits and
discounted bills, guarantees in respect of third-
party indebtedness or against financial loss (see
Panel 7a), and lease finance (see Panel 7b). The
majority of references to lease finance, however,
relate specifically to finance leases, thus leaving
management the opportunity of using operating
leases to keep debt off-balance sheet. The inclusion
of guarantees for third-party indebtedness, how-
ever, would appear to be an effective way of taking
account of a parent company's obligation in re-
spect of the debt of off-balance sheet vehicles.'
The widespread inclusion of certain contingent
liabilities and guarantees is a clear example of
contract definitions that reduce management's
scope for the use of opportunistic accounting
methods and that produce a more conservative
result than that shown by generally accepted ac-
counting principles." Some additional amend-
ments of this nature, however, (e.g. the inclusion of
premiums payable on redemption and of debts sold
to third parties with recourse) are found to occur
"Mian and Smith (1990), in their study of finance subsidiaries
in the US exploring the relationship between financial interde-
pendence and consolidation policy, find that when parents give
direct guarantees of this sort the subsidiary tends to be fully
consolidated, whereas unconsolidated finance subsidiaries tend
to be associated with indirect parent guarantees.
"Leftwich (1983) and Whittred and Zimmer (1986) also note
the widespread inclusion of such contingent liabilities in US and





In actual	 In standard
contracts	 contract forms




Gross borrowin gs to net worth 7 7 14
Borrowings net of cash to net worth 5 1 6
12 8 20
Manner in which borrowings defined:
General 'one line' definition 3 3
Detailed listing of components 9 8 17
12 8
General definitions of borrowings:
Aggregate indebtedness for borrowed monies 2
All obli gations, whether contingent or otherwise,
in respect of financial indebtedness 1
3 3
Detailed definitions of borrowings include:
All monies borrowed or raised 9 8 17
Guarantees (see Panel 7a) 9 7 16
Liabilities, including contingent liabilities, under acceptance
credits and bill discounting 8 8 16
Debentures. bonds. notes, loan stock 8 7 15
Lease finance (see Panel 7b) 8 6 14
Premium payable on final debt repayment 2 6 8
Specified procedure for translation of non-sterling debt 2 4 6
Deferred purchase price of assets or services 2 3 5
Debts sold to third parties with recourse 1 4 5
Other inclusions (each occurring once) 5 2 7
Detailed definitions of borrowings exclude:
Intra-group borrowings 2 5 7
Guarantees in respect of borrowings by subsidiaries 3 2 5
Specific loans 3 — 3
Proportions of subsidiary's debt corresponding to outside
shareholdings, provided amount exceeds subsidiary's
loans to rest of group 1 2 3
Other exclusions (each occurring once) 3 — 3
Panel 7a
Guarantees Included
Against performance of contracts or financial loss 3 2 5




All amounts payable under lease or hire agreements for
moveable assets 1 2 3
Payments under HP, instalment sale and finance lease
agreements that are primarily methods of finance 1 2 3
Indebtedness under finance leases 3 I 4
Amounts payable under HP and finance lease agreements
whether or not included in audited balance sheet 1
Capitalised HP and finance lease agreements per
applicable accounting standards 2 1 3
8 6 14
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more frequently in standard contract forms than
in actual contracts, which may be indicative of
changes that take place in the course of contract
negotiation.
Current Ratio
A typical current ratio covenant reads as fol-
lows:
The company will ensure that, at all times, the
ratio of Current Assets to Current Liabilities
exceeds ...
Of the nine contracts (six standard and three
actual) containing definitions of the current ratio,
four had a general one-line definition while five
listed the various elements in greater detail.
A typical general definition refers to 'all items on
a consolidated basis which would be classified as
current in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles consistently applied'.
All the detailed definitions referred to stock,
good trade debtors, cash and current creditors or
liabilities. Marketable securities and borrowings
were almost always specified explicitly as well.
Other definitions of interest from an accounting
viewpoint, all occurring more than once, stated
that stock should be at the lower of cost and net
realisable value; that stocks should be excluded if
subject to reservation of title; that stocks should be
excluded if obsolete or slow moving; and that
debtors due beyond one year should be excluded.
The inclusion of contingent current liabilities was
only specified in one case. It can be concluded, with
regard to the current ratio definitions studied, that
even those standard contract forms containing
detailed definitions do not stray far from the
figures reported for current assets and current
liabilities on the face of the consolidated balance
sheet.
Summary and conclusions
This paper provides for the first time evidence on
the FRCs included in UK bank loan contracts and
an analysis of the main accounting definitions
used. These findings are based on an examination
of the relevant sections of 25 UK bank loan
contracts and 13 templates. The need for confiden-
tiality restricted the availability of contracts and
certain details relating to borrowers and loans.
However, the general uniformity of the results
indicates that it is unlikely that the relatively small
size of the sample of contracts has biased the
findings.
The main results are that all accounting defi-
nitions rely, in the first instance, on GAAP; that
definitions are frequently tailored to limit the scope
for management discretion; but that some items
are accepted as presented in the accounts, thus
leaving some scope for manoeuvre through choice
of appropriate accounting methods. These results
replicate for the UK the findings of studies in the
US (Leftwich, 1983) and Australia (Whittred and
Zimmer,. 1986; and Stokes and Leong, 1988).
The results of this paper are preliminary in
nature and they raise a number of issues which
merit further research. Regarding the identity of
the most frequently used FRCs, it would be of
interest to investigate their effectiveness as indi-
cators of impending financial distress, and also to
try to account for differences in the popularity of
FRCs such as dividend payout restrictions in the
US as compared with the UK. The research could
also be extended by examining whether the ratios
used and their definitions vary with the industry
sector of the borrower and the characteristics of
the loan and of the lending institution(s). Light
could be shed on the loan negotiation process by
investigating the extent to which the final versions
of covenants found in actual contracts vary from
those contained in the banks' standard templates.
Finally it would be of interest to investigate to
what extent the apparently loose definition of items
such as profit enables corporate management to
avoid covenant violation through appropriate
choice of accounting methods.
References
Castle. G. R. (1980), 'Term Lending—A Guide to Negotiating
Term Loan Covenants and Other Financial Restrictions',
Journal of Commercial Bank Lending, November.
Donaldson, J. A. and Donaldson, T. H. (1982), The Medium-
Term Loan Market. Macmillan.
El-Gazzar. S.. Lilien. S. and Pastena. V. (1989). 'The Use of
Off-Balance Sheet Financing to Circumvent Financial
Covenant Restrictions'. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and
Finance, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring.
El-Gazzar, S. and Pastena. V. (1990). 'Negotiated Accounting
Rules in Private Financial Contracts', Journal of Accounting
and Economics. 12.
Leftwich. R. (1983), 'Accounting Information in Private
Markets: Evidence from Private Lending Agreements',
Accounting Review, January.
MacArthur. J. B. (1988), 'An Analysis of the Content of
Corporate Submissions on Proposed Accounting Standards
in the UK', Accounting and Business Research, Summer.
Mian, S. L. and Smith, C. W. (1990), 'Incentives for Unconsol-
idated Financial Reporting'. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 12.
Peasnell, K. V. and Yaansah, R. A. (1988), Off-Balance Sheet
Financing, Certified Research Report 10, Chartered Associ-
ation of Certified Accountants.
Press, E. G. and Weintrop, J. B. (1990), 'Accounting-Based
Constraints in Public and Private Debt Agreements', Journal
of Accounting and Economics, 12.
Smith, C. W. and Warner, J. B. (1979). 'On Financial Contract-
ing: An Analysis of Bond Covenants', Journal of Financial
Economics, 7.
Stokes, D. and Leong, T. K. (1988), 'Restrictive Covenants and
Accounting Information in the Market for Convertible
Notes: Further Evidence', Accounting and Finance. May.
Watts, R. L. and Zimmerman, J. L. (1990), 'Positive Account-
ing Theory: A Ten Year Perspective', Accounting Review,
January.
Whittred, G. and Zinuner, I. (1986). 'Accounting Information
in the Market for Debt', Accounting and Finance, November.
APPENDIX C
Accounting and Business Research. Vol. 25. No. 99. pp. 139-150. 1995	 139
The Incidence of Accounting-based
Covenants in UK Public Debt Contracts:
An Empirical Analysis
David B. Citron*
Abstract—Accounting-based covenants are of particular interest to accounting researchers in view of their potential
to influence management's accounting policy choices and their attitudes to new accounting standards. This
exploratory paper provides evidence on the incidence of accounting-based covenants in 108 UK public debt contracts
for the penod 1987-1990. Thirty percent of the agreements contain such covenants, the majority of which are
affirmative gearing covenants. Focusing on the institutional differences between the UK and the US, the paper
examines relationships between the presence of accounting-based covenants and (a) characteristics of the issuing firm,
and (b) other control mechanisms Included in the debt agreement. UK firms raising public debt are of good credit
quality and UK insolvency procedures afford unambiguous protection to secured creditors. As a result, accounting-
based covenants are associated with long-term unsecured debt and with firms having high values for assets-in-place
but, in contrast with US findings, are unrelated to gearing. Convertibility appears to reduce the need for
accounting-based covenants, especially when the debt is also subordinated. The relationship between accounting-
based covenants and security depends on the nature of the security (fixed or floating). Longer term non-convertible
debt agreements are. therefore. particularly likely to contain covenants that could influence management's accounting
behaviour. This paper provides a starting point for further research into these issues.
Introduction
Long-term debt agreements contain covenants
placing restrictions on borrowers with a view to
controlling the conflicts that can arise between
debtholders and shareholders (Smith and Warner,
1979). Those covenants that are accounting-
based are of particular interest to accounting re-
searchers. This is because there is a large body of
evidence that firms adopt income-increasing ac-
counting policies in the years prior to breaching
accounting-based covenants (Watts and Zimmer-
man, 1986, Ch. 11; Beneish and Press, 1993;
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Furthermore,
since accounting-based covenants are largely
based on those generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) in force at the time compliance
is being monitored, it has been hypothesised that
new income-decreasing accounting standards
could bring about default. This hypothesis has
been largely investigated by testing for a negative
share price effect among firms most likely to be
'The author is senior lecturer in accounting at City Univer-
sity Business School. He would like to thank Professor Richard
Taifier (City University Business School), Professor Clifford
Smith (University of Rochester), participants in a seminar at the
University of Warwick Business School and two anonymous
referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
paper. Correspondence should be addressed to David B. Citron,
City University Business School. Division of Accounting and
Finance. Frobisher Crescent. Barbican Centre. London
EC2Y 8HB.
adversely affected by a new standard. Research,
on balance, finds no evidence for an adverse
price impact (see, for example, Frost and Bernard,
1989; Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue, 1992), but this
conclusion is not unanimous (Mohrman, 1993).
In view of the relevance of accounting-based
covenants to accounting research, this paper exam-
ines the incidence of such covenants in a sample of
UK public debt agreements. It extends previous
work in this area in a number of ways. First, it
looks at an institutional environment which differs
from that in the US both in terms of the general
quality of the firms accessing the public debt
market and in terms of the two countries' contrast-
ing insolvency procedures. Second. unlike other
research into the structure of public debt agree-
ments (Malitz, 1986; Begley, 1993), it includes
convertible debt issues. Finally, the analysis of
security explicitly distinguishes between fixed and
floating charges.
The next two sections review previous research
and highlight the key features of the UK environ-
ment for public debt instruments. The following
two sections suggest hypotheses as to how firm
characteristics (investment opportunity set and
gearing) and other features of the debt agreement
itself (security, term to maturity, convertibility and
seniority) are likely to influence the incidence of
accounting-based covenants. The subsequent sec-
tions describe the data and research design, report
results and draw conclusions.
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Prior research
Previous research into the incidence of accounting-
based covenants has focused on the US, Canadian
and Australian markets. The small volume of UK
research has looked only at private debt agree-
ments. Basing itself on Smith and Warner's costly
contracting hypothesis (1979), this body of research
examines whether accounting-based covenants are
associated with: (a) characteristics of the issuing
firm (leverage, investment opportunity set); and
(b) other features of the debt instrument itself
(seniority, collateral, term).
There is general agreement on a positive associ-
ation between the use of accounting-based
covenants and leverage (for the US see Malitz,
1986; Duke and Hunt, 1990; Press and Weintrop,
1990; El-Gazzar and Pastena, 1991; Skinner, 1993;
and for the UK, Citron, 1992; Day and Taylor,
forthcoming). The relation with assets-in-place is
inconclusive, however, with Begley (1993) finding
a negative association, while Skinner (1993) shows
a positive relationship. Studies into the related area
of accounting-based executive compensation con-
tracts also have mixed results. While Smith and
Watts (1992) find a positive association between the
use of such contracts and assets-in-place. Ga yer and
Gayer (1993) report no association.
As far as the inter-relations between the terms of
the debt instrument are concerned, accounting-
based covenants are found to be uncommon in both
subordinated debt agreements (Begley, 1993) and
when collateral is present (El-Gazzar and Pastena,
1991). The relationship with term to maturity is
unclear, however, with El-Gazzar and Pastena
finding a positive association, Begley a negative one
and Francis (1989) showing mixed results.
This paper seeks to shed some light on the
conflicting findings outlined above. It examines
these issues in the context of the UK public debt
market, the relevant features of which are set out
in the next section.
The UK public debt market
There are a number of important institutional
differences between the UK and the US that can
help clarify our understanding of the use of ac-
counting-based covenants in UK public debt in-
struments. These are:
1. The UK corporate public debt market is rela-
tively small compared with that in the US (Blake,
1990)' and access to this market is generally
'Of the total sources of funds of UK commercial and
industrial firms during 1987-90 only 4.6% came from market
issues of loan capital and preference stock (Central Statistical
Office, 1992) while in the US bonds and mortgages provided
17.1% of corporate funds (US Department of Commerce,
1993). In the UK. 27.1% of funds came from bank borrowings
compared with 10.6% from loans and short-term paper in the
US.
obtained only by high quality firms (Rutterford,
1992; Thomson, 1988). Connected with this is
the absence of sinking funds in the UK (Rutter-
ford, 1992, p. 142), in contrast to the US where
sinking funds are common in debt with maturity
of 15 years or more (Francis, 1989).
2. The focus of US insolvency law is on debtor
protection while in the UK it is on the preser-
vation of value for the firm's creditors, particu-
larly secured creditors. Thus in Chapter 11
proceedings in the US the debtor generally
remains in control of the business, while in the
UK a receiver is appointed by a secured creditor
and his duty towards that creditor takes pre-
cedence over that to any unsecured creditors
(Franks and Torous, 1993).
3. In the UK contractually agreed priorities of
claims are strictly adhered to in liquidation,
whereas in the US deviations from absolute
priority are common: '... the majority of Chap-
ter 11 reorganisations provide for deviations
from absolute priority in favour of shareholders
and, in some cases, junior or unsecured credi-
tors' (Franks and Torous, 1993, p. 102; see also
Franks and Torous, 1989).
Characteristics of the firm and accounting-
based covenants
Investment Opportunity Set
According to Myers (1977), firm value is made
up from assets that are already in place plus future
discretionary investments (or growth options).
Myers (1977) and Smith and Warner (1979) argue
that the agency costs of debt are more severe for
firms whose investment opportunity set consists
more of growth opportunities than assets-in-place.
It follows that there should be a greater demand for
such firms to provide covenants. For example, an
accounting-based covenant, such as a ratio of debt
to tangible net worth, could limit these agency
problems by requiring the firm to maintain ade-
quate tangible asset levels.
On the other hand, recent North American
research suggests a number of reasons why a low
value for assets-in-place should be associated with
a lesser use of accounting-based covenants:
1. Begley (1993) argues that supply-side consider-
ations counteract the above demand-side
influences. Thus firms with more growth oppor-
tunities will have a greater need for future debt
finance to fund such investments. They will,
therefore, be less prepared to provide gearing
covenants that would restrict future financing
options.
2. Related to the above point, Skinner (1993)
argues that firms with less assets-in-place will
currently only be able to support low levels of
gearing and hence will have fewer covenants.
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3. Recent theoretical work by Feltham and Ohlson
(1993) and Ohlson (1993) views the excess of
market value over book value in growth firms
as a function of their goodwill, i.e. their ability
to earn profits in excess of the risk-free rate of
return. The performance of such firms, whose
value is derived more from their ability to earn
'super-profits' (for example, due to monopoly
power) rather than from their assets-in-place, is
less easily captured by GAAP-based accounting
measures. Hence these firms are less likely to
include accounting-based covenants in their
loan contracts (see also Smith and Watts, 1992,
p. 276; Skinner, 1993, P. 412).
4. Related to point (3), a relatively low ratio of
book value to market value may arise from the
use of conservative accounting policies
(Feltham and Ohlson, 1993). For example, the
practice of writing off' research and develop-
ment expenditure is likely to result in the book
value of such an investment falling below its
economic value. If, however, firms that adopt
conservative accounting practices instil greater
confidence in lenders, there may be less demand
for such firms to acquiesce to the control im-
posed by accounting-based covenants.'
The relatively high quality of firms accessing the
UK public debt market suggests that, for such
firms, the agency costs of debt will carry less weight
than the above four factors in determining the use
of accounting-based covenants.
Gearing
The agency costs of debt are greater the higher
is gearing. This is because highly geared firms are
more likely to become financially distressed and in
such cases shareholders have stronger incentives to
engage in activities such as underinvestment and
dividend payouts that would transfer wealth from
debtholders to themselves. Therefore, in line with
previous research, we would expect highly geared
firms to be more likely to provide accounting-
based covenants that will limit such activities in
advance by requiring them to maintain asset
levels.'
Other features of the debt agreements and
accounting-based covenants
Firms can incorporate a variety of mechanisms
(such as security, seniority and term to maturity)
31 am grateful to a referee for the arguments developed in
points (3) and (4).
3Thornton's (1992) study of the Canadian lease capitalisation
standard shows that firms more vulnerable to potential changes
in GAAP are less likely to include accounting-based covenants
in their loan agreements. This paper assumes, therefore, that all
firms in the sample are equally vulnerable to possible changes
in GAAP during the terms of their debt instruments.
in their loan contracts to control share-
holder/debtholder conflict. Smith and Warner
(1979, p. 154) and Begley (1993) discuss the
difficulties involved in analysing the interrelation-
ships between accounting-based covenants and
these other control mechanisms. The problem
arises because all these features of the loan
agreement are determined jointly as part of an
all-inclusive 'package'. However, since the focus
of this paper is on accounting-based covenants,
it adopts the approach of treating these covenants
as the dependent variable and other features of the
loan contract as independent variables.
As a result the sign of the predicted relationship
between accounting-based covenants and variables
such as seniority or term to maturity is unclear.
This is because it is not known whether these
control mechanisms are likely to act as substitutes
or as complements for one another. The following
paragraphs try to elucidate these issues in the
context of the institutional features of the UK
public debt market.
Security
Where debt is secured, the scope for
debtholder/shareholder conflict is reduced since
the lender's claim over specific assets limits
the likelihood of asset substitution and claim di-
lution (Smith and Warner, 1979, p. 127). It is also
the function of accounting-based covenants, such
as a gearing constraint, to limit the issuing of
additional debt and asset substitution. We would
expect that, when debt is secured, such covenants
are redundant and are therefore less likely to be
used.
Debt secured by a fixed charge does, however,
require a timely trigger to ensure that the asset
subject to the charge is still of value. In such cases,
however, covenants are not expected to be ac-
counting-based (i.e. ratios based primarily on num-
bers found in the financial statements) but to be
more specifically related to the value'of the secured
assets themselves and the income that they alone
generate.
However, this argument only applies where the
debt is secured by a fixed rather than a floating
charge.' Two distinctions between fixed and float-
ing charges are of interest here. First, because the
floating charge permits the borrower to deal in the
assets in question. it provides no protection against
asset substitution. Second, as a general rule. a fixed
charge creditor has priority over a floating charge
'A fixed charge provides the lender with security in the form
of specific identifiable assets that cannot be disposed of by the
borrower without the lender's permission. With a floating
charge, however, the borrower can, within certain limits, deal in
the assets under the charge unless an event of default occurs. If
this happens the floating charge crystallises and becomes a fixed
charge over the assets that are available at that time.
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creditor.' It follows that a lender's priority is less
well protected by a floating charge than by a fixed
charge.
Thus, for a floating charge to provide adequate
security, the debtholder must be able to trigger an
event of default early enough for the security to
realise sufficient funds. Financial covenants
provide notice of impending financial distress. We
would expect, therefore, that accounting-based
covenants will be found in debt secured by only a
floating charge, since this security is of little value
if there is no trigger to crystallise it.
Term to Maturity
The expected relation between the presence of
covenants and term to maturity is ambivalent.
Myers (1977) and Barnea et al. (1980) argue that
the agency costs of debt are reduced by shortening
debt maturity. One way of reducing the greater
degree of shareholder/debtholder conflict likely to
arise with long-term debt would be to include more
accounting-based covenants in the contract.
However, this view assumes that duration and
the presence of covenants are substitutes for one
another. An alternative view is that a debt issue
with particularly severe agency problems, for
example, may both be short-term and include
covenants so as to provide additional control.
As shown above, US research findings in this
area are inconclusive to date. In the UK, however,
we would expect that public debt with a short
term to maturity is unlikely to require accounting-
based covenants because of the relatively low
credit risk of firms raising debt on this market.
Long-term debt agreements, however, are more
likely to include such covenants as there is always
the risk of a deterioration in a company's credit
rating over a 20 or 30-year period. In addition, the
focus of UK insolvency law on protection of
secured creditors makes it all the more important
for long-term unsecured creditors to protect them-
selves with timely default triggers in the form of
accounting-based covenants. This expectation is
further reinforced by the strict adherence to pri-
ority of claims in UK insolvencies. As a result, in
contrast to the US, long-term unsecured creditors
in the UK can entertain no expectation of being
repaid in priority to secured creditors in liquida-
tion.
Convertibility and Seniority
In the US most convertible debt is also subordi-
nated (Van Horne, 1989, p. 618) whereas in the
UK both unsubordinated and subordinated con-
vertible debt issues are common. This allows the
'This priority is further strengthened by various provisions of
the UK insolvency law (see Lingard. 1989, pp. 93 and 159).
effects of convertibility and seniority to be disen-
tangled from one another.
The expected relationship between convertibility
and accounting-based covenants is not clear.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that convertibil-
ity produces a greater alignment of interests be-
tween shareholders and debtholders. so  reducing
the need for protective covenants.' Smith and
Warner (1979, p. 141) point out, however, that the
underinvestment problem is more severe when
convertible debt is present, which would suggest a
positive association between convertibility and
covenants.'
The effect of subordination is also unclear prima
facie. Arguably, agency problems are relatively
more severe for subordinated debt due to the fact
that it ranks behind senior creditors and is there-
fore in greater need of protection against share-
holder activities that transfer wealth away from
debtholders. On the other hand it could be argued
that, by having agreed to lend on a subordinated
basis, these debtholders are aligning their interests
more closely with those of the shareholders. The
fact that the subordinated bonds studied here are
all also convertible lends support to this latter
view. Furthermore, in the UK, where strict priority
of claims is adhered to, it is unlikely that subordi-
nated creditors will benefit much from accounting-
based covenants. This is because, even when
default is triggered, the great majority of the firm's
creditors have to be fully paid before the subordi-
nated creditors can receive anything.
Data and research design
Public debt issues are identified from the 'Bond,
Debenture and Loan Stock Issues' section of
Extel Financial's Record of Takeovers, Offers
and New Issues for the four years 1987-1990.
Building societies, banks, water companies, sub-
sidiaries of overseas companies and Unlisted Secu-
rities Market companies are excluded from the
analysis in order to reduce the diversity of the
population.
The sample includes secured debt, convertible
debt and bonds—the term 'bonds' being used to
designate all unsecured, non-convertible issues. A
total of 145 debt issues are identified as meeting
these criteria.
Where a firm has made more than one debt issue
during the period, all issues are retained in the
°Stokes and Whincop (1993) provide empirical support for
this view with their finding that Australian preference share
issues generally place less reliance on covenants if they are
convertible.
'Whittred and Zimmer (1986) and Stokes and Leong (1988)
find borrowing limitations to be universal among Australian
convertibles. However, such covenants are a requirement of the
Companies Acts and the Australian Associated Stock Ex-
changes.
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analysis only if the types of debt are significantly
different. This is to avoid double-counting virtually
identical debt agreements where a firm has multiple
issues of the same type of debt. 8 Where such
multiple issues take place. only the latest is selected
for inclusion. This process eliminates 29 of the
original 145 debt issues, leaving 116 cases.
Details of the covenants are obtainable from the
offering circular, prospectus or Extel card contain-
ing the listing particulars. The results of this study
are based on data for the 108 cases (93% of the
116) for which these documents and share prices
are available. Owing to the inclusion of different
types of debt issues by individual companies, these
108 debt instruments were issued by 90 different
companies.
A covenant is counted as 'accounting-based'
provided at least the numerator or the denomi-
nator is based on numbers derivable from the main
financial statements. Thus covenants found in debt
agreements secured by a fixed charge, such as those
requiring the value of the secured properties to be
not less than a certain multiple of the secured loan,
are not included as accounting-based covenants.
Debt secured by a fixed charge is classified as
'fixed' even if it has a floating charge as well. It is
classified as 'floating' only if there is no fixed
charge.
Following Myers' (1977) observation that book
values refer to assets already in place, the relative
size of assets-in-place is measured by the ratio of
book value of equity to market value of equity (see
also Gayer and Ga yer, 1993).
Gearing is calculated as the ratio of the book
value of gross debt (both short and long-term) to
market value of the firm's equity. Since lenders will
be interested in the firm's gearing after the new
issue has taken place, the book values of debt are
taken from the section of the debt issue document
detailing group capitalisation. In many cases this
figure includes the new issue itself and, in these
cases, this is the amount used. Where the capitali-
sation total does not include the new issue its value
has been added in. except where the stated purpose
of the issue is refinancing where there is a zero net
effect on total debt.
A problem with the gearing measure is that
where firms have off-balance sheet finance their
gearing ratios will be understated. Where possible,
'Debt issues are treated as significantly different either if they
are of different types, i.e. secured, convertible or bonds; or, in
one case, where the debt is of the same type but the terms to
maturity are significantly different (seven and 25 years). In order
to verify that the Inclusion of more than one issue of the same
type of debt by the same firm would result in duplication of
contract provisions, the documents of nine 'additional' debt
issues by eight different firms were checked. One of these issues
contained accounting-based covenants and eight did not. In all
cases the information on covenants was identical to that in the
debt issues actually included in the sample.
this is taken into account. Some debt issue
documents contain details of liabilities such as
guarantees for third party debt, debt of off-balance
sheet subsidiaries and non-capitalised finance
leases. Where such amounts are disclosed they are
included in the debt figure. While undisclosed
off-balance sheet debt cannot be included, Duke
and Hunt (1990), Press and Weintrop (1990) and
Skinner (1993) all find a significant relationship
between balance sheet-based gearing measures and
accounting-based covenants.
For the measure of term to maturity, optional
earlier redemption by the firm itself is ignored since
this will not necessarily be exercised and therefore
does not reduce the risk to the bondholders. In
some convertible bond issues, however, the bond-
holders have an option to require redemption




Table 1 shows that, of the 108 debt issues
analysed, 42 (39%) took place in 1987. Convertible
issues are particularly numerous in that year, while
unsecured non-convertible bonds and notes pre-
dominate in 1988 and 1989. Convertible issues
return into fashion in 1990 in the form of convert-
ible capital bonds.
The industry sector breakdown of the sample
appears in Table 2. Firms in the industrial ma-
terials/construction, multiple stores and property
sectors account for 46% of the issues.
Of the 108 debt agreements, 32 contain account-
ing-based covenants, 47% of these being by firms
in the brewery and property sectors (see Table 2).
The amounts issued range from £5 m to £320 m,
with a mean value of £85.1 m. The mean value of
the 32 issues with accounting-based covenants of
£84.1 m is very similar to the mean of £85.5 m for
the 76 issues without. While public debt issues
account for only a small part of all companies'
sources of funds in the UK (see footnote 1), for
those companies that do enter this market, public
debt is a significant source. For the 108 debt issues
studied here, the mean ratio of the amount of debt
issued to the company's total debt is 0.26, and the
mean ratio of the amount issued to book capital
employed (debt plus book capital and reserves) is
0.11.
°For example, Slough Estates plc's £150 m 6% convertible
bond issued in April 1988 has a final redemption date of May
2003. However, a further condition states: 'The holder of each
Bond will have the option to require the Company to redeem
such Bond ... on 20 May in any year from 1993 to 1998
(inclusive) at its principal amount together with supplementary
interest
Table 1
Number of Public Debt Issues by Type of Debt: 1987-1990
1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Type of debt:
Secured fixed 7 2 5 2 16
Secured floating 1 3 1 5
Convertible:
Subordinated:
Capital bonds — _ I 8 9
Other 7 I 2 _ 10
Unsubordinated 16 2 1 3 22














bricks (12); cement and
concrete (15); contracting
and construction (18); electrical (19)
Aerospace (21)
Radio and TV (36)
Motor components (41); motor
distributors (42)
Breweries (45)




Newspapers and periodicals (52)
Packaging and paper (54)
Multiple stores (58)
Health and household products
(67); general chemicals (68)
Oil and gas (70)




mining finance (92); overseas
trade (97)
Telephone networks (88)



























'Stock Exchange Actuaries Security Group Numbers.
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Accounting-based Covenants
Table 3 shows the small variation in the types of
accounting-based covenants found in these public
debt documents. Of the 32 documents containing
such covenants, 29 (91%) include a gearing
covenant, and 18 (56%) include a restriction on the
amount of secured and/or other priority debt to
capital and reserves. A third covenant, asset dis-
posals/assets, also appears in 18 (56%) of the 32
documents, but no other accounting ratio is in-
cluded in more than a small minority of cases.
The majority of the various gearing covenants
are affirmative, i.e. they apply at all times while the
debt is outstanding (see Table 3). However, five of
Table 4








Type of debt: sign covenants covenants Total
Secured fixed — 16 16
Secured floating 5 5
Convertible:
Subordinated: +1—
With put option 3 3
No put option 16 16
Unsubordinated +/—
With put option 1 12 13
No put option 4 5 9

















reserves 13 5 18
Asset disposals/assets 18 18
Interest cover 1 5 6





Five other accounting-based covenants occurred, once each.
the limitations on secured/priority debt, as well as
virtually all of the other covenants, are negative.'
Negative covenants effectively proscribe certain
actions, such as the raising of additional debt or
making asset disposals, unless the specified finan-
cial ratios are complied with. The five negative
secured/priority debt covenants all appear in the
loans secured by a floating charge. The asset
disposal and asset acquisition limitations are
classified here as negative covenants by definition,
since they only apply if the firm makes the said
disposals or acquisitions.
These findings are in marked contrast to those of
Begley (1993, p. 20) who finds that accounting-
'°The distinction between affirmative and negative covena nts
is an important one, albeit more so in the context of private debt
agreements, as default in these contracts is more frequently
caused by violations of affirmative covenants (Beneish and
Press, 1993).
based covenants in US public debt agreements are
almost universally negative. The majority of ac-
counting-based covenants in Australian public
debt agreements are affirmative, however (Whit-
tred and Zimmer, 1986, p. 25).
The tightest borrowings/capital and reserves
covenant is 1.25 and the loosest 3. Of the 29 such
covenants, 14 (48%) are set at 1.75, seven (24%)
at 1.5 and four (14%) at 2. No other values occur
more than once.
Univariate Analysis—Secured Debt and Convertible
Subordinated Debt
An examination of the relationship between
security and accounting-based covenants shows, as
expected, that none of the 16 debt agreements
secured by a fixed charge contains such covenants
whereas all five secured by a floating charge do so
(see Table 4). Applying the Fisher exact test (Siegel
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and CasteIlan, 1988) to the 21 secured issues, this
difference between fixed and floating charge debt is
highly significant (p = 0.001. one-tailed). In place
of accounting-based covenants, however, 15 of the
16 agreements with fixed charges contain a
covenant requiring the value of the secured assets
not to fall below a stated multiple of the debt so
secured. and 10 of the agreements also require the
income from the secured assets not to fall below a
given multiple of the interest on the debt in ques-
tion.
Table 4 also shows that 36 (88%) of the 41
convertible debt issues do not have accounting-
based covenants, supportive of Jensen and Meck-
ling's argument that convertibility reduces
debtholder/shareholder conflict." Furthermore,
none of the 19 subordinated convertible issues
contains such covenants. These 19 documents were
checked further to see if. in place of their own
covenants, they are protected by reference to exist-
ing covenants in senior debt issues (see Thornton
and Bryant, 1986, p. 45). No explicit reference to
such covenants was found in any of the documents.
Fourteen of the 19 have cross default clauses,
meaning that a default on other debt would also
constitute default on the subordinated debt. How-
ever, cross default clauses are virtually universal
among the unsubordinated debt issues as well.
These findings, therefore. further support the view
that the alignment with equity interests brought
about by convertibility is strengthened by the
subordination feature.
At first sight, the absence of accounting-based
covenants among the subordinated convertibles
seems to corroborate the finding in Begley's (1993)
US study of non-convertible debt that subordi-
nated debt contracts contain fewer covenants.
However, the underlying rationales appear to be
different. Begley finds that the firms issuing the
subordinated debt are both significantly smaller
and financially weaker. Therefore the loss of flexi-
bility that covenants would bring about for these
firms would be too costly for them. In contrast, the
firms with the 19 subordinated convertibles in this
study are, on average, somewhat larger than the
remaining 89 cases in the total sample.' Further-
more their mean gearing at 0.41 is significantly
lower than the 0.65 of the other 89 cases." This
suggests that covenants are absent from subordi-
nated debt issues in this sample because they are
less risky and therefore there is no demand for
them.
"The 88% result is significantly different from the null
hypothesis that convertible debt is equally as likely to include
accounting-based covenants as not (z = 4.84).
'The 19 firms issuing subordinated convertibles have a mean
size (book value of total debt plus market value of equity) of
£2.4 bn compared with £1.9 bn for the other 89 cases. The
difference is not statistically significant.
' 3 t-value = 3.47. significant at the 1% level, two-tailed.
In summary, in the cases of the 21 secured debt
and the 19 subordinated convertibles the presence
or absence of accounting-based covenants appears
to be entirely accounted for by the type of debt. It
is only in the cases of the 22 unsubordinated
convertibles and the 46 bonds that some issues
contain such covenants and some do not. The
remaining univariate results and the multivariate
results will, therefore, relate only to these 68 issues.
Univariate Analysis—Bonds and Convertible Un-
subordinated Debt
Of these 68 agreements, 27 (40%) contain ac-
counting-based covenants (see Table 4). Table 5
shows that firms issuing debt with accounting-
based covenants have a significantly higher mean
value for assets-in-place. They also have higher
gearing, although the difference here is not statisti-
cally significant, contrary to the significant results
found in US studies. The positive association with
assets-in-place is consistent with Skinner (1993).
However, the weak relationship with gearing
suggests that Skinner's reasoning, that firms with
more assets-in-place have more accounting-based
covenants because they are more highly geared,
may not be at work in the UK public debt market.
This issue is examined further in the multivariate
analysis below.
Table 5 also shows, as expected, that debt
agreements with a longer term to maturity are
more likely to contain accounting-based
covenants. Those issues with accounting-based
covenants have a significantly longer mean term to
maturity (19.7 versus 10.1 years). This relation is
strengthened when, for the 16 convertible issues
with put options, the earliest date when the put can
be exercised is substituted for the date of conver-
sion/final redemption.'
This positive association between term and the
use of accounting-based covenants is contrary to
Begley's (1993) US findings. However, the typical
term to maturity in Begley's sample is 15 to 30
years, while in this sample it ranges from two to 44
years. including 29 issues due in under 15 years. In
order to improve comparability with Beeley's data
set, the analysis is repeated omitting these 29
shorter-term issues. This leaves 39 cases in this
sample with a term of 15 years or more. Twenty of
these 39 contain accounting-based covenants and
they have a mean term to maturity of 24.1 years,
significantly higher' than the 15.5 years of the 19
issues without accounting-based covenants. Thus
"The put options are exercisable at terms ranging from
four-and-a-half to six years. while the terms to maturity of these
16 issues are all 15 years.
' 5 t-value = 5.72. a difference significant at the 0.1% level.
one-tailed.
Table 6
Logit Analysis of the Relation Between Explanatory Variables and the
Presence of Accounting-based Covenants for Unsecured and Convertible




Predicted Wald of Wald
variables
	 sign Coefficient statistic' statistic
TERM	 + 0.233 15.214 0.0001
CONUNSUB	 +1 - —1.972 5.995 0.0143
INVOPP	 + 2.712 6.194 0.0128
GEAR	 + —1.113 1.587 0.2078
Model chi-square 38.85 (4 d.f., p = 0.0000)
% correctly classified 83.82
'Dependent variable = 1 if accounting-based covenant(s) present (n = 27),
= 0 if none present (n = 41).
'TERM = term to maturity in years ignoring put options
CONUNSUB = 1 if a convertible unsubordinated issue (n = 22),
= 0 if not (n = 46)
INVOPP = book value of equity/market value of equity
GEAR = book value of debt/market value of equity
'The Wald statistic is the square of the ratio of the coefficient to its standard
error (SPSS Inc 1990, p. B-42).
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Table 5
Features of Unsecured and Convertible Unsubordinated Debt Issues With and Without












Assets-in-place + 0.87 0.63 —2.36**
Gearing + 0.68 0.57 —0.91
Term:
Ignoring put options + 19.7 10.1 —4.78*
With put option dates
(n = 71) + 19.3 7.1 —6.10*
*Significant at the 0.1% level (one-tail test).
"Significant at the 5% level (one-tail test).
the contrast with Begley's findings stands, the
association between accounting-based covenants
and term being negative in the US but positive in
the UK.'
"All 108 agreements were further analysed for an association
between the stated reason for the issue and the presence of
accounting-based covenants. The stated reasons were classified,
in descending order of risk, as 'expansion (35% of cases).
'general corporate purposes' (41%) or 'refinancing' (24%). No
association was found, presumably due to the irrelevance of
these stated reasons relative to the long duration of the debt.
Multivariate Analysis—Bonds and Convertible Un-
subordinated Debt
Logit analysis is used to explore the significance
of each explanatory variable in the presence of
the other explanatory variables. The analysis
confirms the expectation that accounting-
based covenants are significantly associated
with longer term to maturity (see Table 6). Thus,
in the UK public debt market, accounting-
based covenants and term to maturity appear
to be used as substitute control mechanisms,
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while in the US they complement one another
(Begley, 1993, p. 24)."
Table 6 also shows that convertibility reduces
the need for accounting-based covenants even
when the debt is unsubordinated. Furthermore, as
expected. a high value of assets-in-place is associ-
ated with the presence of accounting-based
covenants although, in contrast with previous re-
search, there is no significant relationship with the
level of gearing. These findings are consistent with
the view that. among firms entering the UK public
debt market, low values for assets-in-place and
high levels of gearing are not proxying for high
agency costs. Moreover, the findings lend support
to Smith's (1993, p. 294) observation that a high
level of gearing in itself will not necessarily require
greater covenant protection provided it occurs in a
firm with a relatively high value for assets-in-place.
This being the case, accounting-based expla-
nations for the use of such covenants in firms with
high assets-in-place may well be predominating in
the market studied here. Thus, a high value for
assets-in-place may result from insufficiently con-
servative accounting which in turn gives rise to a
demand for monitoring. Alternatively, GAAP-
based accounting numbers arguably provide more
accurate measures of financial position in firms
with higher values for assets-in-place, so increasing
their use of accounting-based covenants.
Finally, while this analysis relates to unsecured
debt instruments, it is relevant that some of the
firms involved will also be borrowing on a secured
basis. We would expect the unsecured debt of
such firms to be protected by accounting-based
covenants. This is because these covenants will
provide an alternative source of protection for the
unsecured lenders of these firms in the light of their
other borrowings being protected by security.' To
the extent that a high value for assets-in-place
proxies for the presence of borrowing on a secured
basis, this will result in a positive association
between assets-in-place and the use of accounting-
based covenants. This expectation is examined by
analysing the industry membership of firms that
borrowed on a secured basis in the current sample.
The 21 cases of secured debt shown in Table 4 were
issued by firms in only six industry sectors.' The
"The complementary nature of term to maturity and use of
covenants in Begley's (1993, p.24) data set is supported by her
finding of a significant negative association between duration
and gearing, while in the sample studied here these two
variables are uncorrelated.
°As Stultz and Johnson (1985, p. 513) point out, while the
presence of secured debt may reduce a firm's opportunities for
asset substitution or cash payouts, it does not reduce the
incentive for these actions if there is also unsecured debt
outstanding.
°Property (13 cases). breweries (four cases). and one each
from hotels, contracting and construction, oil and gas. and
cement and concrete.
sub-sample of 68 debt instruments which excludes
secured debt includes 23 debt issues by firms from
these six industry sectors. Using membership of
one of these sectors as a proxy for the likelihood
of having previously issued secured debt, the value
of the assets-in-place ratio for the firms making
these 23 debt issues is 1.13, significantly higher
than the 0.52 for firms in other sectors.' This lends
support to the view that the positive association
between assets-in-place and accounting-based
covenants reflects the demand for protection by
unsecured lenders to firms that have previously
borrowed on a secured basis.
Conclusions
This paper examines the incidence of accounting-
based covenants in UK public debt issued during
the period 1987-1990. Many of these instruments
will still be outstanding well into the 21st century.
Thirty percent of the debt agreements contain
accounting-based covenants, 57% of which are
affirmative. This is in contrast to the US where
public debt covenants are almost universally nega-
tive. This suggests that accounting-based
covenants contained in UK public debt agreements
have more potential for influencing management's
accounting policy choices than those in US public
debt agreements and, as a result, their study is
especially relevant to accounting policy research.
Again, in contrast to the US. the presence of
accounting-based covenants in unsecured debt is
positively associated with term to maturity. It is
suggested that the more frequent use of account-
ing-based covenants in longer term debt in the UK
reflects the relatively high credit quality of firms
raising funds on the UK public debt market, with
credit risk being related to long terms to maturity.
This need for unsecured longer-term debt to be
protected by accounting-based covenants is re-
inforced by UK insolvency law which, unlike the
US Chapter 11 procedure. favours secured credi-
tors and adheres to strict priority of claims.
Unlike the US, again, there is no association
with gearing. It appears that, once the level of
assets-in-place is controlled for. the gearing of
firms accessing the UK public debt market is at an
acceptable enough level such that it does not affect
the demand for accounting-based covenants. How-
ever, the fact that the gearing measure used is
unable to take account of all off-balance sheet
finance may be a confounding factor.
This paper also adds to earlier research by
looking at convertible debt issues. Convertibility
appears to reduce the need for accounting-based
covenants. None of the subordinated convertible
agreements examined includes accounting-based
2U1 value 7.39. p = 0.000, one-tail.
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covenants, indicative of the strong alignment of
these debtholders' interests with those of the share-
holders. The small number of unsubordinated con-
vertibles with accounting-based covenants
reinforces this argument.
This paper is essentially exploratory in nature.
Further testing of the various hypotheses is re-
quired. in particular whether these preliminary
findings are driven by the way in which the UK
institutional framework differs from that in the
US. For example, an institutional factor not re-
searched here is the question of whether public
debt ownership is more concentrated in one
country compared with the other. Public debt
agreements can be expected to have more in com-
mon with private debt agreements where the hold-
ings are more concentrated.
Another caveat of this study is that it uses the
non-accounting-based provisions of debt agree-
ments to help explain the incidence of accounting-
based covenants, whereas all these provisions (both
accounting-based and non-accounting-based) are
co-determined as part of an all-inclusive package.
However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
specify a complete model explaining why a particu-
lar combination of control mechanisms emerges
from lender/borrower negotiations.
A final reservation is that the analysis does not
take account of the possible relationship between
covenants and the price of debt. If ltnders trade off
price against the degree of monitoring provided by
covenants, then there would be a negative associ-
ation. If, however, covenants proxy for the per-
ceived risk of the debt, then the expected
association would be positive since the cost of debt
would be higher for riskier firms.
However, the paper does provide evidence that
the factors driving the incidence of accounting-
based covenants in UK public debt agreements are
different to those that operating in the US public
debt market. Another issue of importance to ac-
counting researchers is that the prevalence of affir-
mative accounting-based covenants in longer term
debt means that such agreements could influence
UK corporate management's accounting policy
choice for many years in the future.
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The Audit Report under Going Concern
Uncertainties: An Empirical Analysis
David B. Citron and Richard J. Taller*
Abstract—This study explores the value of the audit report in the context of the going concern qualification (GCQ)
decision along the joint dimensions of auditor competence and independence. Likelihood of company failure, auditor
switch rates, the self-fulfilling prophecy argument and audit firm size are analysed as variables potentially affecting
the value of the audit report in a GCQ situation. This study focuses on the outcomes of such decisions: the presence
or absence of a GCQ, for a large sample of UK quoted companies over the decade 1977-86. Our results suggest
that, unless the likelihood of failure is very high, the probability of a GCQ is very low. We find some evidence in
support of an association between the presence of a GCQ and auditor switching but no support for the self-fulfilling
prophecy argument. In addition. smaller UK audit firms do not appear to exhibit lower GCQ rates than do large
firms. There is some evidence that the Issues of auditor competence and independence may be a cause for concern
in this context in the UK.
Introduction
The UK audit environment provides low rates of
qualification on a going concern basis of the
accounts of companies prior to bankruptcy.' This
paper examines the value of the audit report in
situations of going concern uncertainty, where
'value' is taken to be a function of both auditor
competence and auditor independence.
In his review of the going concern decision litera-
ture. Asare (1990) points to the mixed results of
research into the importance of the going concern
report. In this study we focus explicitly on the end re-
sult of the decision process: the presence or absence
of a qualification, which is the central concern of the
financial statement user. We investigate whether
the presence or absence of a going concern qualifi-
cation (GCQ) is associated with the likelihood
of company failure, auditor switch rates, the self-
fulfilling prophecy argument and audit firm size.
For the audit to be of value to the consumer of
audit services, the auditor must be perceived as
being both technically competent and independent
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1981; De Angelo, 1981a
and 1981b). Mautz and Sharaf (1961) argue that
the professional auditor is indeed widely perceived
as being competent. and regarding the potential
going concern qualification there is experimental
evidence to support this contention (Kida, 1980;
Campisi and Trotman, 1985; Barnes and Hoot,
1989).2
 With respect to independence, however,
*The authors arc. respectively, lecturer in accounting and
professor of accounting and finance at the City Unovnity
Business School. They thank Eitel Financial Limited for
allowing the use of their database.
See Table I.
1Koh and Killough (1990) and Koh (1991). however. provide
a dissenting view.
Mautz and Sharaf (1961. p. 210) are less sanguine:
. because auditing suffers from what may be
described as -built-in anti-independence factors":
Research that explores auditor independence
within an economic framework focuses on the cost
factors influencing the independence of the auditor
in various situations (Watts and Zimmerman.
1981; De Angelo. 1981a and 1981c). De Angelo
(1981b and 1981c) uses this framework to argue
that larger firms will be more strongly motivated to
act independently. Farmer et al. (1987) find that
auditors are indeed more likely to accept clients'
controversial accounting treatments when the risk
of client loss is high and that of litigation low.
In the case of the GCQ, the literature (e.g. Kida.
1980: Altman. 1982: and Moizer. 1985) highlights
a number of cost factors that may reduce indepen-
dence. These can be summarised as follows;
(i) The value of the auditor's economic interest
in the client;
(ii) The likelihood that this economic interest
will be lost either due to the client switching
auditors or failure brought about by the
GCQ itself (self-fulfilling prophecy);
(iii) The likelihood that the client will sue if the
report is qualified and the client does not fail.
Cost factors helping promote independence en-
compass:
(i) The loss of future revenues due to loss of
reputation should the auditor not qualify and
the client fail;3
(ii) The likelihood of lawsuits by third parries if
there is no GCQ and the client fails.
'Wilson and Gnmlund (1990) provide evidence that damaged
audit firm reputation is indeed associated with real adverse
economic consequences.
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The strength of these factors in the GCQ situ-
ation makes it an appropriate context in which to
study independence (Kida, 1980). However, the
limited evidence available on the relationship
between audit report qualifications and auditor
switching appears contradictory. Chow and Rice
(1982), Mutchler (1984) and Craswell (1988) find a
relationship between qualified audit reports and
auditor switching, although this is not supported
by Schwartz and Menon (1985).
Studies of the opinions of lending bankers
(Firth, 1980) and accountants (Mutchler, 1984; Holt
and Moizer, 1990) lend some credence to the fear
that a GCQ will itself lead to a company's failure:
the self-fulfilling prophecy argument. The UK
Auditing Guideline instruction to ignore such con-
siderations (APC, 1985, para. 32) is itself prima
facie evidence that such perceptions do exist.
The extant research tends to deal with the issues
of auditor competence and independence separately.
However, in the complexities of real life, these two
factors may not only be difficult to separate out but
may be interdependent (De Angelo, 1981a; Pear-
son, 1987). This study views auditor independence
and technical competence as inseparable dimen-
sions of the audit process. Only if the requirements
of both are met will the audit report be of value.
Hypotheses
We test primarily for the joint presence of compe-
tence and independence, although in some in-
stances (where competence is not at issue) the focus
is more specifically upon independence.
Our first three hypotheses relate to the association
between the likelihood of client failure and the GCQ
rate. Regarding auditor competence, the higher the
likelihood of failure the more straightforward will
be the judgment as to whether a client is suffering
going concern problems. Also, from the viewpoint
of independence. the greater the likelihood of client
failure, the higher will be the auditor's perceived
probability of losing that client. As a result, the
auditor's future economic interest in the client will
be lower, thus reducing the costs militating against
giving a GCQ. In addition, the higher the failure
probability, the lower the likelihood of damage to
the auditor's reputation from giving a GCQ.
The point of interest is how great must the
likelihood of failure be for the auditor to reach the
conclusion that a going concern uncertainty does
indeed exist and, having reached that conclusion,
for the independence of the auditor not be called
into question. In the absence of direct measures of
the objective likelihood of failure, we use as proxies
the time lag between publication of accounts and
failure, and the financial status of the client prior
to failure. We seek to test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The shorter the time between
audit report signature and failure the greater the
propensity for qualification.
Hypothesis 2: The weaker the financial position
of the failing company at the balance sheet date,
the more likely it is to have received a going
concern qualification.
Hypothesis 3: The more imminent failure is at
the date of accounts publication and the more
precarious the financial position, the more the pres-
sures on the auditor to qualify are compounded
leading to an increased probability that the failing
company receives a going concern qualification.
Following Altman (1982), the risk of bankruptcy
is measured using the z-score approach which
provides an unbiased statistical measure of com-
pany solvency (Taffier, 1983; 1984).
The next two hypotheses examine ways in which
a GCQ may itself increase the probability that the
audit firm will lose the client: auditor switching
(Hypothesis 4), and the self-fulfilling prophecy
(Hypothesis 5). To the extent that there is an
association between a GCQ and the auditor's
perception of the likelihood of auditor change
and/or failure induced by the GCQ itself, the
presence of going concern uncertainty is a situation
inherently threatening to independence.
In the case of the auditor switch argument,
auditor perception of the likelihood of client loss
cannot be measured directly. Following Schwartz
and Menon (1985), we therefore test for a relation-
ship between the actual presence of such a qualifi-
cation and a subsequent auditor switch:
Hypothesis 4: There will be a higher frequency
of auditor switching among companies that
have received a going concern qualification.°
The research cited above provides some evidence
on the self-fulfilling prophecy argument. However,
the proposition that GCQs actually precipitate
failure in cases where it would not otherwise have
occurred is difficult to test, since it is not possible
to ascertain what would have happened in the
absence of a GCQ. To explore this issue further, an
indirect approach is taken by comparing the failure
rate of qualified companies with that of a matched
group of non-qualified companies. Our prior
expectation, consistent with the self-fulfilling
prophecy argument, is:
Hypothesis 5: Qualified companies will exhibit a
higher rate of subsequent failure than a matched
group of non-qualified companies.
'We recognise that a change in auditors could be due to the
auditors' resigning their position as opposed to their being
removed by the company. However, even if it were the audit
firm that formally initiated the termination of the relationship.
this may be partially in response to a perceived threat of
dismissal. Auditor resignation in a potential GCQ situation
must cast some doubts on whether such auditors are carrying
out their duties towards shareholders fully independently.
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Hypothesis 6 analyses the relationship between
audit firm size and GCQ rates. In the GCQ
context, the larger the audit firm the less will be the
potential loss relative to the value of the firm's total
client portfolio should, for example. the client
switch auditors. Similarly, the larger the audit firm
the greater will be the potential loss of future
revenues due to loss of reputation if a GCQ is not
provided where appropriate. Moreover, in terms of
technical competence, the larger firm may be more
experienced in the audit of fully quoted companies,
to which the results of this paper relate:
Hypothesis 6: Failed companies which are au-
dited by larger firms should experience a higher
qualification rate than those audited by small
firms.
Data
Population and Sample Selection Criteria
Our results relate to fully quoted. independent
UK companies in manufacturing, construction,
wholesale and retail activities. Failure is defined as
being placed in receivership, creditors' voluntary
liquidation or being compulsorily wound up. An
audit report is defined as being qualified on a going
concern basis provided explicit reference is made in
it to the company's 'going concern' status.'
The data source used is the EXSTAT database
of company financial information provided by
Extel Financial Ltd. The data on failed companies
relate to the decade 1977-1986. Failed industrial
companies were identified from Extel Financial
Ltd's book CGT Capital Losses: Securities of Neg-
ligible Value, which provides a complete list of such
concerns.
Results for continuing (i.e. non-failed) compa-
nies are used in testing Hypotheses 4 and 5; the
data for these firms are for the period 1979-1986.
Hypothesis 4 (auditor switching) compares a
sample of continuing qualified companies with a
matched control group of continuing non-qualified
companies over this period. Hypothesis 5 (self-
fulfilling prophecy) compares all qualified compa-
nies (both failed and non-failed) over these years
with a matched group of non-qualified firms.
Non-failed companies with going concern quali-
fications were identified by reading the audit
'TThis explicit cnterion is used to avoid subjectivity. A small
number of cases were observed where audit reports were (i)
qualified on a 'subject to basis due to uncertainty surrounding
the company's financial position but with the term 'going
concern' not used, or (ii) where the going concern basis used for
drawing up the company's accounts and the surrounding
uncertainties are referred to not in the audit report itself but in
the directors' report or notes to the accounts. These cases were
not counted as going concern qualifications due to the (deliber-
ate?) ambiguity.
reports for all poorer performing companies in the
database.'
Schwartz and Menon (1985) stress the import-
ance of matching control groups of companies by
industry and size. In this study we match by a third
factor as well: financial status. This is because the
financial strength of a company may also affect its
tendency to switch auditors.?
Each qualified company is thus matched with an
unqualified company according to the following
criteria:
(i) by year;
(ii) by industry sector using the Financial
Times/Actuaries Classification;
(iii) by size based on turnover; and
(iv) by financial status. This is done using com-
panies' PAS (performance analysis scores),
which are the percentile rankings of their
z-scores for the year in question (Taffier,
1984).
Extent of GCQ among Failed and Non-Failed
Companies
Table 1 shows that. of the 107 quoted companies
that failed during the ten-year period 1977-86,
only 28 (26.2%) had their accounts qualified on a
going concern basis in the period immediately
prior to failure. Thus, in the remaining cases, the
audit report did not draw attention to the fact that
the company might not 'continue in operational
existence in the foreseeable future' (SSAP 2, ASC
1971). The Table also indicates that 27 of the 28
qualified companies incurred historical cost losses
before taxation in their last set of accounts.' By
contrast. only 52 (65.8%) of the 79 not qualified
companies incurred pre-tax losses. It would thus
appear that a pre-tax loss is a necessary, although
not a sufficient, condition for the auditor to issue
a going concern qualification."'
'Such companies were defined as those with a-scores
indicative of potential insolvency problems. i.e. z-score <
(Taller. 1983).
'In his related research into the costs to auditors of providing
a qualified audit opinion. Wilkerson (1987) emphasises the
importance of matching as closely as possible the underlying
economic uncertainty facing both the expenmental and the
control groups of companies.
'The one such company apparently reporting profits showed
a stated pre-tax profit of £1.7 m on turnover of £24 m but had
wrongly capitalised £4.6 m of losses. Thus It was, in fact, heavily
loss making.
'The difference between qualified and non-qualified compa-
nies is. not surpnungly, significant at better than cc—0.01
using the x2-test.
'In their study of the relationship between audit reports with
consistency exceptions and bankruptcy. Hopwood et a/. (1989)
suggest that auditors may insist more strongly on the appli-
cation of good accounting pnnciples when they perceive the
likelihood of failure to be high, so as to reduce any potential
liability. This may provide an alternative explanauon for the
virtual uniform presence of reported losses among companies
with GCQs.
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Not qualified on going concern basis: 79 73.8% 52(65.8%)
107 100.0% 5 (73.8%)
To ascertain whether the imminent failure of the
28 qualified companies was public knowledge prior
to their receiving the qualification, financial press
reports were examined. In at least 20 (71%) out of
the 28 cases, the weak financial status of the
company was either public knowledge prior to the
issuing of the audit report or the company's finan-
cial situation was so critical that the auditors
would have been negligent to an exceptional extent
had they not issued such a qualification.
A low going concern qualification rate among
failed companies, however, may be explained by
failure being caused by factors that could not have
been reasonably foreseen at the time the accounts
were signed. The histories of the 79 non-qualified
companies subsequent to the date of publication of
their last accounts were studied using financial press
reports. Such potential causes of failure could be
identified in only nine (11.4%) of the 79 cases."
Thus. 70 (65.4%) of the 107 failed companies had
not been qualified on a going concern basis nor could
we discover from publicly available information
any event that might have explained their downfall.
The GCQ rate for non-failed but 'at risk' com-
panies in the population was analysed to provide
a benchmark for comparison with the GCQ rate
among failed firms." For companies failing in the
eight-year period 1979-1986, for which data on
non-failed firms were available. the GCQ rate was
25.3%. However. only 5.9% of non-failed 'at risk'
"Any such analysis has a subjective element. Thus, we
included not only major events but also those which would not
normally have brought about the failure of a reasonably healthy
enterprise but may arguably have provided the 'straw that
broke the camel's back' for a company that was already
financially vulnerable.
' 2 A set of accounts is deemed to relate to a non-failed
company if that company published a subsequent set of ac-
counts. A company is considered 'at risk' if it shows a negative
z-score (Taftler. 1983).
"Twenty-one out of 83 failed firms were given GCQs. as were
65 out of the 1107 sets of accounts of non-failed firms with
negative z-scores.	 = 43.5 with 1 degree of freedom,
(a =
 0.001)- 10.81.
14The equivalent population GCQ rate for all non-failed firms
was 0.9%,
companies were so qualified, a difference signifi-
cant at better than the 0.1% level.3.14
It is often argued that it is not the auditor's
role to predict business failure (e.g. Altman. 1982).
However, there is little evidence as to how
auditors actually perceive their responsibilities
in this connection. The UK Auditing Guideline
requires a statement in the financial statements
or a reference in the audit report if there is
significant uncertainty about a company's
going concern status, even if, for some reason, this
would have no impact on the recoverability or
classification of balance sheet items (APC, 1985.
para. 31). In a similar vein. SAS No. 59
(AICPA. 1988) requires auditors to report on
going concern uncertainties even where asset
recoverability and liability classification are not
affected.
Adopting the view that the audit report
should be signalling any significant uncertainty
about a company's going concern status, one
would expect a preponderance of failed
companies to receive a going concern qualification
in the reporting period prior to failure. This.
however, is demonstrably not supported by the
evidence.' 5 - 16 Nonetheless, the GCQ rate for failed
firms is significantly higher than for 'at risk' non-
failed firms.
"The US going concern qualification rate among 65 failed
companies (compiled from Altman. 1982. Tables 3 and 5) of
48% for the 1977-1982 period is statistically significantly higher
(at = 0.01 using the y. 2 test) than the 24% rate in = 79) in this
study for the same period in the UK. Menon and Schwartz
(1986) report a GC qualification rate of 43% for the period
1974-1983 in the US. similar to that of Altman. Whereas the
bankruptcy procedures differ to some extent between the two
countries, an additional explanation for these results may reside
in features of the regulatory and legal environment in the US
that provide a stronger system of support for auditor indepen-
dence.
' 6Hopwood et al. (1989) find that the GCQ still has significant
explanatory power in distinguishing between bankrupt and
non-bankrupt companies and might therefore serve as an
early-warning signal for corporate failure. They point out that
due to the relative infrequencies of the bankruptcy and GCQ
events, this potential predictive power is not inconsistent with
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failing companies qualified 43 15 26
Tests of hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Time Lag between Publication of
Accounts and Failure
The average time delay between publication of
the last accounts prior to failure and the failure
event itself' was 7.9 months. For qualified com-
panies. the average time lag was only 5.5 months
whereas, for companies without the qualification,
it was 8.7 months." Table 2 provides a more
detailed analysis of these lags. The fundamental
goin g concern concept laid down in SSAP 2 (ASC.
1971) indicates that, unless stated otherwise, a
company's accounts are drawn up on the basis that
the 'enterprise will continue in operational exist-
ence for the foreseeable future'. This is interpreted
in the UK Auditing Guideline: The Auditor's
Considerations in Respect of Going Concern (AFC.
1985 para. 8) as a period 'normally extending to a
minimum of six months following the date of the
audit report or one year after the balance sheet
date, whichever is the later'.
Table 2 shows that, while 43% of companies
that failed within six months of account publi-
cation (effectively synonymous with audit report
date) were qualified. only 15% of those failing
more than six months after publication were
qualified. This difference is statistically significant
at better than the 5% level using the x = test.' Of
the 65 companies in Table 2 that failed more than
six months after publication of the accounts. five
failed before the next balance sheet date. Of these,
however, only one received a GCQ. Thus, of the
total of 47 companies failing within the Auditing
Guideline's overall definition of 'foreseeable
future', only 19 (40%) received a going concern
qualification. We may conclude that, although the
evidence again highlights the low qualification rate,
it does support Hypothesis 1: that there is an
inverse association between propensity to qualify
and time between date of publication and failure.
"Date of failure is defined as the date of suspension of stock
market listing immediately pnor to receivership, liquidation,
etc.
"The difference is statistically significant at cc = 0.01 using
the test of sample means. Peel (1989) reports similar results for
an earlier time penod.
= 5.55 with 1 degree of freedom, Lin, (z =0.05) = 3.8.
Hypothesis 2. Relationship between Financial Status
and Qualification
To obtain an objective measure of the failed
companies' financial position as revealed in their
last set of accounts, an enhancement of the conven-
tional z-score approach termed the 'risk index' or
'z-score of z-scores' is used (Tattler. 1984). This
linear additive weighted composite model is de-
rived from three factors: the number of years the
company has been registering an 'at risk' (i.e.
failing profile) z-score. the size of the at risk z-score
and the rate of decline in the company's z-score.
The more years at risk, the lower is the score; and
the steeper the downward trend, the higher is the
risk index. The index provides an assessment of
probability of financial distress in the next year on
a 1-5 scale!'
Table 3 compares the risk rating distributions of
the 107 failed companies according to 'low' (risk
ratings 3) or 'high' (risk rating 4) probability
of financial distress. The Table shows that 22
(39%) of the 57 companies with a high probability
of financial distress received going concern qualifi-
cations. However, only six (12%) of the 50 com-
panies exhibiting low probability of distress were
so qualified. This difference is significant at the 1%
level using the x 2 test. 2 ' Thirty-five (44%) of the
non-qualified companies were 'in the high prob-
ability of distress category.
This evidence is supportive of Hypothesis 2: that
the weaker the financial status of the company, the
more likely it is to be qualified on a going concern
Hypothesis 3. Combined Effect of Time Period to
Failure and Financial Status
Table 4 classifies the 107 failed companies ac-
cording to 'likelihood of failure' at the date of
publication of the final set of accounts. 'Likelihood
"Taller (1984, Table 3) provides cumulative probability of
failure risk index statistics for the then prevailing economic
climate. He shows, ex post, a risk index 4 is associated with an
80% probability of financial distress in the next year.
21 XL, 9.7 with 1 degree of freedom, Lin, (x = 0.01) -6.6.
12These results are consistent with those of Peel (1989) who,
using a logit model, found for a sample of failed UK quoted
companies that those receiving a GCQ were more severely
financially distressed than those not so qualified.
Table 4
Combined Analysis of Period to Failure and Risk Category by Audit Report Status
Likelihood of Failure at Date
of Accounts Publication
Low High Total
Qualified on going concern basis 12 16 28




°A of failing companies qualified 15 59 26
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Table 3
Risk Rating of Failed Companies by Audit Report Status
Probability of Financial Distress
'Low' 'High' Total
Qualified on going concern basis 6 22 28
Not so qualified 44 35 79
50 57 107
°A of failing companies qualified 12 39 26
'Low': risk rating 3.
'High': risk rating 4.
of failure' is defined as a function of period to
failure and financial status. A company whose final
accounts exhibit a high risk rating and which
subsequently fails within six months of accounts
publication is defined as having a high likelihood
of failure. The three other possible combinations
are classified as low likelihood of failure.
Table 4 shows that 59% of the companies with
a high likelihood of failure were qualified on a
going concern basis. This can be contrasted with
the lower qualification rates of 43% for short
period alone (see Table 2) and 39% for high risk
rating alone (see Table 3). The difference in the
rates of qualification between low and high likeli-
hood of failure samples (15% and 59%) shown in
Table 4 is statistically significant at better than the
0.1% level using the x 2 test.23.24
Hypothesis 3 is strongly supported by the evi-
dence. The more imminent failure is and the
weaker the company's financial position, the
higher the probability of receiving a going concern
qualification. This finding appears to underline the
degree of certainty the auditor seems to require
before giving a qualification.
— 20.44 with 1 degree of freedom,	 (x = 0.001) =
10.8.
'Perhaps just as interesting is the comparison between high
likelihood of failure firms and those which exhibit either high
probability of financial distress or period to failure less than sot
months but not both. For the latter sample of 45 concerns only
eight were qualified on a going concern basis (18%). The
relevant X 2 statistic to test for significant difference in qualifica-
tion rates is 13.1 for I degree of freedom which is significant at
better than 0.1%. ;dm (x = 0.001) = 10.8.
To explore this issue further two logit models
were fitted to the 107 case data, with the dependent
variable indicating a going concern qualification or
not and the independent variables representing
time delay and degree of risk. The derived models
took the following form:25
1/21n(p,/{1 — p,})+ 5
. 3.74 + 0.642 delay + 0.699 risk	 (1)
(0.256)	 (0.241)	 - (0.265)
and
1/2 ln(p,1{1 —p,}) +5
= 4.13 + 1.055 (delay x risk)	 (2)
(0.157)	 (0.251)
where p, is the probability of a going concern
qualification for firm
delay 1 if the accounts are published within 6
months of failure
=0 otherwise
and risk = 1 if `high' risk rating
=0 if not.
A `high likelihood of failure' is represented by
delay x risk = 1 in model 2. The standard errors
are provided below the variable coefficients.
By ranking the estimated probabilities and as-
signing the cut-offs at the 28th ranked company, in
both cases, 12 of the 28 qualified statements (43%)
"The models were derived using the maximum likelihood








Going Concern - No Going Concern
Qualification	 Qualification Total
Auditor switch 8 10
No auditor switch 53 59 112
61 61 122
% Auditor switches 13.1 3.3 8.2
Table 6
Companies Receiving a GCQ, 1979-1986
No %




*Of these, two qualifications (suffered by one company) were followed
by a third qualification and then failure: and two qualifications (separate
companies) were each followed by a second qualification and then
acquisition.
were predicted as non-qualified, but only 11 of the
79 non-qualified (14%) were misclassified." Again
we have strong evidence to support the thesis that
the auditor will only qualify in extremis.
Hypothesis 4. Relationship between Going Concern
Qualifications and Auditor Switching
We explore this by analysing auditor switch
rates among continuing companies!' The hypoth-
esis of a higher rate of auditor switching among
qualified companies is tested by comparing the
experience of qualified non-failed companies with
a control group of matched non-qualified compa-
nies. The database contained 61 cases of going
concern qualification for 38 continuing com-
panies' with financial year-ends between 1979 and
1986. The control sample was derived as outlined
in the Data section above.
"We exclude consideration of differential misclassification
costs because of the problems in determining their magnitude
in this situation. Dopuch et al. (1987) and Hopwood et al.
(1989) resolve this issue in a related situation by providing a
wide range of cost considerations.
'Intended auditor switch rates among the 107 failed compa-
nies in our sample were also examined. There was an indication
given in nine cases (8.4%), usually in the Directors Report, of
company management intention to switch auditors in the
following year. The number of such cases is too small to test for
any significant differences between the qualified and non-
qualified sub-samples.
"These totals exclude four cases of firms acquired in the
following year with resulting auditor switch to that of the new
parent.
Following Chow and Rice (1982) and Schwartz
and Menon (1985), we explore auditor switches
occurring within one year of a qualification, as
beyond this period other factors may intervene.
Table 5 shows that, of the 61 audit reports avail-
able for each group, 13.1% of the qualified com-
panies switched auditors in the following year,
while only 3.3% of the non-qualified companies
did so, a result just significant at the 10% level.'
The difference in auditor switching rates between
matched samples of qualified and non-qualified
companies is in the hypothesised direction and
appears statistically significant at the 10% level. As
such we have some evidence that auditor switch
rates may vary depending on the presence or
otherwise of a going concern qualification."
Hypothesis 5. Relationship between Receipt of Going
Concern Qualification and Likelihood of Failure
Table 6 summarises the subsequent events that
befell the companies concerned in the 86 cases of
= 2.72 with 1 degree of freedom, and making the
continuity correction, dr„( x = 0.1) = 2.71.
wrhis analysis tests for the objective fact of auditor switch-
ing. A related issue is whether those GCQ companies switching
auditors subsequently also received a GCQ from the new
incumbent. Of the eight cases in question, seven were actually
unqualified in their first report from the new auditors. Of these
seven, only two showed a significant financial recovery in terms
of achieving a positive z-score. This Issue merits further
investigation.
Table 7
GCQ Rates for Failed Companies by Audit Firm Size
Audit Firm Size
Big 9 Non Big 9 Total
Qualified on going concern basis 9 19 28
Not so qualified 29 50 795 107
% of failing companies qualified 24 28 26
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accounts with GCQs in year-ends between 1979
and 1986. Only 21 GCQs (24%) were followed by
failure; 61 (71%) were cases of non-failure as
defined above. To explore whether these results are
consistent with the self-fulfilling prophecy argu-
ment, the subsequent events befalling the above 86
GCQ companies were compared with those for a
matched sample of 86 non-qualified companies.3'
This matching was carried out on the same basis
as for Hypothesis 4, except that the control group
was not now limited to non-failed companies.
Whereas 21 of the 86 GCQ companies failed
before publishing another set of accounts, effec-
tively the same number (22) of the 86 non-qualified
companies also experienced failure. On this basis
we have no evidence that failure is more likely to
follow upon a GCQ than upon a non-qualified
report, a finding not supportive of the objective
existence of the self-fulfilling prophecy effect as set
out in Hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 6. Going Concern Qualification Rates
among Audit Firms of Different Sizes
Table 7 sets out the going concern qualification
rates among the failed clients of the Big Nine UK
audit firms as compared with those of non-Big
Nine audit firms in our sample. The rate of qualifi-
cation was 24% for Big Nine clients as compared
with 28% for non-Big Nine clients. As such, we are
not justified in rejecting the null position that failed
clients of larger audit firms should experience a
higher qualification rate.
This inconclusive finding may be indicative of
the contrary cost pressures at work on audit firms,
referred to above. Thus, following De Angelo
(198 lb and 1981c), larger firms may exhibit greater
independence (and hence, we argue, be more likely
to qualify) owing to the collateral effect of their
relatively large client base. 33 On the other hand,
"We are indebted to one of the referees for suggesting this
methodological approach.
'For the penod covered by this research, the Big Nine UK
audit firms were Arthur Andersen. Arthur Young McClelland
Moores. Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte Haskins & Sells. Ernst
& Whinney, Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price Waterhouse.
Thomson McLintock and Touche Ross.
33Competence may also be enhanced by firm size as argued
in the Hypotheses section.
Mutchler (1986) points to the financially weaker
client base of smaller audit firms, inclining them to
be more likely to give going concern qualifications.
Furthermore it is possible that larger firms may be
subject to greater competitive pressures.
Summary and conclusions
This paper seeks to assess the value of the audit
report in going concern uncertainty situations. An
audit report is deemed of value if it results from
both a technically competent and independent
audit process. The paper explores the association
between rates of going concern qualification
(GCQ), representing auditor decision outcomes,
and those factors which might influence the audi-
tor's competence and independence. The study is
based on an analysis of GCQ rates in the UK
during the decade 1977-1986 when only 26% of
failing companies in our sample were qualified on
a GC basis prior to bankruptcy.
A positive relationship is found between the
objective likelihood of company failure and the
probability of a GCQ. However, the GCQ rate
appears low unless the likelihood of failure is very
high. Only a combination of both a very weak
financial position and imminence of the failure
event produces a GCQ rate in excess of 50% for
failed companies. This evidence may be consistent
with auditors displaying a relatively low level of
competence. Alternatively, auditors may be assign-
ing a relatively high weight to those factors militat-
ing against giving a GCQ in order to preserve their
future economic interest in the client, unless the
likelihood of failure is in fact very great. It would,
therefore, appear that both issues of auditor
competence and auditor independence may
demand attention in the context of GCQ decisions.
Sampled companies with GCQs exhibit a stat-
istically significant (at the 10% level) higher rate of
auditor switching. This finding may support the
perception that fear of auditor switching could
influence the audit firm against giving a GCQ. This
is an area where further research may be war-
ranted. Furthermore, there may well be a dis-
crepancy between the objective likelihood of losing
the client, as studied here, and the auditor's percep-
tion of this likelihood.
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Paradoxically, the majority of companies receiv-
ing a GCQ survive. The implication is that the
fear of a self-fulfilling prophecy should not present
a threat to auditor independence. To examine
this issue more explicitly, the failure rates of
matched samples of qualified and non-qualified
companies were compared directly. No difference
whatsoever was found. Our evidence provides no
support for the objective reality of the self-fulfilling
prophecy argument. Further research may need
to focus on perceptual issues and beliefs of the
parties involved rather more than on the objective
reality.
The group of UK Big Nine firms is not found to
provide a consistently higher rate of GCQs than
other audit firms, thus suggesting that concern
regarding the relative degree of independence and
audit quality of smaller firms may be overstated.
However, to gain a deeper understanding of the
impact of audit firm size, further research needs to
consider alternative ways of partitioning by size,
and analysing firms' client health profiles.
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